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Abstract
In this thesis, I develop two sets of methods to help understand two distinct but also
related issues in financial economics.
First, representative agent models have been successfully applied to explain asset
market phenomenons. They are often simple to work with and appeal to intuition by
permitting a direct link between the agent’s optimization behavior and asset market
dynamics. However, their particular modeling choices sometimes yield undesirable
or even counterintuitive consequences. Several diagnostic tools have been developed
by the asset pricing literature to detect these unwanted consequences. I contribute
to this literature by developing a new continuum of nonparametric asset pricing
bounds to diagnose representative agent models. Chapter 1 lays down the theoretical
framework and discusses its relevance to existing approaches. Empirically, it uses
bounds implied by index option returns to study a well-known class of representative
agent models — the rare disaster models. Chapter 2 builds on the insights of Chapter
1 to study dynamic models. It uses model implied conditional variables to sharpen
asset pricing bounds, allowing a more powerful diagnosis of dynamic models.
While the first two chapters focus on the diagnosis of a particular model, Chapter
3 and 4 study the joint inference of a group of models or risk factors. Drawing on
multiple hypothesis testing in the statistics literature, Chapter 3 shows that many of
the risk factors documented by the academic literature are likely to be false. It also
proposes a new statistical framework to study multiple hypothesis testing under test
iv
correlation and hidden tests. Chapter 4 further studies the statistical properties of
this framework through simulations.
v
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1Introduction
1.1 Index Option Returns and Generalized Entropy Bounds
Asset markets generate risk and return characteristics that continuously challenge
our thinking. To rationalize market abnormalities, economists create models under a
few generally accepted economic principles. These models are constantly scrutinized
and possibly rejected with the advent of new empirical findings, and new models
are again proposed to accommodate new findings. In this process, a few important
diagnostic tools have been developed by the literature to restrict the behavior of a
plausible model. For instance, under the basic no-arbitrage condition, Hansen and
Jagannathan (HJ, 1991) construct bounds on the second moment of the stochastic
discount factor for a given asset menu. This nonparametric bound provides a simple
way to summarize asset market data and helps screen candidate discount factors.
Snow (1991) extends their work by showing how to bound higher moments of the
pricing kernel. Bansal and Lehmann (BL, 1997) and Alvarez and Jermann (AJ,
2005) derive restrictions on entropy, a separate metric on dispersion, based on the
equity risk premium. Stutzer (1995) proposes an information bound that minimizes
1
the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion. These nonparametric bounds rely on the
fundamental no-arbitrage condition and provide unique lens through which we can
characterize asset market data, diagnose existing asset pricing models, and design
new models to explain a larger set of empirical regularities.
I contribute to this literature by providing a unifying theory on non-parametric
bounds. Starting from the no-arbitrage condition alone, I show the existence of a
continuum of bounds that restrict the δ-th norm of the pricing kernel, with δ P
p8, 0q Y p0, 1q. Next, I show that these bounds can be naturally interpreted as
restrictions placed by an optimizing investor with a power utility function. In par-
ticular, I define an augmented return space with respect to a pricing kernel and
show that an agent’s portfolio choice problem based on this augmented return space
imposes a constraint on moments of the pricing kernel. In a strict duality sense, I
show that my approach is complementary to the Hansen and Jagannathan approach.
Motivated by the similarities between my bounds and the BL/AJ entropy bound, I
complete my bound spectrum by showing that the entropy bound is a limiting case
of my bounds. Finally, I describe the nonparametric bound universe and discuss its
exhaustiveness.
To facilitate the application of my bounds, I propose a new metric termed the
generalized entropy function. It is a natural generalization of the entropy concept
(Stutzer, 1996, Backus, Chernov and Zin, 2011, Hansen and Sargent, 2008) and
encodes all the information of a pricing kernel. The system of new nonparamet-
ric bounds can then be brought in to restrict the generalized entropy function of
the pricing kernel. Through Taylor series expansions, similar to Martin (2008) and
Backus, Chernov and Martin (BCM, 2011), I show how various moments of the pric-
ing kernel contribute to the generalized entropy function and more importantly, how
weighted asset return moments provide information on the entropy function. An
example featuring a finite state complete market economy is given to gain insights
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into the workings of bounds.
For empirical applications, I attack the pseudo problem in a well-known class of
models. Rare disaster models, as pioneered by Rietz (1988) and recently rejuvenated
by a sequence of papers by Robert Barro and his coauthors ( Barro, 2006, Barro
and Ursua, 2008 and Barro et al., 2009), use tail information to explain market ab-
normalities, in particular the equity risk premium. The inherent difficulty for this
strand of literature is on how to measure events that only happen rarely. Similar
to BCM, who gauge disaster models’ performances against index option data along
several metrics, I also use option data to infer tail information in the pricing kernel.
Unlike BCM, I consider static portfolio strategies involving option returns and rely
on nonparametric bounds to study the tail behavior. My approach is different from
and advantageous over BCM in several respects. First, no specific assumption is
made on the connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and the market port-
folio. As a result, my results are robust to model misspecifications. Second, instead
of fitting a parametric model and using it to summarize the option cross-section, I
take the realized option returns as given and study their implications on the pricing
kernel. This again alleviates the goodness-of-fit concern of empirical option pricing
models. Finally, a formal statistical framework is developed to test model perfor-
mances. This not only allows us to consider multiple assets simultaneously but also
generates statistical significance for different model configurations.
Turning to the empirical findings, I first document the unique moment charac-
teristics of trading strategies involving deep out-of-the-money (OTM) put options
from a nonparametric bound perspective. Bounds implied by OTM puts universally
dominate bounds implied by either the market index or risk-neutral straddles. This
highlights the pricing of jump risks in OTM puts, and is precisely the type of in-
formation one needs to bear on models with tail risks. Next, I use data implied
bounds to confront standard rare disaster models. As a first step, I mark up the
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permissible parameter region in which all nonparametric bounds are simultaneously
satisfied. Through this process, the discriminatory power of the newly developed
bounds stands out. More importantly, my bounds allow me to better distinguish
alternative tail specifications with asset market data alone, offering a way to circum-
vent the pseudo problem for disaster models. Lastly, to take statistical uncertainty
into account, I develop a formal testing framework that can accommodate multiple
assets and different types of bounds. Under this framework, I reject the benchmark
disaster model and a few alternative specifications.1 Nonetheless, the model’s ability
of approaching asset market bounds does look impressive and I believe the idea of
raising pricing kernel dispersion through tail distortions is promising. Taken as a
whole, my results suggest more sophisticated specifications of disaster models, pos-
sibly through the time-dependency of disaster probabilities along the lines of Barro
and Ursua (2008) and Watcher (2008).
1.1.1 Diagnosing Dynamic Asset Pricing Models with Generalized Entropy Bounds
Modern asset pricing theory makes tremendous progress towards reconciling asset
market movements and macroeconomic fundamentals. Prominent examples, includ-
ing the long-run risks, habit and rare disaster models, rely on predictable variations
and/or higher order moments of macroeconomic quantities to explain market re-
turns. As a result, the corresponding discount factors also feature time-varying state
variables and/or skewed and heavy-tailed innovations. Despite their differences in
macroeconomic dynamics and preference orderings, they share one common feature:
the pricing kernel departs from log-normality unconditionally and displays higher
order moments, especially over long horizons. For instance, the long-run risks model
1More specifically, I reject the benchmark disaster model in Barro (2006) and a few other
parameterizations at 5% significance. As a comparison across different parameterizations, I find
that models that feature larger and less frequent jumps are rejected more strongly than models
that feature smaller but more frequent jumps.
4
highlights the fluctuating quantities of risks. When integrated over time, the uncon-
ditional pricing kernel becomes heavy-tailed due to the mixing of normal shocks.2
The disaster model, on the other hand, relies on infrequent downside movements of
fundamentals and thus displays skew by assumption. The question is: How do we
measure higher order moments of the pricing kernel and, more importantly, how does
financial market data bear on these measures?
I use the generalized entropy developed in Liu (2012) to capture higher order
moments of the pricing kernel. As shown in Liu (2012), the generalized entropy takes
a system of nonlinear power transformations of the pricing kernel to characterize
its unconditional moments. Moreover, market returns provide robust restrictions
on these moments through the generalized entropy bounds. To facilitate the study
of dynamic asset pricing models, I extend Liu (2012) in two important aspects.
First, I apply the generalized entropy to multi-horizon pricing kernels. Second, I use
conditioning information to sharpen inference with the generalized entropy bounds.
Both ingredients are necessary to differentiate candidate models by making full use
of financial market data.
My research is related to a recent paper by Backus, Chernov and Zin (BCZ, 2011)
who evaluate representative agent models using entropy and bond yields. Their
entropy measure is shown to be a special case of the generalized entropy, and is
hence termed the basic entropy. Taking both the long-run risks and habit models as
examples, I argue that the generalized entropy is able to reveal important moment
characteristics of the pricing kernel that is missed by the basic entropy. In addition,
conditioning information allows me to directly test predictability assumptions, which
are the key to leading asset pricing models.
Using the generalized entropy as a diagnostic tool, I examine dynamic asset pric-
ing models. Without conditioning information, I find that the habit model by Chan
2See Hansen and Scheinkman (2013).
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and Kogan (2002) cannot generate enough higher order moments (i.e., third moments
and beyond) to meet the generalized entropy bounds with certain powers. The rejec-
tion is statistically significant. This finding agrees with BCZ but strengthens their
results as their rejection is only true in mean. With conditioning information, I find
mild statistical evidence to reject the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit model. In
particular, dynamic strategies that exploit time-varying economic uncertainty imply
utility gains that are too high for the Campbell-Cochrane model to reconcile. The
long-run risks model survives both exercises.
1.2 . . . and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns
Forty years ago, one of the first tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
found that the market beta was a significant explanator of the cross-section of ex-
pected returns. The reported t-ratio of 2.57 in Fama and MacBeth (1973) comfort-
ably exceeded the usual cutoff of 2.0. However, since that time, hundreds of papers
have tried to explain the cross-section of expected returns. Given the known num-
ber of factors that have been tried and the reasonable assumption that many more
factors have been tried but did not make it to publication, the usual cutoff levels for
statistical significance are not appropriate. We present a new framework that allows
for multiple tests and derive recommended statistical significance levels for current
research in asset pricing.
We begin with 312 papers that study cross-sectional return patterns published in
a selection of journals. We provide recommended p-values from the first empirical
tests in 1967 through to present day. We also project minimum t-ratios through 2032
assuming the rate of “factor production” remains similar to the recent experience.
We present a taxonomy of historical factors as well as definitions.3
3We also provide a link to a file with full references and hyperlinks to the original articles:
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/˜charvey/Factor-List.xlsx.
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Our research is related to a recent paper by McLean and Pontiff (2013) who argue
that certain stock market anomalies are less anomalous after being published.4 Their
paper tests the statistical biases emphasized in Leamer (1978), Ross (1989), Lo and
MacKinlay (1990), Fama (1991) and Schwert (2003).
Our paper also adds to the recent literature on biases and inefficiencies in cross-
sectional regression studies. Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010) critique the usual
practice of using cross-sectional R2s and pricing errors to judge the success of a
work and show that the explanatory powers of many previously documented factors
are spurious.5 Balduzzi and Robotti (2008) challenge the traditional approach of
estimating factor risk premia via cross-sectional regressions and advocate a factor
projection approach. Our work focuses on evaluating the statistical significance of a
factor given the previous tests on other factors. Our goal is to use a multiple testing
framework to both re-evaluate past research and to provide a new benchmark for
current and future research.
We tackle multiple hypothesis testing from the frequentist perspective. Bayesian
approaches on multiple testing and variable selection also exist. However, the high
dimensionality of the problem combined with the fact that we do not observe all the
factors that have been tried poses a big challenge for Bayesian methods. While we
propose a frequentist approach to overcome this missing data issue, it is unclear how
to do this in the Bayesian framework. Nonetheless, we provide a detailed discussion
of Bayesian methods in the paper.
There are limitations to our framework. First, should all factor discoveries be
treated equally? We think no. A factor derived from a theory should have a
lower hurdle than a factor discovered from a purely empirical exercise. Neverthe-
4Other recent papers that systematically study the cross-sectional return patterns include Sub-
rahmanyam (2010), Green, Hand and Zhang (2012, 2013).
5A related work by Daniel and Titman (2012) constructs more powerful statistical tests and
rejects several recently proposed factor models.
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less, whether suggested by theory or empirical work, a t-ratio of 2.0 is too low.
Second, our tests focus on unconditional tests. It is possible that a particular fac-
tor is very important in certain economic environments and not important in other
environments. The unconditional test might conclude the factor is marginal. These
two caveats need to be taken into account when using our recommended significance
levels for current asset pricing research.
While our focus is on the cross-section of equity returns, our message applies to
many different areas of finance. For instance, Frank and Goyal (2009) investigate
around 30 variables that have been documented to explain capital structure decisions
of public firms. Welch and Goyal (2004) examine the performance of a dozen variables
that have been shown to predict market excess returns. These two applications are
ideal settings to employ multiple testing methods.6
1.3 Multiple Testing in Financial Economics
In many areas of economic research, answers to broad research questions emerge
through time via various studies. For example, in development economics, scores
of papers have tried to explain why countries grow at different rates.7 In financial
economics, hundreds to factors have been proposed to explain the cross-section of
stock returns.8 Similar to the meta-analysis approach in medical research, it is often
useful to compare results from different studies. Multiple hypothesis testing is an
essential tool for such an exercise. We propose a new method of multiple testing
that accounts for both correlation of the tests and the fact that the meta-researcher
is faced with limited data — often in the form of test statistics from previously
published papers.
6Harvey and Liu (2014a) show how to adjust Sharpe Ratios used in performance evaluation for
multiple tests.
7See Petrakos et. al (2007) for a recent review on economic growth.
8See Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2013b), McLean and Pontiff (2013) and Subrahmanyam (2010).
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When testing multiple hypotheses, the primary challenge is to guard against
false positive results. The statistics literature has established many criteria of Type
I error rates in the context of multiple testing. Two commonly used criteria are the
family-wise error rate (FWER) and the false discovery rate (FDR).9 FWER is the
probability of making at least one false discovery. FDR is the expected proportion of
falsely rejected hypotheses. Many alternative definitions of error rates exist that try
to modify the traditional FDR. These error rate definitions are useful in that they
help us evaluate the accept/reject decisions for a set of hypothesis tests as a whole.
Several methods have been proposed to control the various error rates. The most
familiar methods for controlling FWER are the Bonferroni correction and the Holm
(1979) correction. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) propose a step-down procedure to
control FDR under independent test statistics. Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) show
that the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure also controls FDR under certain dependence
structure. They also propose a modified procedure that controls FDR under arbitrary
dependence structure. These methods are simple to use as they only involve the
summary t-statistics or p-values for each individual hypothesis test. However, they
are designed to control FWER or FDR under a general data structure and are often
too conservative (i.e., too few true discoveries) for the particular data at hand.
Another strand of literature suggests a bootstrap based permutation approach.10
The permutation test resamples the entire dataset several times and constructs an
empirical distribution for the pool of test statistics. The empirical distribution then
serves as the reference distribution for determining the cutoff values. This approach
incorporates the data structure, in particular the correlation structure among the
individual test statistics. Therefore, it is less conservative than the aforementioned
9Holm (1979) is the first to formally define the family-wise error rate (FWER). Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995) define the false discovery rate (FDR).
10See Westfall and Young (1993) and Ge et al. (2003).
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methods. However, permutation tests are computationally challenging. Moreover,
permutation tests also require the knowledge of each individual dataset based on
which the t-statistic or p-value constructed. In cases when this information is not
available, permutation tests are not feasible.
Unfortunately, many interesting empirical inquiries in economics and science do
not align with both the simple adjustment (e.g., Bonferroni and Benjamini-Hochberg
procedure) and the permutation resampling approach. First, many economic vari-
ables are influenced by common shocks and are, hence, correlated. This means
simple adjustment like Bonferroni or Benjamini-Hochberg are overly conservative
and misleading as independence among test statistics is unrealistic. Ideally, corre-
lation should be modeled so that its impact on multiple testing can be evaluated.
Second, when a collection of previous studies are pooled together, we often do not
have the luxury of having the original dataset for each study. All we have is the
single test statistic that summarizes the significance a research finding. For example,
Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2013b) study more than 300 factors that purportedly explain
the cross-section of stock returns. It would be infeasible for them to rebuild each of
the original datasets. In this case, permutation tests cannot be used.
We propose a new framework that makes it easy to evaluate the impact of corre-
lation while at the same time only using summary statistics. We start by modeling
the distribution of null hypotheses. Motivated by standard Bayesian hypothesis
testing, we use a parametric mixture distribution to succinctly capture how null and
non-null hypotheses are drawn. Next, we decompose commonly used test statistics
into the sum of score statistics and use the Pearson correlation among the contem-
poraneous score statistics to model the dependence among test statistics. Then, we
estimate model parameters by matching key moments of model implied and observed
summary statistics. Finally, we find the threshold levels for hypothesis testing by
equaling the exactly calculated Type I error rate under the estimated parameter
10
values to a pre-specified significance level.
Our method achieves similar goals as many methods in meta-analysis in medical
research. In meta-analysis, researchers combine samples of multiple studies to gain
statistical power in detecting subtle effects. Recent advances in meta-analysis11 make
it possible to combine results even without individual-sample data. Our method is
different from these studies in an important way. The individual studies in meta-
analysis usually have a common null (e.g., a gene type does not affect a certain trait)
and alternative hypothesis (e.g., how much a gene type affects a certain trait). In
other words, the joint null and alternative hypothesis in multiple testing is exactly
the same as the null and alternative hypothesis for each individual test. This makes
the calculation of Type I error rate straightforward as everything is conditional on
the common null being true. In our context, although under the cover of a broad
question, different studies are testing different hypotheses. As a result, the composite
alternative hypothesis is much more complicated than in traditional meta-analyses.
This makes the calculation of certain Type I error rate (e.g., FDR) impossible using
the prevalent methods. We overcome this problem by postulating a probabilistic
model for the set of null hypotheses.
1.4 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical frame-
work of generalized entropy bounds and relates to existing nonparametric bounds.
It then makes inference on disaster models using bounds implied by index option
returns. Chapter 3 follows the insights of Chapter 2 to study dynamic models. It
incorporates model implied state variables as conditioning information to further
distinguish candidate models. Chapter 4 first documents more than 300 risk factors
that have been discovered by the academic literature. It then introduces a multiple
11See Conneely and Boehnke (2007, 2010).
11
testing framework to adjust the t-ratios of these factors. It also proposes a new mul-
tiple testing framework that can simultaneously model test correlation and hidden
tests. Chapter 5 studies this new framework in greater detail through a simulation
study.
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2Index Option Returns and Generalized Entropy
Bounds
2.1 A unifying theory on non-parametric bounds
Hansen and Jaganathan (1991), Snow (1991), Bansal and Lehmann (1997) and Al-
varez and Jermann (2005) derive non-parametric bounds under the basic no-arbitrage
condition. Depending on the forms of the non-linear transformations of the pricing
kernel, strong no-arbitrage condition may be required to generate meaningful bounds.
For instance, the entropy bound employs a logarithmic transformation of the pricing
kernel. As a result, it only makes sense if the pricing kernel is strictly positive with
probability one. To the contrary, the variance bound by Hansen and Jaganathan
(1991) in general has no sign restrictions 1 since the pricing kernel is raised to the
second power. To be specific about the asset pricing environment and facilitate dis-
cussion, I briefly introduce some notations that will be used throughout the paper.
Let ℵ be the collection of gross returns. Conceptually, it includes returns of all
tradable assets and portfolios of them. Under the assumption of no-arbitrage, there
1Hansen and Jaganathan (1991, 1994) consider generalizations for which the pricing kernel is
restricted to be nonnegative or strictly positive.
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exists a pricing kernel M that prices all returns in ℵ, i.e.,
ErMRs  1, @R P ℵ. (2.1)
Hansen and Jaganathan (1991, 1994) define Q   and Q  to be the set of strictly
positive and nonnegative pricing kernels, respectively. Similarly, I define ℵ   
tR : R P ℵ and R ¡ 0 with probability oneu and ℵ   tR : R P ℵ and R ¥
0 with probability oneu. For the same reason as in the entropy bound, I generally
require M P Q   and R P ℵ   to produce meaningful bounds. Therefore, except
for some discussions on weaker conditions towards the end, I impose these two con-
straints for the rest of this section. Notice that M P Q   is an implication of the
strong no-arbitrage condition and R P ℵ   is a weak condition for gross returns of
primitive assets due to limited liability. However, a portfolio of assets with exces-
sive short positions can generate negative returns with a positive probability. The
theories I develop will not apply to these portfolio strategies.
2.1.1 A continuum of new bounds
Let M P Q   and R P ℵ   be the stochastic discount factor and an arbitrary return,
respectively. Under the no-arbitrage condition, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. : EpM 1p q ¤ rEpR qp qs 1q , for any p ¡ 1, q ¡ 1, 1
p
  1
q
 1.
Proof. The proof involves simple manipulations of the Euler equation and Ho¨lder’s
inequality.
EpM 1p q  ErpMRq 1pR 1p s
¤ rEprpMRq 1p spqs 1p  rEpR 1p qqs 1q
 rEpMRqs 1p rEpR qp qs 1q
 rEpR qp qs 1q .
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The second line applies Ho¨lder’s inequality to pMRq 1p and R 1p , and the last line
uses the Euler equation EpMRq  1.
The above proof is distinctly different from the proof of the HJ variance bound
or, more generally, Snow’s high-moment bounds. These bounds place restrictions on
the p-th moment of the pricing kernel, with p greater than one. As a result, direct
applications of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality or Ho¨lder’s inequality on the no-arbitrage
condition suffice2. For fractional powers on the pricing kernel as in Proposition 1,
the trick is to first create a power-transformed gross return to go with the pricing
kernel and then annihilate them both through the no-arbitrage condition by applying
Ho¨lder’s inequality in the middle.
Proposition 1 bounds the 1{p-th moment of M by the q{p-th moment of a
return. As p runs from one to  8, 1{p covers every value in p0, 1q. At the same
time, q{p  1{p1pq goes from 8 to zero. Therefore, we are exhausting negative
moments of the return on the right hand side. However, due to the symmetry of
M and R in the no-arbitrage condition, we can obtain a continuum of bounds on
negative moments of the pricing kernel by switching M and R in Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. : EpM δq ¥ rEpR δ1δ qs1δ, @δ P p8, 0q.
We rewrite the bounds in Proposition 1 to make them conformable with the
notations in Corollary 1:
EpM δq ¤ rEpR δ1δ qs1δ, @δ P p0, 1q. (2.2)
Combining Corollary 1 and equation (2.2), we find lower bounds on EpM δq when
δ   0 and upper bounds when δ P p0, 1q. The change of direction at zero seems cum-
bersome and inevitable, but I will show later that it is simply a matter of scaling.
Under appropriate transformations, the system of bounds will be smoothly connected
2For an introduction on Ho¨lder’s inequality, see Casella and Berger (2001), Chap.4.
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at zero.
The bounds developed above apply for any R P ℵ  . To provide the tightest re-
strictions on the pricing kernel, we can search for the optimal return R corresponding
to each power δ. This is similar to the search procedure in Snow (1991) and Bansal
and Lehmann (1997). In particular, define ρpδq as
ρpδq 
$''&''%
sup
RPℵ  
rEpR δ1δ qs1δ if δ P p8, 0q,
inf
RPℵ  
rEpR δ1δ qs1δ if δ P p0, 1q.
(2.3)
Then ρpδq gives the sharpest lower (upper) bound on EpM δq when δ P p8, 0q
(δ P p0, 1q).
2.1.2 Interpreting bounds
What are the economic stories behind these bounds? In particular, what do the
two sides of these inequalities measure? Do equalities reveal something fundamental
about the economy? I provide a utility-based interpretation of my bounds.
Let us first introduce a risk-aversion index γpδq defined as
γpδq  1
1 δ , δ P p8, 0q Y p0, 1q.
Note that γpδq has a well-defined support as a risk-aversion coefficient: γpδq P
p0, 1q if δ P p8, 0q and γpδq P p1, 8q if δ P p0, 1q. Next, define the augmented
return space as
ℵ  tR : EpMRq  1 and R ¡ 0 with probability oneu.
It is crucial to see the difference between ℵ   and ℵ: the former contains returns
of assets that are tradable in the market while the latter contains all positive returns
that satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. In other words, ℵ   includes whatever the
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market has while the potentially much larger ℵ includes what the market could
have. The difference between ℵ   and ℵ measures the degree of market complete-
ness.
Endowed with this augmented return space ℵ, I seek to solve the portfolio choice
problem for an agent with unit endowment and risk-aversion γpδq. This optimization
problem can be written as
UδpMq  sup
RPℵ
Er R
1γpδq
1 γpδqs. (2.4)
The maximized utility UδpMq depends on the discount factor M , whose information
is already embedded in ℵ. The following proposition gives the solution to this
maximization problem.
Proposition 3. The solution to the maximization problem in (2.4) is given by
UδpMq  rEpM
γpδq1
γpδq qsγpδq
1 γpδq 
rEpM δqs 11δ
1 γpδq , (2.5)
R˜δpMq  M
1
γpδq {EpM γpδq1γpδq q. (2.6)
Proof. The appendix contains a detailed proof. The inequalities in Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 establish the finiteness of the objective function, making the optimization
problem well-defined. The proof then proceeds in two steps. First, the optimal
portfolio choice R˜δ is solved as a function of the Lagrange multiplier associated with
EpMRq  1, viewed as a budget constraint. Second, the Lagrange multiplier itself
is solved using the no-arbitrage condition.
Now the economic meanings of bounds stand out. To ease interpretation, we can
rewrite the bounds shown in Corollary 1 and equation (2.2) as
rEpM δqs 11δ
1 γpδq ¥
ErR1γpδqs
1 γpδq , @R P ℵ
  . (2.7)
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By Proposition 2, the quantity on the left hand side is the maximized utility over the
augmented return space ℵ for an agent with a risk-aversion coefficient of γpδq. It is
the highest achievable utility if the market is complete in the sense that ℵ  ℵ  
or, as a weaker requirement, the optimal choice R˜δpMq is actually tradable, i.e.,
R˜δpMq P ℵ   . For a given risk aversion γpδq, the log of R˜δpMq loads negatively on
the log pricing kernel, i.e.,
log R˜δpMq  AδpMq  1
γpδq logM, (2.8)
where AδpMq is a scaling constant. Given the stylized fact that market moves
counter-cyclically, my bounds are easier to satisfy at equality and can potentially
be more informative than HJ or Snow’s high-moment bounds.
From an asset pricing perspective, although the marginal investor determines the
discount factor, investors with different levels of risk aversion all have a say in the
behavior of the discount factor. Their optimal portfolio choices automatically place
a sequence of thresholds that the discount factor has to overcome. As the power δ
goes through its admissible region, we are essentially running through the support
of the risk-aversion coefficient of power-utility agents. This interpretation is in spirit
similar to Bansal and Lehmann (1997)’s interpretation of the growth-optimal port-
folio, albeit I am able to significantly generalize their argument.
From a methodological perspective, it is interesting to compare the approach I
have taken to interpret my bounds and that of HJ (See Hansen and Jaganathan,
1991, Gallant, Hansen and Tauchen, 1990 and Bekaert and Liu, 2003). HJ bounds
are constructed by projecting the pricing kernel onto the space of available asset
payoffs. The L2-norm of the projected pricing kernel has the minimal standard devi-
ation across all valid pricing kernels. I start from a candidate pricing kernel and ask
what an optimizing agent will do in an ideal world where all “admissible” returns
are tradable. Consequently, by limiting the asset space to tradable asset returns, the
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agent’s real-world objective function dictates a lower bar that the starting candidate
pricing kernel has to satisfy. As a matter of fact, in a strict duality sense, these
two approaches are complementary to each other. I rigorously define the duality
concept and prove it in the appendix. On a practical level, HJ’s approach is more
transparent when certain moment of the pricing kernel (e.g., variance, sharpe ratio,
etc.) is the focus and my approach is more intuitive when a return moment (e.g., a
CRRA investor’s objective function) is the interest.
2.1.3 Characterizing the non-parametric bound universe
Thus far, I have established bounds for various moments of the pricing kernel, with
zero being the only undefined case. Additionally, I extend the log-utility interpre-
tation of the entropy bound to general power utilities. These results prompt us to
wonder if the entropy bound is the one that fills the hole of my bound spectrum.
Indeed, it is. The following proposition formally establishes this.
Proposition 4. The bounds given in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 both imply the
entropy bound: EplogpMqq ¤ EplogpRqq.
Proof. The proof applies the same intuition as how power utility converges to log-
utility. I only show how bounds in Proposition 1 imply the entropy bound. Essen-
tially the same proof can be done for bounds in Corollary 1. I start by scaling the
bounds in equation (2.2):
EpM δq  1
δ
¤ rEpR
δ
1δ qs1δ  1
δ
.
This is true because δ ¡ 0. Taking limits as δ Ó 0 and under regularity conditions,3
the left hand side is readily seen to converge to EplogpMqq using L’Hoˆspital’s rule.
3We need conditions on moments of M and R to be able to exchange limits and expectation.
Dominated convergence will suffice. See Davidson (1994) Part IV for some specific conditions.
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A careful application of the rule to the right hand side will also deliver EplogpRqq
as the limit.
We are now ready to summarize the non-parametric bound universe that the lit-
erature has discovered. Figure 2.1 shows a diagram of this bound universe. When
the power equals one, the expected marginal rate of substitution is bounded within
r 1
minR
, 1
maxR
s for a generic R P ℵ  . This seemingly informative bound becomes
redundant in the presence of a risk-free rate Rf , since EpMq  1{Rf . Starting from
s  1 and going right, one encounters the spectrum of Snow’s high-moment bounds
and HJ bound is sitting at s  2. Going left, one sees the continuum of bounds I
just developed, and the BL/AJ entropy bound fills the hole at s  0. It is intriguing
to see the symmetric pattern of these bounds around s  1, particularly in light of
the order by which they are discovered by the literature.4
Lastly, we ask if the bound system is complete. This is more than a technical
question because we do not want to leave out any information on the pricing kernel
that can be assessed by the asset market. In particular, given the existence of
these one-sided inequalities for essentially any moment of the pricing kernel, one
may wonder whether other bounds, possibly with opposite directions of inequalities,
can further enrich the bound universe. After all, a two-sided bound certainly looks
4Recent papers by Almeida and Garcia (2012,2013) proposes similar nonparametric bounds.
However, there are important differences between their works and my work. First, they follow the
Hansen and Jaganathan (1991) approach but use a new objective function to derive bounds. One
can insert their optimal solution into the objective function to obtain a bound that is similar to
mine. However, these bounds are not exactly the same as their bound assumes a known risk-free
rate. Moreover, I propose a framework that is different than the Hansen and Jaganathan (1991)
approach to systematically construct and understand nonparametric bounds. It highlights the
optimizing behavior of the economic agents, which is new to the literature. The resulting bounds
are also in their cleanest forms, i.e., all statistical uncertainty and discrete time approximations are
passed on to the right-hand side of the bound through a portfolio optimization problem. Second,
I discuss my bounds in comparison with the basic entropy bound. Through a moment-expansion
exercise, I analytically show how my bounds capture higher-order moments of both the pricing
kernel and asset returns. These insights would be difficult to see if the bounds involve sample
moments of returns. Third, I use index option returns to confront state-of-the-art asset pricing
models. This exercise highlights the power of bounds and, in my view, is most relevant application
of my bounds.
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Figure 2.1: The non-parametric bound universe
more appealing than a one-sided bound as both sides are constrained. The following
proposition eliminates such possibilities and indirectly shows the exhaustiveness of
the above bound universe.
Proposition 5. For a given power s and the corresponding upper (lower) bound
on EpM sq, the lower (upper) side of EpM sq is generally unbounded. Hence, the
non-parametric bound system is exhaustive.
Proof. The idea is to construct a sequence of pricing kernels that can all price a return
but has unbounded limit for a given moment. I leave this proof to the appendix.
2.1.4 Discussions and extensions
The new continuum of bounds can be extended along several dimensions. First, it
can be adapted to study the dynamic behavior of the pricing kernel. Let Mt,t n 
Mt 1Mt 2 . . .Mt n be the time aggregated pricing kernel andRt,t n  Rt 1Rt 2 . . . Rt n
be a generic multi-period return. The long-horizon asset returns provide bounds on
the unconditional moments of the time aggregated pricing kernel. These uncondi-
tional moments of the multi-period pricing kernel reveal the dynamic dependency of
the single period pricing kernels. Different moments shed lights on different forms
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of dynamic dependency. For instance, one natural way to scale an n-period pricing
kernel is to take the fractional power 1{m on the time aggregated pricing kernel. A
bound on thus scaled kernel is given by
EpM
1
m
t,t nq ¤ rEpR
1
m1
t,t nqs
m
m1 ,m ¥ 2.
When m Ñ 8, properly scaled version of the above bound converges to the multi-
period entropy bound. Backus, Chernov and Zin (2011) use the multi-period entropy
bound to study time-dependency in discount rates. Setting m at n, the left hand side
becomes Erexpp 1
n
°n
j1 logMt jqs so the average of the log pricing kernel is revealed.
By decomposing the pricing kernel into a permanent and a transitory component
(Alvarez and Jermann, 2005), such scaling leaves the expectation of the permanent
component intact while allows the transitory component to decay at a rate of n.
Bounds give us information on how fast they decay. Liu (2013) builds on this insight
to diagnose dynamic asset pricing models using the generalized entropy bounds.
Second, conditioning information can be incorporated to sharpen bounds on un-
conditional moments (Bekaert and Liu, 2004, Gallant, Hansen and Tauchen, 1990
and Ferson and Siegel, 2003). Notice that simply adding instruments to the condi-
tional Euler equation (Hansen and Jaganathan, 1990) is different from using returns
that are generated from a dynamic trading strategy. The utility-based interpretation
of my bounds naturally favors the latter approach. As shown in Ferson and Siegel
(2003), the use of returns of dynamic strategies significantly sharpens HJ bounds. Liu
(2013) uses conditioning information to differentiate key predictability assumptions
in leading asset pricing models.
2.2 Bound informativeness
Having established a system of bounds, one may wonder what unique insights can a
bound on a certain moment of the discount factor give us. After all, the exploration
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of a continuum of powers is physically impossible so we would like to select a few
bounds that are both representative and informative. With this goal in mind, I
perform a dissection of the bound universe. Much like a doctor performing surgery, I
need a “surgical knife” to decompose the bound system. I first develop a useful tool
in studying bounds. I define a quantity that is a natural generalization of the entropy
concept popularized by Bansal and Lehmann (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2005)
and Backus, Chernov and Zin (2011) of the recent asset pricing literature. I show
that it is both economically meaningful and analytically tractable. With this tool in
hand, I apply the cumulant-expansion technique (Backus, Chernov and Martin, 2011
and Martin, 2008) to examine both sides of a bound. Lastly, a concrete example is
given to gain deeper understanding of the workings of a bound.
2.2.1 A useful quantity
The recent asset pricing literature proposes a convenient measure to study the link
between the pricing kernel and asset returns (Alvarez and Jermann, 2005, Bansal and
Lehmann, 1997, Backus, Chernov and Zin, 2011 and Martin, 2011).5 The entropy of
the marginal rate of substitution is used to measure pricing kernel dispersion and is
bounded below by the continuously compounded risk premium:
LpMq  logEpMq  EplogMq ¥ EplogRq  logpRf q, (2.9)
where R P ℵ   is an arbitrary return and Rf  1{EpMq is the gross risk-free rate,
assuming one exists. Researchers rely on the entropy bound to gauge the amount
of dispersion that an asset pricing model has to generate. However, considering the
continuum of bounds that are relatives of the entropy bound, we would expect to
gain additional insights by using other bounds. I propose a quantity that is a natural
5Notably, entropy is gaining popularity in many fields of economics and finance. See Stutzer
(1996), Hansen and Sargent (2008), Ghosh, Julliard and Taylor (2011) and Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2010).
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generalization of the original entropy concept. The continuum of bounds developed
in the previous section can then be brought in to further restrict the pricing kernel.
In essence, I am normalizing the system of bounds in reference to the entropy bound.
The Generalized Entropy Function (GEF) of a positive pricing kernel is defined
as:
GEF ps;Mq  logEpMq  1
s
logEpM sq (2.10)
for any real-valued s. It is an extension of the original entropy because its limit at
zero is exactly the entropy, i.e.,
lim
sÑ0
GEF ps;Mq  LpMq.
Assuming the finiteness of all moments, GEF ps;Mq is an everywhere continuous
function on the real line. Moreover, many convenient properties of entropy are
maintained by the GEF. For instance, GEF equals zero at a power s if and only ifM is
a constant. Similar to entropy, it is scale-invariant, i.e., GEF pws;Mq  GEF ps;Mq
for a constant w. Hence, GEF leaves the pricing kernel numeraire invariant. This
is an appealing property empirically because we do not need to worry about the
adjustment between a nominal and a real pricing kernel. Additionally, GEF is pivotal
around p1, 0q in the sense that every GEF has to pass p1, 0q on the two-dimensional
plane. This gives a fixation point to anchor the GEF’s corresponding to different
pricing kernels. Finally, in the familiar lognormal case, GEF ps;Mq  p1  sqσ2M{2
where σ2M is the variance of the log pricing kernel.
The bound universe developed in the previous section can be brought in to restrict
GEF ps;Mq. The implied restrictions can be shown as:
GEF ps;Mq ¥ s 1
s
logEpR ss1 q  logpRf q, @s P p8, 1q. (2.11)
Notice how the two types of bounds in Corollary 1 and equation (2.2) nicely line
up with each other in terms of the direction of inequalities. The undesirable flip
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in direction at zero disappears once we introduce the generalized entropy function.
From this perspective, GEF seems to be a more appropriate apparatus in studying
EpM sq when s   1. When s ¡ 1, Snow’s continuum of high-moment bounds imply
GEF ps;Mq ¤ s 1
s
logEpR ss1 q  logpRf q, @s P p1, 8q. (2.12)
Figure 2.2 plots a generic GEF with asset market bounds.
Of course, sharper restrictions can be found by explicitly searching for the optimal
bounds, as in equation (2.3). Given the convenience offered by GEF, for the rest of
the paper I will focus on bounds given in the form of (2.11) or (2.12) unless otherwise
specified. I will refer to the system of bounds given in (2.11) as the generalized
entropy bounds or, with a slight abuse of terminology, simply entropy bounds. The
bounds in (2.12) are termed high-moment bounds.
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Figure 2.2: A typical plot of GEF ps;Mq and asset market bounds. This figure plots a
generic GEF and asset market bounds. The thick solid line depicts the GEF and the thin dashed
line depicts asset market bounds.
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2.2.2 Expanding the GEF
The Cumulant-Generating Function (CGF) is another recently developed tool to
study higher order moments of the pricing kernel (Backus, Chernov and Martin,
2011 and Martin, 2008). By Taylor-expanding the log expected pricing kernel into a
power series, it shows how higher order moments contribute to the overall entropy.
Backus, Chernov and Martin (2011) use entropy as a measure of dispersion and
study how a disaster model and an empirical option pricing model imply different
moment characteristics of the pricing kernel. Assuming representative agent and
i.i.d. consumption growth rates, Martin (2008) links fundamentals to moments of
consumption growth and performs a calibration exercise. I contribute to this liter-
ature by showing that asset returns provide valuable information about the entire
CGF and not just at zero, which corresponds to the original entropy. This signif-
icantly strengthens the link between asset pricing models and market returns and
can potentially help us better distinguish candidate models.
I start by performing a Taylor expansion of our newly defined GEF ps;Mq. This
amounts to Taylor expanding EpM sq  Epes logMq around s  0:
GEF ps;Mq 
8¸
i1
κiplogMq
i!
 1
s
8¸
i1
κiplogMq
i!
si

8¸
i2
κiplogMq
i!
p1 si1q
 κ2plogMq
2!
p1 sq   κ3plogMq
3!
p1 s2q
 κ4plogMq
4!
p1 s3q   κ5plogMq
5!
p1 s4q . . . . (2.13)
The first two lines Taylor-expand the two components in GEF ps;Mq and group sim-
ilar terms. The last line explicitly writes out the first few terms in this expansion.
Here κiplogMq denotes the i-th “cumulant” of the log discount factor and is defined
26
as the i-th derivative of logEpes logMq at s  0. Cumulants are closely related to
moments: κ1plogMq and κ2plogMq are the mean and variance of logM , respectively
and κ3plogMq and κ4plogMq are related to the usual skewness (ν1) and excess kur-
tosis (ν2) through: ν1  κ3plogMq{rκ2plogMqs 32 and ν2  κ4plogMq{rκ2plogMqs2
(Backus, Chernov and Martin, 2011).
The expansion of GEF reveals that cumulants are weighted by polynomials of s.
In particular, the i-th scaled cumulant κiplogMq{i! is multiplied by p1  si1q. By
varying the value of the argument s, GEF ps;Mq puts different weights on different
moments. In this way, GEF ps;Mq conveys information about all the moments of
the pricing kernel. In particular, when evaluated at s  0, GEF ps;Mq equals the
original entropy, which is an overall sum of tκiplogMq{i!u8i1.
I argue that GEF ps;Mq is especially useful in teasing out the tail information
of the pricing kernel. Take, for example, a standard disaster model along the lines
of Barro (2006, 2009). In such a model, large drops in consumption in disastrous
states generate a huge amount of negativity in skewness and all the other odd mo-
ments. Consequently, the marginal rate of substitution, which loads negatively on
consumption growth, will display excess positivity for all odd moments. At the same
time, even moments will mechanically increase as well with the presence of outliers in
state prices. This creates an identification problem for the ultimate source of disper-
sion. Backus, Chernov and Marin (2011) argue that odd cumulants in the original
entropy expansion reflect the inherent asymmetry in jumps. However, given that all
moments are equally weighted at s  0, it is difficult to see the differential effect
between odd and even moments. I suggest taking large negative s values to inflate
this wedge. Large negative s makes the loadings associated with even moments pos-
itive and those associated with odd moments negative. Thus, a “net” jump effect
is singled out by taking the difference of odd and even moments. In fact, s   1
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is the only parameter region for the net jump effect to appear. This highlights the
importance of my bound system developed in the previous sections.
Similar expansions can be applied to returns on the right hand side of bounds.
This is important in that it gives us guidance on the selection of the most informative
asset returns. I cumulant-expand the right hand side of equation (2.11) as:
GEF ps;Mq ¥ s 1
s
8¸
i1
κiplogRq
i!
p s
s 1q
i  logRf
 rEplogRq  logRf s  
8¸
i2
κiplogRq
i!
p s
s 1q
i1, (2.14)
where κiplogRq is the i-th return cumulant. We see that in addition to the continuously-
compounded equity risk premium rEplogRqlogRf s, an extra term
°8
i2
κiplogRq
i!
p s
s1
qi
comes out of the expansion. For large negative s values, s
s1
is close to one, so the
first few higher order cumulants will enter significantly into the right hand side. This
means that to search for the tightest lower bounds, we need returns that possess ex-
cess (positive) skewness and kurtosis. Option strategy returns fit these descriptions
(Coval and Shumway, 2001 and Broadie, Chernov and Johannes, 2008). In the em-
pirical section of the paper, I follow this intuition to explore the restrictions that
option strategy returns place on the discount factor.
2.2.3 A complete market economy example
To better illustrate the workings of entropy bounds, I consider a complete market
economy with finite states. Under this setup, limiting distributions for the discount
factor can be easily derived and asset market has a transparent structure. Through
this exercise, we try to gain intuition on the following questions: 1. How does the
generalized entropy reduce to a tail measure when s is sufficiently negative? 2. How
exactly do security returns bound the pricing kernel?
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Consider a one-period economy with only two states of nature. The state prices
are given by:
M 
"
M1, with probability p1
M2, with probability p2  1 p1. (2.15)
Imagine that state 1 is a bad state and state 2 is a normal state so that M1 ¡ M2.
Relating to a disaster model, we will have M1 " M2. In this economy, GEF ps;Mq
has the following limiting behavior:
GEF ps;Mq  logpEMq  1
s
logpEM sq
Ñ logpp1M1
M2
  p2looooomooooon
W¯
q
when sÑ 8.
What is W¯? In the presence of a risk-free rate Rf , W¯ can be expressed as
1
Rf
 1
M2
.
This is the expected wealth for a risk-neutral optimizing agent with an endowment of
one unit of the riskless bond. To see this, notice that the expected returns for the two
Arrow-Debreu securities are 1{M1 and 1{M2, respectively. A risk-neutral agent only
cares about expected returns. Hence, she will shy away from the insurance asset that
is relatively expensive and have a concentrated position on the second Arrow-Debreu
security. Her expected end-of-period wealth is thus equal to the beginning-of-period
wealth (1{Rf ) times the expected return of the second elementary security (1{M2).
This interpretation of W¯ reminds us of the utility-based interpretation of entropy
bounds in the previous section.
Intuitively, a risk-neutral investor’s portfolio choice contains superior informa-
tion about tail events because her incentive in “selling” the insurance asset is the
strongest. To see how the tail event probability is reflected in W¯ , note that
W¯  logr1  p1pM1
M2
 1qs  p1pM1
M2
 1q
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under mild conditions6. Therefore, the rare event probability p1 is amplified by the
multiplier pM1
M2
 1q. The more frequently tail events happen and/or the larger the
state price for a disastrous state is, the more profit a risk-neutral agent can exploit.
In this sense, the tail event information is partially identified through the risk neutral
agent’s optimization behavior.
On the other hand, the right hand side of equation (2.11) reduces to logp 1
Rf
EpRqq
when sÑ 8. Hence, the generalized entropy bounds simply say that in expectation
no return can exceed the return of the second Arrow-Debreu security. This is trivially
true given the structure of the economy. What is not so trivial, even for this two-state
economy, is how entropy bounds internally extract information from the discount rate
and provide economically sensible links to market securities.
The example can be easily extended to an N -state case, but the marginal gain in
intuition is limited. In essence, the generalized entropy bounds feed on the idea that
a moment of the discount rate can be viewed as the objective function for a certain
type of investors. By taking large negative moments, the rare event information
stands out and this information is gauged against the maximized utility of a nearly
risk-neutral agent.
2.3 Option market bounds and rare disaster models
Tail information, long recognized as a potential source to generate economic risk
premiums (Rietz, 1988), has recently been elevated to quantitatively explain asset
market abnormalities. Barro (2006), Barro and Ursua (2008) and Barro, Nakamura,
Steinsson and Ursua (2009) extrapolate the tail distribution of the US consumption
growth process by looking at international macroeconomic data. Based on the ex-
change economy and representative agent framework, they argue that the calibrated
6For a standard disaster model, in which the disaster state probability is in the range of 1%-2%
and the state price ratio is within 10, the approximation is good.
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rare event distribution can explain key moments of US asset returns, in particular
the equity risk premium. Gabaix (2009), Wachter (2009) and Gourio (2008) extend
the basic disaster model to account for other salient features of asset markets.
At the heart of the rare disaster literature is the so-called pseudo problem: given
the rare occurrence of disasters, one cannot measure their distributions accurately
based on a relatively short univariate time series. As a remedy, researchers pool
data from other sources to avoid the inherent small sample problem. An alternative
approach is to use asset market returns to infer the tail information in the pricing
kernel. Since option prices are informative about the investors’ ex-ante valuation of
extreme event risks, they can be a useful source of information. Backus, Chernov
and Martin (2011) use equity index options to infer the distribution of consump-
tion growth. I also consider index options but take a different approach to study
their implications on the pricing kernel. In particular, I use the newly developed
nonparametric bounds to restrict the behavior of a pricing kernel. In doing so, tail
information of the kernel is distilled into various moment inequalities. My approach
has several advantages. First, it is based on the basic no-arbitrage condition alone
and thus free from any misspecification on the linkage between the pricing kernel and
asset returns. Second, no parametric model is needed to fit the cross-section of option
prices. Instead, individual option trading strategies are estimated and fed into the
nonparametric bounds. Lastly, a formal statistical testing framework is developed.
It features the simultaneous testing of several bounds. I show the discriminatory
power of the generalized entropy bounds at negative power values.
2.3.1 Data description
For the empirical analysis, I use monthly data on the S&P 500 index, the associated
index options and the risk-free rate. The riskfree rate is from Kenneth French’s on
line data library. The full sample for index returns run from July 1926 to Decem-
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ber 2011. The shorter sample, which coincides with the span of the option data
from OptionMetrics, is from January 1996 to December 2011, yielding 192 months
of data. All nominal returns are converted to ex-post real returns using the inflation
rate based on CPI.
I collect European style S&P 500 index options for the period from January 1996
to December 2011 from the OptionMetrics database. The data set contains daily
settlement prices for options with various strike prices and maturities, as well as liq-
uidity measures such as open interests and trading volumes. It also includes dividend
yield for the market index and interpolated zero coupon yields. They are useful for
us to construct option trading strategies later on. To mitigate microstructure issues,
I drop option data with average bid-ask prices less than one eighth of a dollar, with
open interests less than 100 contracts or with zero trading volumes. Finally, I use
put-call parity relationships to filter out data that obviously violate the no-arbitrage
condition.
To construct equally-spaced monthly returns from option prices, I follow a pro-
cedure that is similar to Coval and Shumway (2001), Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001)
and Driessen and Maenhout (2005). First, options with strike-to-spot ratio closest to
92%, 96% and 100% are targeted on the first trading day of each month. Next, these
option contracts are followed and identified until the beginning of the subsequent
month and the monthly holding period returns are calculated. In this process, op-
tion contracts that expire in the third week of the same month have to be excluded.
Due to liquidity concerns, I focus on short-maturity options with around seven weeks
to maturity at the buying date and about two weeks to maturity at the selling date.
These options have large trading volumes and are less affected by liquidity problems
(Bondarenko, 2003).
The equally-spaced return series are convenient to handle empirically, especially
when we use them to confront asset pricing models. This is because most discrete
32
time models specify a fixed sample frequency. Additionally, as argued by Driessen
and Maenhout (2005), thus constructed returns are more sensitive to changes in jump
or volatility risks than hold-to-maturity returns. This sensitivity is important for this
paper as risk-sensitive returns can potentially provide the most informative bounds
on the pricing kernel. Finally, from a more technical point of view, my bound theory
requires returns to have a positive support. However, hold-to-maturity returns are
at times extremely high, which creates trouble in constructing a short strategy that
always generates positive returns.
Instead of using raw option returns data, I focus on returns from a few well-known
derivative strategies. There are two main reasons for this: 1. These economically
meaningful strategies offer clear interpretations of the sources of risks (jump risks
and/or volatility risks) that are being traded; 2. The recent literature on option
pricing anomalies mainly focus on these trading strategies (Bondarenko, 2003, Coval
and Shuway, 2001 and Driessen and Maenhout, 2005). To be consistent and compa-
rable with existing studies, I choose to adopt this tradition.
In particular, I take the following two strategies as the benchmark strategies:
• an out-of-the-money (OTM) put option with 96% moneyness;
• an at-the-money(ATM) straddle.
A deep OTM put is a hedge against market crashes and much less so against volatil-
ity movements. Its price is therefore only sensitive to market jump risks. On the
other hand, an ATM market-neutral straddle generates profits when either the mar-
ket volatility is high or when market crashes, so it is exposed to both volatility and
jump risks. These two option strategies are among the most commonly traded strate-
gies by market practitioners and have been extensively studied by the recent option
pricing literature (Coval and Shumway, 2001, Jackwerth, 2000, Bondarenko, 2003),
which make them the ideal choice as benchmark strategies.
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In addition to the benchmark strategies, I further consider two types of “crash-
neutral” variants of them. They are simply the two original options mixed with an
offsetting short position in the 92%-OTM put option7. In doing this, large returns
when market crashes are capped off for long positions in the benchmark strategies
and symmetrically, short positions are protected against large downward movements
of the market returns8. It would be interesting to see whether these alternative
strategies can provide any additional information beyond what is provided by the
benchmark strategies.
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for the returns of various derivative strate-
gies as well as the market index. Consistent with the literature, these option strate-
gies generate large negative average returns and Sharpe ratios. The flip side would be
the potential profits generated by short positions in these strategies. Moreover, the
returns are highly non-normally distributed, as reflected by the large magnitude of
skewness and kurtosis. These moment characteristics of index option strategy returns
will be helpful later on in forming informative bounds on the pricing kernel. Nonethe-
less, in spite of the magnitude, the mean returns for my sample are notably smaller
and about half the size of those reported by Coval and Shumway (2001), Broadie,
Chernov and Johannes (2007) and Bondarenko (2003). This is mainly driven by the
instability of mean returns for these derivative strategies. The aforementioned papers
mainly focus on the period before 2005 and many include the 1987 crash episode,
whereas mine starts in 1996 and extends all the way to the most recent period. It is
7For details on the construction of the crash-neutral strategies, see Coval and Shumway (2001)
and Jackwerth (2000).
8This is only approximately true because the beginning-of-period 92%-OTM put and 96%-OTM
put may have different maturities. In fact, the deeper 92%-OTM put may have a higher price than
the 96%-OTM put simply because the former’s maturity is significantly longer than the latter. This
creates trouble in the usual interpretation of crash-neutral strategies: for instance, a short leg in
92%-OTM put becomes a long leg. Therefore, I also create robust-crash-neutral put and straddles
which essentially delete these abnormal dates. See the descriptions of Table 1 for details.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics. This table reports the summary statistics of the returns for
the S&P 500 index and several derivative strategies. The long index series is from July 1926 to
December 2011 and the short index series is from January 1996 to December 2011, which is also
the time span for all the option strategy returns. The first column displays the strategy name
and the last column reports the correlation of the strategy returns with the short-sample market
index. “C-neutral put” and “C-neutral straddle” denote crash-neutral put and straddle returns, for
which the original 96%-OTM put and ATM straddle are mixed with a short leg on 92%-OTM put
option, respectively. See Coval and Shumway (2001) for the construction of the crash-neutral put
and Jackwerth (2000) for the construction of the crash-neutral straddle. “R-C-neutral put” and
“R-C-neutral straddle” denote robust crash-neutral put and straddle returns, respectively. They
are the original crash neutral series excluding the date in which the 92%-OTM put maturity date
is more than three trading weeks longer than the 96%-OTM put maturity date at the moment of
buying. In doing this, six observations are deleted from the 192 monthly observations, including
two months in which the 92%-OTM put has a higher price than the 96%-OTM put. Skewness and
kurtosis are the standardized central third and fourth moments, respectively. The riskfree rate is
60bp annualized for the long sample and 54bp for the short sample. These rates are the inputs for
the calculation of the Sharpe ratios for the corresponding samples.
Mean Std. Sharp Skew. Kurt. Max Min Corr.Index
Index,long 0.007 0.055 0.113 0.225 10.323 0.384 -0.285 NA
Index,short 0.005 0.049 0.087 -0.605 3.666 0.118 -0.177 1.000
0.92-OTM put -0.236 0.728 -0.325 2.756 13.049 3.944 -0.877 -0.305
0.96-OTM put -0.201 0.611 -0.330 1.519 4.839 2.261 -0.849 -0.277
1.00-OTM put -0.082 0.627 -0.132 1.897 7.990 3.256 -0.849 -0.323
ATM straddle -0.017 0.340 -0.052 1.702 6.809 1.501 -0.778 0.001
C-neutral put -0.310 0.996 -0.312 -2.553 18.805 2.135 -7.438 -0.096
C-neutral straddle -0.015 0.428 -0.035 -0.528 13.847 1.665 -2.823 0.077
R-C-neutral put -0.212 0.724 -0.293 -0.075 7.469 3.135 -2.960 -0.119
R-C-neutral straddle -0.025 0.422 -0.059 -0.660 14.602 2.665 -1.823 0.059
worthwhile to mention that the recent six years (2006-2011) see significant increases
in returns for these strategies. For instance, the average 92%-OTM and 96%-OTM
put returns are -12.8% and -13.6% per month, respectively, much larger than their
sample averages in early years. A full investigation into the change in these return
characteristics is beyond the scope of this paper. To the extent that my sample
under-represents the true option return population and overestimates mean returns,
the bounds constructed below can be regarded as conservative lower bounds on the
generalized entropy function of the pricing kernel.
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2.3.2 Bounds implied by option strategies
With these return data from the asset market and relying on the analytical tools
developed in the previous sections, I explore their implications on the behavior of
a pricing kernel. Ideally, to provide the sharpest bounds, we need to search for the
optimal dynamic strategy that maximizes a certain unconditional moment of the
return. However, parameter estimates for even simple static portfolio choice prob-
lems are usually very unstable, partly due to the volatile nature of market returns
(Brandt, 1999, Sahalia and Brandt, 2001). Moreover, since we are considering port-
folios that involve highly non-normal and mechanically correlated option returns, the
estimation issue can only get worse. Eventually, this estimation uncertainty trans-
lates into bound uncertainty and may significantly affect our inference. To alleviate
this estimation issue, I choose to consider simple static option strategy that has the
following form
RP  Rf   αSpRS Rf q, (2.16)
where αS denotes the fraction of wealth allocated to a generic return RS. Hence,
only the tradeoff between a safe asset and a return is considered9.
Figure 2.3 plots the bound frontiers given in inequalities (2.11) and (2.12) when
power s equals to 2, 0.5, 0, -1, -3 and -8, and Table 2.2 reports the optimal portfolio
weights at a riskfree rate of zero per month10. Notice that when s  2, the admissible
region for the pricing kernel is below the depicted curves, whereas at other powers it
is above the depicted curves. I intentionally leave this “inconvenient” feature in the
9In doing this, I also ignore the possible utility gain from a combination of the market index
and a derivative strategy. For a CRRA investor with a risk aversion coefficient of more than one,
Driessen and Maenhout (2005) show the allocation to the market index is rarely significant. This
indirectly shows the limited utility gains by considering the market index.
10The mean and the standard deviation of the riskfree rate for the short sample is 4bp per month
and 40bp, respectively. Therefore, I center it at zero and extend to 3 standard deviations away
from the center in Figure 2.3.
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Table 2.2: Optimal portfolio weights for benchmark and index strategies. Panel A
shows the optimal portfolio weights for the optimization problem described in Figure 2.3 at a fixed
interest rate of zero. Panel B shows the range of the admissible portfolio weights that guarantees
a positive portfolio return series. For a return series tRtu
T
t1, the range is given by rαmin, αmaxs 
r1{p1  maxrtRtu
T
t1sq, 1{p1  minrtRtu
T
t1sqs.
Power Market 96%-OTM put ATM straddle
Panel A
s  2 -1.954 0.489 0.149
s  0.5 0.941 -0.199 -0.070
s  0 1.839 -0.341 -0.137
s  1 3.450 -0.437 -0.260
s  3 5.428 -0.442 -0.461
s  8 5.667 -0.442 -0.663
Panel B
αmin -9.589 -0.450 -0.680
αmax 5.369 1.175 1.281
picture to emphasize the flip in the direction of bounds around s  1. Four different
types of portfolios are shown on this plot: two types involve the two benchmark
derivative strategies and, for comparison purposes, the other two types involve the
market index.
Several patterns emerge from Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2. First, strategies involv-
ing the put option clearly dominate the other strategies across all powers and a
wide range of riskfree rates. At s  2, which is at the HJ bound, the Sharpe ratio
essentially determines the strength of restrictions that a given security return puts
on the pricing kernel. As a result, in accordance with the rankings of the absolute
Sharpe ratio given in Table 1, 96%-OTM put returns implies the sharpest constraint,
and is followed by the index and lastly the straddle returns. At other powers, the
optimal bound belongs to the spectrum of generalized entropy bounds and hence
has a utility-based interpretation as discussed before. In particular, a bound at a
given power s corresponds to the transformed optimized utility of a power utility
agent with a risk-aversion of 1
1s
. In a closely related empirical paper, Driessen and
Maenhout (2005) study the asset allocation problem of an investor who has access
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Figure 2.3: Bounds implied by benchmark strategies and the index. This figure plots
the non-parametric bound frontiers (right hand side in inequality (2.11)) for the benchmark trading
strategies and the market index across different hypothetical riskfree rates. The estimation is done,
at each hypothetical riskfree rate, by conducting a nonlinear search on the optimal portfolio weight
αS to either maximize or minimize the right hand side of inequalities (2.11) and (2.12). The
solid line, thin dashed line, dotted line and thick dashed line depict the frontiers for the passive
market strategy, active market strategy, ATM straddle strategy and 96%-OTM put option strategy,
respectively. The passive market strategy simple sets αS at zero at every interest rate level and the
active market strategy involves a search as described above.
to index options. Their empirical results lend support to my results, especially at
s  0.5 and s  0. At s  0.5, both their paper and my results show that an agent
with a risk-aversion of two will have a significant short position in the 96%-OTM put
option: their paper, allowing the market index to enter into the asset menu as well,
has an estimate of about 10% for αS while I have an estimate of approximately
20% by excluding the index. At s  0, which corresponds to the logrithmic utility
case as in the original entropy bound, their estimate is around 15% and mine again
roughly doubles their estimate. Putting the difference in asset menus and sample
periods aside, both studies show the economic benefits by allowing investors to trade
deep OTM put options. The two plots for s  0.5 and s  0 in Figure 2.3 illustrate
these benefits by highlighting the differences in utility gains among the four can-
didate strategies. As s goes negative, the related risk-aversion coefficient becomes
even smaller so the relative gain in expected returns by shorting put options further
outweighs the loss from variance and other higher-order moments. Consequently,
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the optimal bound requires even larger absolute position in the OTM put option.
Notably, the ATM straddle returns for my sample yield an unimpressive mean rela-
tive to 96%-OTM put options and a very high variance relative to the market index.
Accordingly, strategies involving the straddle returns appear to imply an inferior
bound compared to either the put option strategy or the index strategy.
To offer a deeper interpretation of the above empirical findings, it is worthwhile
to repeat the insights in bound interpretations given in Section 2.2. Although the
marginal or representative investor determines the market prices of jump and volatil-
ity risks11, investors with different risk-attitudes all reveal valuable information about
these prices through their trading behavior. For example, all else being equal, higher
prices of jump risks imply more expensive deep OTM put options. With a fixed
physical jump distribution, this implies a lower ex-ante and ex-post average return
for buying puts. However, for a less risk-averse agent who does not value the put
option’s hedging ability as much as the average consumer, she treats the increase in
put prices as a lucrative trading opportunity. By shorting more, she increases her
expected utility. Following this logic, the above empirical findings highlight the more
important role of priced jump risks than volatility risks in option prices. Notice that
this is not saying that volatility risks should have little pricing impacts, as we are
only looking at this through static power utility agents’ optimization problems. To
have priced volatility risks emerge as an effective bound, we may have to investigate
more complicated dynamic strategies given the strong predictability in volatilities.
This is left to future research.
Besides the two benchmark derivative strategies, alternative strategies may ap-
11The presence of jump and stochastic volatility in the index price is well established in the
option pricing literature. Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001), Coval and Shumway (2001) and Bakshi
and Kapadia (2003) show the presence of volatility premium. Bates (2002), Pan (2002) and Ait-
Sahalia, Wang and Yared (2001) show the presence of jump risk premium.
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Figure 2.4: Bounds implied by benchmark strategies and two alternative OTM put
strategies. This figure plots the non-parametric bound frontiers (right hand side in inequality
(2.11)) for the benchmark trading strategies and two alternative OTM put option strategies across
different hypothetical riskfree rates. The estimation is done, at each hypothetical riskfree rate, by
conducting a nonlinear search on the optimal portfolio weight αS to either maximize or minimize
the right hand side of inequalities (2.11) and (2.12). The solid line, thin dashed line, dotted line
and thick dashed line depict the frontiers for the 92%-OTM put option strategy, ATM put option
strategy, ATM straddle strategy and 96%-OTM put option strategy, respectively.
Table 2.3: Optimal portfolio weights for alternative put and crash-neutral strategies.
Panel A shows the optimal portfolio weights for the optimization problem described in Figure 2.4
and 2.5 at a fixed interest rate of zero. Strategies involving the 92%-put option, ATM put option,
crash-neutral put option and crash-neutral straddle are shown. Panel B shows the range of the
admissible portfolio weights that guarantees a positive portfolio return series. For a return series
tRtu
T
t1, the range is given by rαmin, αmaxs  r1{p1  maxrtRtu
T
t1sq, 1{p1  minrtRtu
T
t1sqs.
Power 92%-OTM put ATM put R-C-neutral put R-C-neutral straddle
Panel A
s  2 0.406 0.207 0.253 0.138
s  0.5 -0.129 -0.088 -0.184 -0.070
s  0 -0.202 -0.162 -0.331 -0.138
s  4 -0.253 -0.306 -0.467 -0.545
Panel B
αmin -0.254 -0.307 -0.468 -0.601
αmax 1.141 1.178 0.253 0.354
pear attractive for certain CRRA investors and thus provide tighter bounds on the
pricing kernel. Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show bounds implied by two alternative put op-
tion strategies and two crash-neutral strategies, respectively, and Table 2.3 shows the
corresponding weights. Figure 2.4 shows that a strategy that shorts the 96%-OTM
put option turns out to be the dominating one across all powers. This is somewhat
surprising since we would expect its performance to lie between the ones involving
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Figure 2.5: Bounds implied by benchmark strategies and two crash-neutral strate-
gies. This figure plots the non-parametric bound frontiers (right hand side in inequality (2.11))
for the benchmark trading strategies and two crash-neutral strategies across different hypothetical
riskfree rates. The estimation is done, at each hypothetical riskfree rate, by conducting a nonlinear
search on the optimal portfolio weight αS to either maximize or minimize the right hand side of
inequalities (2.11) and (2.12). Note that the two robust crash-neutral return series are used instead
of the original full-sample series. The solid line, dot-dashed line, dotted line and thick dashed line
depict the frontiers for the crash-neutral straddle strategy, crash-neutral put option strategy, ATM
straddle strategy and 96%-OTM put option strategy, respectively.
the 92%-OTM put and those involving the ATM put. A closer look at the admissi-
ble portfolio weights reveal that strategies shorting the 92%-OTM put have strong
weight restrictions: given that the maximum net return is close to 4 (See Table 1), the
maximum proportion one can short on a 92%-OTM put is 1{p1p4 1qq  0.25 at
a riskfree rate of zero. In absolute value, this is significantly smaller than the allow-
able 0.45 short position on the 96%-OTM put, as shown in Table 2.2. Consequently,
despite the fact that the 92%-OTM put has a more negative average return than the
96%-OTM put, weight constraints prevent investors from exploiting it any further.
This phenomenon, although statistically irrelevant for the portfolio dominance re-
sults (strategies involving the 96%-OTM put are more attractive partly because they
allow more aggressive short positions), points to the instability issue of the in-sample
portfolio choice problems12. I will shortly come back to this issue for a full discussion.
12Notice that the in-sample portfolio choice problems are well-defined both theoretically and
numerically within our context. In particular, although sometimes the solutions are close to the
boundary (See Table 2.2 when s  1,3 or 8), the infinitely large marginal utility at the bound-
ary for an CRRA investor will restrict the optimal choice to well within the boundary. However,
the boundary-dependence of the optimal solution is exacerbated in our context because the CRRA
investor’s risk-aversion is sometimes close to zero.
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Figure 2.5 shows that bounds from the benchmark put option strategy dominate
crash-neutral strategies at s  2 and perform well for the other three powers. In par-
ticular, the deep OTM put strategy weakly dominates the crash-neutral put strategy
at s  0.5 and is on par with the latter at s  0 and a little less informative at
s  4. The key observation is that the difference between bounds based on these
two strategies is significantly smaller than the difference between them and the other
two strategies. Taken as a whole, Figure 2.4 and 2.5 suggest the superior role of deep
OTM put strategies (especially strategies with 96%-OTM put) in effectively shaping
the admissible space of candidate pricing kernels. They reveal information on the
pricing of jump risks in the economy and empirically provide the sharpest bounds
that any valid discount rate must satisfy.
The above optimized bounds can be directly used to confront candidate pricing
kernels. However, they may appear too stringent or cumbersome from several practi-
cal concerns. First, in-sample portfolio choice generates portfolio weights that are too
volatile (See Brandt, 2000, Driessen and Maenhout, 2005). What is even more detri-
mental in our setup is the boundary-dependence of the optimal weights. As seen from
Table 2.2 and 2.3, weights for several strategies are close to their boundary values for
large negative powers. This exacerbates the in-sample instability issue since extreme
observations are more sample-dependent than sample moments. Second, transaction
costs and margin requirements for real-world option trading strategies may limit the
amount that we can short. Although traction costs are small for the index option
market (Bakshi, Cao and Chen, 1997) and our long positions in the riskfree asset can
serve as margin, these microstructure effects may become non-negligible if we have
excessive short positions on index options. Third, weights for these optimal bounds
depend on the prevailing riskfree rate and are thus time-varying. This is cumbersome
for most applications, since a different bound has to calculated for a different riskfree
rate. Some inspections of Figure 2.4 and 2.5 reveal that option implied bounds are
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constant across a wide range of bond rates. This prompts us to think about option
strategies that are independent of the bond rates.
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Figure 2.6: Bounds implied by optimal and conservative benchmark strategies. This
figure plots the non-parametric bound frontiers (right hand side in inequality (2.11)) for the bench-
mark trading strategies and conservative benchmark strategies across different hypothetical riskfree
rates. For the optimal benchmark strategies, the estimation is done, at each hypothetical riskfree
rate, by conducting a nonlinear search on the optimal portfolio weight αS to either maximize or
minimize the right hand side of inequalities (2.11) and (2.12). The dotted line and the thick dashed
line depict the frontier for the ATM straddle strategy and 96%-OTM put option strategy, respec-
tively. The solid lines at s  2, 0.5, 0,4 depict the interest-rate independent longing 50%, shorting
-20%, shorting -35% and shorting -35% on the 96%-OTM put option strategies, respectively.
Driven by the these concerns, I propose a simple way to create conservative and
interest rate independent portfolio strategies. For the most informative 96%-OTM
put strategies, I set a lower threshold αL  35%13 on the short position to avoid
excessive shorting and fix the put weight at the optimal zero-interest put weight
given in Table 2.2 if it does not exceed the threshold, or at αL otherwise. By doing
this, we end up having the following three types of OTM put strategies: a long 50%
strategy at s  2; a short 20% strategy at s  0.5 and a short 35% strategy at
other powers. Figure 2.6 display the bounds for these conservative strategies together
with the bounds from the two benchmark strategies. Not surprisingly, they agree
well with the optimal strategies for s  2, 0.5 and 0. At s  4, the discrepancy is
13This number is chosen to approximately equate the optimal weight at s  0 and a riskfree rate
of zero. It is also about 10% away from the boundary weight, which helps alleviate the boundary-
dependent problem.
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about 1% and much smaller than the difference of around 8% between the straddle
strategy and the optimal OTM put strategy. For the rest of the paper, I use these
simple yet efficient bounds to study restrictions on the pricing kernel. Again, had
we missed important information by utilizing these sub-optimal bounds, they still
provide valid, albeit conservative restrictions on the pricing kernel.
2.3.3 Rare disaster models and option return bounds
I consider a representative-agent exchange economy model with infrequent large de-
clines in consumption growth (See Barro, 2006, 2009). More precisely, I focus on
models with an iid environment. This is a first step in understanding the distri-
bution of tail events in consumption growth. Moreover, since we restrict ourselves
to simple static portfolio strategies in the construction of bounds, it is only fair to
consider a pricing kernel with iid shocks. I also adopt a Possion-normal distribution
for the jump component in consumption growth14. This parametric setup has two
appealing features: 1. It is flexible enough to match some of the empirical regular-
ities on rare event distributions as documented by Barro (2006); 2. It is infinitely
divisible and thus allows us to “zoom” in on an arbitrarily small frequency. I state
the model at the annual frequency but will use its monthly counterpart to match
asset market bounds constructed from monthly returns data.
The time-additive utility representation for the representative agent is given by
E0p
8¸
t0
βt
C1γt
1 γ q,
where γ governs investor risk-aversion. The pricing kernel is known to be
logMt 1  log β  γ logGt 1, (2.17)
14For its applications in the macro-finance literature, see Naik and Lee (1990), Martin (2007)
and Backus, Chernov and Zin (2011)
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where Gt 1  Ct 1{Ct is the consumption growth rate. Log consumption growth is
assumed to be driven by two independent shocks,
logGt 1  t 1   ηt 1, (2.18)
where t 1  N pµ, σ2q is the normally-distributed component and the distribution
of the jump component ηt 1 is given by
ηt 1|pJ  jq  N pjθ, jν2q, J  Poissonpωq. (2.19)
To derive the entropy-related quantities for this kernel, we start from calculating the
moment-generating functions (MGF) of the two shocks. The MGF for the normal
shock is Epest 1q  exppµs   σ2s2{2q, and the MGF for the Poisson-normal part,
shown in Backus, Chernov and Martin (2011), is
Epesηt 1q  exppωresθ psνq2{2  1sq. (2.20)
Then, by independence of the two shocks, the cumulant-generating function (CGF)
can be shown to be
CGF psq  logEpes logMt 1q  s log β γµs  1
2
γ2σ2s2 ωreγsθ pγsνq2{2 1s. (2.21)
By setting s  1, the continuously compounded one-period riskfree rate rf 
 logEpMt 1q is given by
rf  plog β  γµ  1
2
γ2σ2   ωreγθ pγνq2{2  1sq. (2.22)
Finally, combining the above two pieces, the generalized entropy function (GEF) can
be shown as
GEF psq  1
2
γ2σ2p1 sq   ωreγθ pγνq2{2  1
s
eγsθ pγsνq
2{2  s 1
s
s. (2.23)
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Table 2.4: Parameter specifications for
disaster models This table shows the param-
eter specifications for disaster models. Panel
A shows the fixed parameters. The total
variance in consumption growth is given by
σ2   ωpθ2   ν2q. Panel B shows the disas-
ter intensity and size combinations that rep-
resent three types of disaster distributions:
light disaster type (ωL, θL), mild disaster type
(ωM , θM ) and severe disaster type (ωS , θS).
Parameter Value
Panel A
β 0.99
γ 5
rf 0.02
σ2   ωpθ2   ν2q 0.0352
ν2 0.22
Panel B
ωL 0.04
θL -0.15
ωM 0.02
θM -0.30
ωS 0.01
θS -0.60
When sÑ 0, GEF psq reduces to the original entropy
LpMq  1
2
γ2σ2   ωreγθ pγνq2{2   γθ  1s. (2.24)
Using GEF psq as a model diagnosing tool, we are now ready to explore the effects
of rare disasters on the pricing kernel. The stacked parameter vector for a disaster
model is pβ, γ, µ, σ2, ω, θ, ν2q1, which has seven components. To better concentrate
on economically interesting parameters such as the disaster intensity ω and size θ,
I perform a “partial derivative” exercise. First, as shown in Panel A of Table 2.4,
I fix the two preference parameters, the riskfree rate and two variance statistics re-
lated to the consumption growth process. The total variance in consumption growth
σ2 ωpθ2 ν2q is fixed at the sample estimate based on the US real consumption data
(Backus, Chernov and Martin (2011)) and the variance for the normal component of
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the Poisson-normal shock is estimated from realized disasters based on international
data (Barro ,2006). These second-order moments can be estimated with much more
precision than first-order moments (µ and θ) and my choices agree with the disas-
ter literature. Next, I fix the expected loss in a disaster state at ωθ  0.006 and
consider three ω and θ combinations that represent light, mild and severe disaster
types, respectively, as shown in Panel B of Table.2.415 These three types of disaster
distributions imply increasing magnitude in disaster size and roughly agree with the
historical consumption data of the US, an average country in Barro’s sample (Barro,
2006), and a few European countries which experienced large drops in per capita
GDP during World War II, respectively. Note that these alternative tail specifica-
tions are difficult to differentiate empirically, as by design they imply exactly the
same mean consumption growth, total volatility in growth and interest rate. This
relates to the so-called pseudo problem in disaster models. It is therefore interesting
to see whether GEF can better distinguish these models, and additionally, whether
asset market returns provide support for any of them.
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Figure 2.7: Generalized entropy function plots for three disaster models.
15The mean µ of the normal shock component is used to match the interest rate.
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Figure 2.7 shows the corresponding GEF plots for the three disaster models. I
focus on the region from -3.5 to 1. As s goes beyond 1 or below -3.5, either the severe
disaster case or the light disaster case will display explosive behavior. In addition,
I will show later that bounds at these powers are less informative anyway. Starting
at s  1 where all three GEF ’s equal zero and going left, the GEF of the severe
disaster type rises more steeply compared to the other two and reaches its peak
around s  0.8. At its peak, the GEF more than triples that of either the mild or
light disaster type. Going further left, it remains the dominating one until s reaches
-3, at which the GEF from for light disaster type catches up. The mild disaster
type follows a similar pattern, rising more than the light disaster case initially and
meeting it at around -2. Eventually, all three start rising sharply for large negative
powers, with the light disaster case being the earliest to rise.
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Figure 2.8: Weighted cumulants for two disaster models. This figure displays the second
to sixth weighted cumulants for the mild and light disaster model at s  2, 0,1 and 3. The j-th
weighted cumulant is defined as
κjplogMt 1q
j! p1s
j1q in equation (2.13). The left (dark) bar and the
right (light) bar measure the weighted cumulant for the mild and light disaster model, respectively.
To see how various weighting schemes on cumulants generate the patterns in the
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GEF, Table 2.8 displays the contributions from the second to sixth weighted cumu-
lants to the overall (generalized) entropy.16 Since the severe disaster type involves
explosive behavior at the sixth moment, I choose to focus on the first two types of
disaster distributions. We can view the case at s  0 as the benchmark, since all
individual cumulants are weighted equally. At s  0, both disaster types imply the
same second cumulant (variance) by design. However, the mild disaster case implies
higher third to sixth cumulants. As a result, its overall entropy is higher.17 At s  2,
which corresponds to the Hansen-Jaganathan bound, the signs for cumulants are
reversed and, more importantly, higher-order cumulants are magnified compared to
the case at s  0. This is because the polynomial coefficients attach more weights
to higher-order terms at s  2. This also explains the relatively large magnitude in
entropy when the power goes above one, as shown in Figure 2.7. At s  1, inter-
estingly, all odd cumulants vanish and the entropy is a sum of even moments only.
Given the vast literature on skewness preferences18, it is interesting to see whether
even moments alone can stand some of the empirical regularities from option returns.
In other words, stronger restrictions on the pricing kernel might be found by focusing
on s  1 since skewness or in general odd cumulants are no longer present to help
boost up entropy. More dramatically, at s  3, odd cumulants show up as negative
and hence cancel out the effects of even cumulants. The empirical inquiry at s  1
applies to this case as well. Moreover, the bites coming from negative odd cumulants
explain why the light disaster GEF dominates the mild disaster GEF at s  3: rel-
16Strictly speaking, as in Equation 2.13, the j-th individual cumulant of the log pricing kernel is
κjplogMq. However, with a slight abuse of terminology, I sometimes refer to the factorial adjusted
cumulant
κjplogMq
j! as cumulant since the factorial provides a natural scaling of the raw cumulant.
The j-th weighted cumulant is defined as κ2plogMqj! p1  s
j1q. See Backus, Chernov and Martin
(2011) for the derivation of the individual cumulants for Poisson-normal shocks
17Of course, other higher-order cumulants matter, so we need to extrapolate from the patterns
seen from the second to sixth cumulant.
18See Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Rubinstein (1973), Harvey and Siddique (2000).
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atively larger disaster size θ for the mild disaster case generates disproportionately
high absolute odd cumulants that in turn reduce the overall entropy. In sum, the
generalized entropy function generates interesting combinations of cumulants and it
remains an empirical question whether asset returns can bind it in a meaningful way.
I now confront the rare disaster models with option implied bounds. Analogous
to the calibration approach in the macro-finance literature, the plan is to mark up the
admissible parameter space corresponding to a set of asset market bounds. Similar
approaches have been taken by Hansen and Jaganathan (1991) to depict the efficient
mean-variance frontier based on market Sharpe ratios and by Bansal and Lehmann
(1994) to restrict the representative agent’s risk-aversion based on equity premium.
Again, to sharpen our focus on economically interesting quantities, I choose to con-
sider the triple pω, θ, γq1. To avoid negative volatility, this time I choose to fix the
variance σ2 of the normal shock component.19 Also, risk aversion is released as a
free parameter to match return bounds. Other than these changes, the rest are the
same as in Panel A of Table 2.4.
Bounds based on option strategies essentially delineate a domain in the three-
dimensional pω, θ, γq space. To ease visual inspection, I plot the contours on the
two-dimensional pω, γq plane. Figure 2.9 shows these contours for four values of dis-
aster size θ. Many interesting patterns emerge from this figure. First, as expected,
larger magnitude of θ requires smaller risk aversion. At θ  0.10, a 4% annual
equity risk premium asks for a risk aversion of around 5.5 if a disaster occurs every
60 years. When θ drops to -0.50, a risk aversion of 2.3 would suffice. Fixing the dis-
19We could do this for the previous calibration exercise. In fact, there will be little change in
model implications if we adopt this, because only local variants of the baseline disaster model (|ωθ|
is small) are considered. I choose to fix the total variance before so it has a partial derivative flavor.
This time, however, since we are searching over the entire pω, θ, γq space, a fixed total variance
may sometimes imply a negative σ2. Therefore, I set σ2 at 0.0352 instead. In fact, given the rare
occurrence of disasters (especially for the US), I think it makes more sense to equalize σ2 with the
estimate based on historical data.
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Figure 2.9: Risk aversion bounds implied by index option returns. This figure shows
the required risk aversion coefficients corresponding to different disaster frequency ω, disaster size θ
and entropy bounds based on option returns. The thin dotted line depicts the required risk aversion
in generating a 4% annual equity risk premium. The thin dash-dotted line, thick dash-dotted line,
thick solid line, thick dashed line and thick dotted line depict the required risk aversion coefficients
in satisfying the entropy bounds at power s  2, 0.5, 0,1 and -2, respectively.
aster frequency at 1/60, as θ changes from -0.10 to -0.50, the required risk aversion
by the most stringent entropy bound drops from slightly more than 10 to around 6.
In particular, at Barro’s calibration (ω  1{60, θ  0.38), I calculate that a risk
aversion of 7.2 is needed to satisfy the entropy bound at s  1. Such a risk aversion
may be regarded as too high to reconcile with many aspects of an individual’s risk
taking behavior. Secondly, option strategy returns require much larger risk aversion
coefficient than the equity risk premium. In particular, at 1{ω  100, the HJ bound
implied by longing 50% in the 96%-OTM put typically requires an extra 0.5 units in
risk aversion across different disaster size specifications. On top of that, the entropy
bound at s  0 (by shorting 40% on 96%-OTM put) asks for an additional 2 units
in risk aversion. Finally, the incremental requirement imposed by the most stringent
entropy bound at s  1 is around 0.5 to 1 in units of risk aversion. Changes in risk
aversion may be hard to quantify economically; a better way to read the economic
significance off the figure is to reverse the roles of the x- and y-axis. For instance,
when θ  0.50 and fixing the risk aversion at 6, an entropy bound at s  1 im-
plies that disasters need to happen on average at least once every 50 years, whereas
a period of around 100 years would suffice for the entropy bound at s  0. A 50%
drop in consumption that happens twice every century is certainly worse than the
case with only one drop every century. The difference in bounds’ implications is
hence economically significant. Thirdly, in unreported results, I consider alternative
interest rates and entropy bounds at even more negative powers. An annual riskfree
rate in the range of p1.00, 1.06q results in little change in the contour plots. This
is mainly because of the insensitivity of option implied bounds to interest rates, as
we discussed before. Entropy bounds at more negative powers do not substantially
improve on the parameter frontiers depicted by the entropy bound at s  1.
To relate my findings to the literature, it is important to emphasize the method-
ological differences. In particular, Backus, Chernov and Martin (2011) try to infer
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rare event information from option data. However, two strong assumptions are made
in their paper to make the task feasible: 1. Dividend is a levered claim on consump-
tion; 2. A Merton type option pricing model is chosen to summarize the cross-section
of option data. Both are based more on convenience than reality, and it is difficult
to measure how small deviations from them could affect the inference on tail in-
formation. My approach, on the other hand, is model-free by nature. Based on
the fundamental no-arbitrage condition, it asks how much (generalized) dispersion a
pricing kernel has to generate in order to rationalize the profits from trading jump
risks. Although it cannot deliver a definitive point estimate, informative bounds can
tell a lot about the robust features of a pricing kernel. In terms of the empirical
findings, they conclude that option prices imply lower probabilities of extreme ad-
verse events than what international macroeconomic data imply. My results, to the
contrary, show that more frequent and/or severe disasters are probably needed to
reconcile with the historical option return series.20
2.3.4 Testing rare disaster models with option market bounds
In this section, I study the statistical significance of the violation of bounds. I start
by laying down a testing framework. Suppose the set of parameters governing a
specific model is Π. In the case of a disaster model, Π  pβ, γ, µ, σ2, ω, θ, ν2q1. The
transformed moment vector of the pricing kernel is defined as
ΩMpΠ;Sq 

rEM s1s 11s1  Is1Pr0,1q
rEM s2s 11s2  Is2Pr0,1q
. . .
rEM sN s 11sN  IsNPr0,1q
fiffiffiffifl , (2.25)
where S  ps1, s2, . . . , sNq1 denotes the collection of powers we are interested in and
IsjPr0,1q equals 1 if sj P r0, 1q and 1 otherwise. At s  0, IsPr0,1q  1 and the
20My results partially agree with the option return literature (See Jackwerth (2000) and Bon-
darenko (2003)), which find that more frequent crashes need to be added to explain put returns.
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corresponding transformed moment EpM sq 11s should be understood as EplogMq.
These sign functions, IsjPr0,1q’s, adjust the directions of bounds so that the left hand
side (moments of the pricing kernel) always dominate the right hand side (moments
of market returns). Similarly, the transformed return moment vector is given by
ΩRpR;Sq 

EpR
s1
s11
1 q  Is1Pr0,1q
EpR
s1
s11
2 q  Is2Pr0,1q
. . .
EpR
s1
s11
N q  IsNPr0,1q
fiffiffiffiffifl , (2.26)
where Rj denotes a specific type of return from the market. At s  0, the return
moment EpR ss1 q should be treated as EplogRq. For a valid parameterization Π of
the pricing kernel, the difference between ΩMpΠ;Sq and ΩRpR;Sq should be positive,
i.e.,
ΘpSq  ΩMpΠ;Sq  ΩRpR;Sq ¡ 0. (2.27)
The element-wise positivity of ΘpSq  pθps1q, θps2q, . . . , θpsNqq1 constitutes our
basic testable assumptions. In actual estimation, the population moments of returns
can be replaced by their sample counterparts for a given sample size T:
ΘˆpSq  ΩMpΠ;Sq 

1
T
°T
t1R
s1
s11
t,1  Is1Pr0,1q°T
t
1
T
R
s2
s21
t,2  Is2Pr0,1q
. . .°T
t1
1
T
R
sN
sN1
t,N  IsNPr0,1q
fiffiffiffiffifl . (2.28)
By applying the Generalized Method of Moments of Hansen and Singleton (1982),
we can easily find the asymptotic distribution of ΘˆpSq for this just identified system.
However, our problem is a non-standard multivariate inequality test and the usual
Wald or Likelihood-ratio tests will not apply. The difficulty lies in the specification
of a null hypothesis that can generate easy-to-calculate critical values. Following
the multivariate testing literature by Gourieroux, Holly and Monfort (1982), Wolak
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(1987) and especially a recent paper by Patton and Timmermann (2010), I set the
null at ΘpSq  0, which is least favorable to the alternative ΘpSq ¡ 0. To find
p-values, I simulate a large number of draws from the empirical limiting distribution
of ΘˆpSq and calculate the fraction of draws that result in an element-wise positive
θ. This is similar to the simulation exercise in Patton and Timmerman (2010).
The above testing procedure ignores the estimation uncertainty in the GMM
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. This uncertainty could be large given the
presence of highly skewed and fat-tailed option returns. As an alternative, I boot-
strap the historical return data to provide robust p-values. In particular, I re-sample
the historical return series with replacement for a large number of times. For each
sample, I calculate the in-sample ΩRpR;Sq vector and compare it to ΩMpΠ;Sq. Fi-
nally, I count the number of times that ΩMpΠ;Sq does not lie above ΩRpR;Sq in an
element-wise sense.
Ideally, we would like to jointly consider generalized entropy bounds at various
powers with multiple assets. However, a few statistical issues restrict the way in
which we can form these tests. First, testing moment bounds at different powers us-
ing the same asset is problematic. This is because the disturbance terms are perfectly
related in a nonlinear way, which violates the basic ergodicity assumption necessary
for most asymptotic theories to work. Second, the limiting distribution becomes
increasingly unstable as we increase the dimension of the testing statistics. Given
a few hundred monthly observations, this puts a practical limit on the size of the
panel of bounds. Facing these issues, I choose to consider two types of simple bound
tests. One is the univariate entropy bound test using market returns only. This also
serves as the benchmark test since many recent papers studying equity risk premium
impose such a bound (See Backus, Chernov and Martin, 2011, 2012, Martin, 2008
and Alrevaz and Jermann, 2005). The other type is the joint test of the entropy
bound of the index and a generalized entropy bound of an option trading strategy.
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As in previous sections, bounds at powers of 2, 0.5, 0, -1 and -2 are considered and
the corresponding optimal option trading strategies are given in Section 4.2.
To focus on important quantities and to isolate the effects of the riskfree rate, I
use the following procedure to generate a null hypothesis for the parameter vector
Π. First, similar to before, I treat pβ, σ2, ν2q as nuisance parameters and set them
at p0.99, 0.0352, 0.22q. Second, I set the real annualized riskfree rate at 0.95, 1.00
and 1.05, which roughly correspond to the lower bound, mean and upper bound of
a sensible estimate based on the US history. Lastly, given a point of interest for the
triple pω, θ, γq1, I choose µ to match the required interest rate. By doing this, I give
pω, θ, γq1 a lot of freedom in meeting bounds from option data and the burden in
hitting a target interest rate is transferred onto µ. Of course, a large deviation of µ
from the historical consumption growth indicates a failure of the hypothesized Π. I
choose to report the model-implied mean consumption growth µ  ωθ instead21.
Table 2.5 reports the testing results for the baseline disaster model with ω  0.02
and θ  0.35. This roughly corresponds to the ω  0.017, θ  0.38 estimate
based on the empirical distribution of international disasters by Barro (2006), and
close to the baseline parameter choice of the rare disaster literature (See Martin,
2009, Backus, Chernov and Zin, 2011). At γ  5, both the entropy bound for the
index and the HJ bound for the optimal option strategy are satisfied at the histori-
cal mean, as demonstrated by the positivity of the corresponding Mdiff statistics.
22
Notably, at s  0, the model implied entropy is in excess of the risk premium by at
least 5% annually. Hence, not surprisingly, the MKT test has p-values well above
21This is because Ec  µ ωθ is the strict model counterpart to the mean historical consumption
growth. For reasonable ω and θ pairs, the difference between Ec and µ is small.
22At s  0, the Mdiff statistic can be directly interpreted as the dispersion in the pricing kernel
in excess of the risk premium. At other s values, Mdiff measures generalized excess dispersion and
its sign indicates if a bound is satisfied at the historical mean return moment.
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Table 2.5: Baseline disaster model testing results. This table reports the testing results for
the baseline disaster model with ω  0.02, θ  0.35. Rf is the annual riskfree rate and Ec  µ ωθ
is the implied mean consumption growth. MKT denotes the test of the entropy bound with the
market return alone, and MKT+OPT denotes the joint test of the entropy bound for the market
return and generalized entropy bound at power s for the corresponding option strategy return.
Mdiff is the mean difference given in equation (2.28). P
a-value and P b-value are the p-values
generated from the theoretical limiting distribution and a bootstrapped procedure, respectively.
MKT MKT + OPT
s  0 s  2 s  0.5 s  0 s  1 s  2
γ  2 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.081 1.018 0.315 0.500 0.387 0.566
pEc -0.025q Pa-value 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.031 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.030 1.120 0.263 0.449 0.361 0.532
pEc  0.001q Pa-value 0.252 0.017 0.009 0.025 0.001 0.000
P b-value 0.234 0.017 0.011 0.027 0.001 0.000
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.019 1.218 0.215 0.400 0.337 0.500
pEc  0.025q Pa-value 0.666 0.023 0.036 0.063 0.002 0.000
P b-value 0.664 0.022 0.041 0.066 0.003 0.001
γ  5 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.057 2.698 0.213 0.362 0.303 0.444
pEc  0.018q Pa-value 0.906 0.904 0.046 0.096 0.003 0.002
P b-value 0.901 0.908 0.052 0.100 0.006 0.002
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.108 2.628 0.162 0.311 0.278 0.409
pEc  0.028q Pa-value 0.995 0.994 0.100 0.139 0.010 0.003
P b-value 0.995 0.995 0.104 0.135 0.012 0.004
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.157 2.561 0.114 0.262 0.253 0.376
pEc  0.044q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.179 0.173 0.017 0.005
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.182 0.175 0.020 0.007
γ  6 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.202 9.103 0.093 0.217 0.223 0.331
pEc  0.039q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.227 0.225 0.030 0.014
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.225 0.216 0.034 0.016
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.253 9.088 0.043 0.165 0.197 0.296
pEc  0.048q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.364 0.288 0.046 0.024
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.350 0.269 0.047 0.032
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.302 9.074 0.005 0.116 0.173 0.263
pEc  0.056q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.519 0.336 0.071 0.042
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.506 0.322 0.069 0.045
γ  7 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.485 10.831 0.149 0.067 0.072 0.121
pEc  0.074q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.885 0.590 0.275 0.202
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.886 0.587 0.257 0.200
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.536 10.831 0.199 0.118 0.046 0.086
pEc  0.081q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.944 0.659 0.348 0.292
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.948 0.644 0.338 0.286
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.585 10.831 0.246 0.167 0.021 0.052
pEc  0.088q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.976 0.727 0.435 0.361
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.979 0.715 0.416 0.365
0.90 across all interest rate specifications, suggesting no evidence in the rejection of
the entropy bound from the index returns. This is also the case when HJ bound is
added, indicating no discriminating power from HJ bound either. When we include
more demanding option strategy returns at the original entropy bound (s  0), the p-
values drop to 10-18%. The reduction in p-value is impressive, especially considering
the close to one p-value when the index return is the only testing asset. Nonetheless,
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the model survives at conventional significance levels. When s goes to 1 and 2,
p-values drop to well below 5%, suggesting a strong rejection of the baseline disaster
model across all target interest rates.
To remedy this, one must increase the amount of dispersion in the generalized
entropy function. As we learned from the previous section (see Figure 2.9), one good
way to achieve this is to increase the marginal investor’s risk aversion. Indeed, when
γ is raised to 6, the model is borderline accepted at the 5% significance level, and,
at γ  7, the p-values show no sign of rejection at all. However, as risk aversion
gets larger, the implied mean growth rate becomes implausibly high. For instance,
the implied mean growth rate Ec is about 5% when γ  6 and Rf  1.00; when
γ rises to seven, Ec is in the range of 7-9%. These numbers are in contradiction
with the historical consumption data for the US. Clearly, a tension exists between
risk aversion and the riskfree rate, and it is stronger than what thin-tailed consump-
tion growth models imply. An inspection of equation (2.22) tells us why this is so.
Compared to standard models with normal shocks, disaster models carry an extra
exponential term ωreγθ pγνq2{2  1s. Since disasters rarely happen (ω is small), this
term is small for low γ values. However, as risk aversion rises, it grows exponentially
and quickly dominates the intertemporal substitution effect γµ and the precaution-
ary savings effect 1
2
γ2σ2. In particular, at γ  7 and assuming a mean consumption
growth rate of 2%, this term is four times the value of the substitution effect and 20
times the value of the precautionary savings effect. Clearly, under a disaster model
framework, the agent’s hedging demand for rare event risk is strong for even moder-
ately high risk aversion levels. Given a mean consumption growth around 2%, this
strong hedging motive requires low risk aversion to reconcile with the relatively high
interest rate. On the other hand, asset market returns ask for higher risk aversion to
meet generalized entropy bounds. These two forces make the determination of the
representative agent’s risk attitude no longer a one-sided exercise. Taken as a whole,
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it seems that the baseline disaster model is unable to explain the bond market and
the option market at the same time.
Table 2.6: US type disaster model testing results. This table reports the testing results for
the baseline disaster model with ω  0.02, θ  0.10. Rf is the annual riskfree rate and Ec  µ ωθ
is the implied mean consumption growth. MKT denotes the test of the entropy bound with the
market return alone, and MKT+OPT denotes the joint test of the entropy bound for the market
return and generalized entropy bound at power s for the corresponding option strategy return.
Mdiff is the mean difference given in equation (2.28). P
a-value and P b-value are the p-values
generated from the theoretical limiting distribution and a bootstrapped procedure, respectively.
MKT MKT + OPT
s  0 s  2 s  0.5 s  0 s  1 s  2
γ  2 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.089 1.054 0.319 0.507 0.392 0.574
pEc  0.028q Pa-value 0.020 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.023 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.037 1.156 0.268 0.456 0.366 0.540
pEc  0.003q Pa-value 0.196 0.012 0.008 0.019 0.001 0.000
P b-value 0.191 0.013 0.010 0.023 0.001 0.000
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.012 1.254 0.219 0.407 0.342 0.507
pEc  0.022q Pa-value 0.601 0.016 0.036 0.060 0.001 0.000
P b-value 0.610 0.017 0.037 0.062 0.003 0.000
γ  5 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.054 0.731 0.298 0.472 0.364 0.518
pEc  0.004q Pa-value 0.107 0.023 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.110 0.027 0.006 0.013 0.001 0.001
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.003 0.831 0.247 0.421 0.338 0.483
pEc  0.006q Pa-value 0.468 0.060 0.019 0.047 0.001 0.000
P b-value 0.473 0.062 0.020 0.048 0.002 0.001
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.046 0.926 0.198 0.372 0.314 0.451
pEc  0.016q Pa-value 0.860 0.060 0.052 0.087 0.005 0.002
P b-value 0.862 0.064 0.060 0.090 0.005 0.003
γ  7 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.010 2.272 0.252 0.409 0.320 0.387
pEc  0.006q Pa-value 0.595 0.590 0.019 0.054 0.002 0.004
P b-value 0.588 0.584 0.024 0.060 0.005 0.005
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.061 2.199 0.201 0.357 0.294 0.352
pEc  0.013q Pa-value 0.925 0.921 0.053 0.094 0.006 0.009
P b-value 0.927 0.928 0.058 0.099 0.009 0.012
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.110 2.128 0.152 0.309 0.26 0.319
pEc  0.020q Pa-value 0.995 0.994 0.111 0.135 0.012 0.015
P b-value 0.995 0.994 0.116 0.135 0.013 0.019
γ  9 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.167 10.814 0.123 0.252 0.221 0.418
pEc  0.022q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.162 0.186 0.031 0.998
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.160 0.185 0.032 0.998
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.218 10.813 0.073 0.201 0.195 0.455
pEc  0.028q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.289 0.239 0.044 0.999
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.274 0.232 0.050 1.000
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.267 10.813 0.025 0.152 0.171 0.490
pEc  0.033q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.417 0.297 0.070 0.999
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.409 0.286 0.072 1.000
If the extrapolated disaster distributions cannot explain the US market, what
can? I next test disaster models with alternative distributional assumptions. Table
2.6 reports the testing results at ω  0.02, θ  0.10, which is arguably what the
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Table 2.7: Severe type disaster model testing results. This table reports the testing results
for the baseline disaster model with ω  0.01, θ  0.60. Rf is the annual riskfree rate and
Ec  µ   ωθ is the implied mean consumption growth. MKT denotes the test of the entropy
bound with the market return alone, and MKT+OPT denotes the joint test of the entropy bound
for the market return and generalized entropy bound at power s for the corresponding option
strategy return. Mdiff is the mean difference given in equation (2.28). P
a-value and P b-value are
the p-values generated from the theoretical limiting distribution and a bootstrapped procedure,
respectively.
MKT MKT + OPT
s  0 s  2 s  0.5 s  0 s  1 s  2
γ  2 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.077 0.974 0.312 0.496 0.385 0.563
pEc  0.023q Pa-value 0.037 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.034 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.026 1.075 0.260 0.444 0.359 0.529
pEc  0.003q Pa-value 0.281 0.018 0.009 0.027 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.278 0.022 0.011 0.034 0.001 0.000
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.023 1.172 0.212 0.396 0.334 0.497
pEc  0.028q Pa-value 0.703 0.020 0.037 0.067 0.002 0.001
P b-value 0.703 0.029 0.046 0.072 0.003 0.001
γ  5 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.213 9.786 0.076 0.206 0.224 0.339
pEc  0.049q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.279 0.230 0.028 0.012
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.262 0.232 0.031 0.014
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.264 9.777 0.026 0.154 0.198 0.305
pEc  0.059q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.417 0.286 0.049 0.019
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.413 0.291 0.053 0.027
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.313 9.768 0.022 0.106 0.174 0.271
pEc  0.069q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.566 0.349 0.066 0.033
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.554 0.334 0.075 0.037
γ  5.5 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.379 10.818 0.068 0.040 0.137 0.220
pEc  0.075q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.707 0.438 0.123 0.072
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.699 0.427 0.125 0.076
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.430 10.817 0.118 0.011 0.111 0.185
pEc  0.084q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.821 0.512 0.172 0.110
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.828 0.499 0.175 0.102
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.479 10.817 0.165 0.060 0.086 0.151
pEc  0.093q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.906 0.587 0.228 0.158
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.904 0.574 0.220 0.156
US has experienced23. Table 2.7 and 2.8 show testing results based on perturbations
around the baseline case. In Table 2.6, as expected, the rejections from violations of
the entropy bounds are generally stronger than those in the baseline case. In fact,
risk aversion has to go all the way up to 9 to pass the bound test at s  1 at 5%
level. At the same time, the hedging demand at θ  0.10 is substantially lower than
that at θ  0.35. As a result, the US type disaster model still implies a sensible
mean consumption growth even at γ  9. If one is willing to accept such a high risk
23For the US, a consumption decline in the magnitude of 10% only happened once: in 1931, the
per capita consumption dropped by 9.9%. Hence, strictly speaking, my assumption on the disaster
frequency doubles what the US actually experienced. A lower assumed ω value makes the rejections
in Table 2.6 even more stronger.
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Table 2.8: Mild type disaster model testing results. This table reports the testing results for
the baseline disaster model with ω  0.04, θ  0.15. Rf is the annual riskfree rate and Ec  µ ωθ
is the implied mean consumption growth. MKT denotes the test of the entropy bound with the
market return alone, and MKT+OPT denotes the joint test of the entropy bound for the market
return and generalized entropy bound at power s for the corresponding option strategy return.
Mdiff is the mean difference given in equation (2.28). P
a-value and P b-value are the p-values
generated from the theoretical limiting distribution and a bootstrapped procedure, respectively.
MKT MKT + OPT
s  0 s  2 s  0.5 s  0 s  1 s  2
γ  2 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.085 1.039 0.317 0.503 0.389 0.569
pEc  0.026q Pa-value 0.025 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.028 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.033 1.141 0.266 0.452 0.363 0.535
pEc  0.001q Pa-value 0.222 0.013 0.007 0.022 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.215 0.014 0.010 0.026 0.001 0.000
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.016 1.239 0.217 0.403 0.339 0.502
pEc  0.024q Pa-value 0.633 0.018 0.036 0.060 0.001 0.000
P b-value 0.634 0.021 0.038 0.066 0.003 0.001
γ  5 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.009 0.011 0.266 0.427 0.336 0.477
pEc  0.005q Pa-value 0.426 0.249 0.010 0.043 0.001 0.001
P b-value 0.415 0.250 0.014 0.045 0.002 0.002
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.043 0.104 0.215 0.376 0.310 0.442
pEc  0.015q Pa-value 0.841 0.396 0.040 0.080 0.004 0.001
P b-value 0.840 0.383 0.048 0.088 0.006 0.003
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.092 0.193 0.167 0.327 0.286 0.409
pEc  0.025q Pa-value 0.983 0.376 0.091 0.117 0.007 0.002
P b-value 0.984 0.361 0.096 0.122 0.008 0.003
γ  7 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.159 7.682 0.136 0.260 0.235 0.274
pEc  0.027q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.139 0.185 0.027 0.032
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.138 0.179 0.026 0.039
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.210 7.655 0.085 0.208 0.209 0.239
pEc  0.035q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.253 0.231 0.035 0.053
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.244 0.222 0.041 0.056
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.259 7.629 0.037 0.159 0.184 0.206
pEc  0.042q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.392 0.296 0.060 0.086
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.376 0.274 0.058 0.088
γ  8 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.335 10.803 0.012 0.083 0.135 0.012
pEc  0.046q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.533 0.381 0.122 0.459
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.517 0.369 0.125 0.468
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.387 10.803 0.062 0.032 0.108 0.024
pEc  0.052q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.683 0.454 0.178 0.560
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.689 0.443 0.178 0.555
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.435 10.803 0.109 0.017 0.084 0.058
pEc  0.058q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.811 0.525 0.241 0.649
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.806 0.508 0.230 0.640
aversion level, then the US type disaster specification can fit the asset markets. For
the severe type model in Table 2.7, a risk aversion of 5.5 suffices to satisfy option
return bounds, but a 8% mean growth rate in consumption seems implausibly high.
Turning to the less severe but more frequent type shown in Table 2.8, a somewhat
high mean growth rate around 3.5% and a somewhat high risk aversion of γ  7 are
simultaneously needed to pass all the tests.
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Table 2.9: Robust option strategies testing results. This table reports the testing results
for various disaster models with robust option strategies. In particular, the short position in 96%-
OTM put is halved to 20% for option strategies at s  0,1 and 2. Rf is the annual riskfree
rate and Ec  µ   ωθ is the implied mean consumption growth. MKT denotes the test of the
entropy bound with the market return alone, and MKT+OPT denotes the joint test of the entropy
bound for the market return and generalized entropy bound at power s for the corresponding option
strategy return. Mdiff is the mean difference given in equation (2.28). P
a-value and P b-value are
the p-values generated from the theoretical limiting distribution and a bootstrapped procedure,
respectively.
MKT MKT + OPT
s  0 s  2 s  0.5 s  0 s  1 s  2
pω  0.02, θ  0.35q Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.057 2.698 0.213 0.286 0.151 0.198
pEc  0.018q Pa-value 0.901 0.907 0.045 0.006 0.003 0.002
P b-value 0.906 0.908 0.045 0.008 0.004 0.003
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.108 2.628 0.162 0.234 0.125 0.164
pEc  0.028q Pa-value 0.993 0.994 0.097 0.019 0.011 0.015
P b-value 0.995 0.995 0.102 0.022 0.013 0.013
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.157 2.561 0.114 0.186 0.101 0.131
pEc  0.038q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.186 0.047 0.032 0.032
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.180 0.055 0.033 0.040
ω  0.02, θ  0.10 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.054 0.731 0.298 0.396 0.212 0.272
pEc  0.004q Pa-value 0.106 0.025 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.112 0.026 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.003 0.831 0.247 0.345 0.186 0.238
pEc  0.006q Pa-value 0.474 0.061 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.000
P b-value 0.478 0.059 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.001
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.046 0.926 0.198 0.296 0.162 0.205
pEc  0.016q Pa-value 0.863 0.063 0.054 0.004 0.001 0.002
P b-value 0.857 0.058 0.062 0.007 0.003 0.004
ω  0.04, θ  0.15 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.009 0.011 0.266 0.351 0.184 0.232
pEc  0.005q Pa-value 0.427 0.256 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.001
P b-value 0.419 0.246 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.001
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.043 0.104 0.215 0.300 0.158 0.197
pEc  0.015q Pa-value 0.842 0.383 0.041 0.004 0.002 0.004
P b-value 0.841 0.374 0.049 0.006 0.003 0.003
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.092 0.193 0.167 0.251 0.133 0.164
pEc  0.025q Pa-value 0.984 0.375 0.097 0.013 0.006 0.009
P b-value 0.984 0.365 0.095 0.018 0.008 0.014
ω  0.01, θ  0.60 Rf  0.95 Mdiff 0.213 9.786 0.076 0.129 0.072 0.094
pEc  0.049q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.273 0.123 0.091 0.095
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.269 0.129 0.094 0.094
Rf  1.00 Mdiff 0.264 9.777 0.026 0.078 0.046 0.059
pEc  0.059q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.418 0.243 0.193 0.209
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.408 0.240 0.204 0.199
Rf  1.05 Mdiff 0.313 9.768 0.022 0.029 0.022 0.026
pEc  0.069q Pa-value 1.000 1.000 0.569 0.402 0.341 0.361
P b-value 1.000 1.000 0.560 0.396 0.338 0.347
Finally, one may wonder whether the demanding entropy bounds at negative
powers come from the excessive short position that we allow investors to hold. In
other words, given the statistical uncertainty around the optimal allocation rule,
maybe the selected representative option trading strategies imply in-sample moment
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characteristics that are too harsh for any representative agent type of model to sat-
isfy. To address this robustness concern, I reduce αL by half and redo all tests at
γ  5. Table 2.9 shows the results. We see that although all the p-values associated
with s  0,1 and 2 are somewhat larger than their counterparts in the previous
tables, the rejections are still strong. In particular, the baseline model is rejected at
below 5% significance level for s  1 and s  2 across all target interest rates.
For the US type and the mild type disaster models, none of the specifications can
pass the generalized entropy bound tests at s  0,1 or 2. For the severe type,
the p-values are now well above 5% but it still does not qualify as a successful model
since the implied mean consumption growth rate is too high.
As we reduce the magnitude of αL, we do see that the bound mean statistics
Mdiff gets better (closer to zero) at negative powers. For instance, for the baseline
model, the bound inequality at s  0 is improved by around 8%-10%. This is equiv-
alent to saying that we reduce the mean (log) return of the representative option
trading strategy by 8%-10%. With such a significant drop in mean, how come the p-
values do not increase much? This stems from the small variation of the transformed
option returns. To see this, note that at negative power s, we are essentially taking
fractional powers of the returns, e.g., at s  1, EpR ss1 q  EpR 12 q. Consequently,
the highly volatile option strategy returns are flattened out by these power transfor-
mations. This reduced variation in the transformed sample, together with a negative
mean bound estimate, makes the rejection of bounds highly significant. This feature
again highlights the discriminatory power of generalized entropy bounds at negative
powers.
To summarize the above empirical findings, I show how standard disaster mod-
els under several parameterizations fail to meet the nonparametric bounds based on
robust option trading strategies. The discriminatory power of bounds with negative
powers are highlighted. However, I consider these findings as suggestive as opposed
63
to conclusive. First, although I find evidence against streamline disaster models,
their abilities in magnifying (generalized) entropy through tail distortions are im-
pressive. Within a risk aversion of ten, even the US type specification can meet all
the entropy bounds with a reasonable amount of mean consumption growth. This
leads one to conjecture that more sophisticated variants of disaster models may be
up to the challenge (See Barro and Ursua, 2008 and Watcher, 2008). Second, even for
the current version of disaster model, I have not exhausted all plausible parameter
choices. For instance, the variance ν2 for the normally distributed individual jump is
shown to have important effects on the riskfree rate at a high risk aversion level. Yet
I set it at 0.2 for simplicity. A more extensive exploration of the seven-component
parameter vector Π may yield a winner.
Despite these caveats, there are a few important takeaways from the above exer-
cise. First and foremost, confronting a pricing kernel with the equity risk premium
alone is not enough, especially when tail behavior is considered. In fact, except at
γ  2 and for a riskfree rate below 1, the equity risk premium constraint is satisfied
across all specifications, most of the time with a p-value close to one. This reveals its
lack of power in discriminating tail behaviors of the pricing kernel. By subjecting a
discount rate to a spectrum of option trading strategies at different powers, we gain
a better sense of its all-around performance. Secondly, it is crucial to consider gen-
eralized entropy bounds at negative powers, not only because of its informativeness
by mean moment restrictions as demonstrated by Figure 2.9, but also because of the
statistical powers they afford through fractional power transformations of returns.
This analytical feature, combined with the moment characteristics of option returns,
can potentially provide the most exacting and thus informative moment constraints
on the pricing kernel. Of course, return robustness should be checked to avoid overly
restrictive constraints.
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2.4 Conclusion
Under the fundamental no-arbitrage condition, this paper develops a spectrum of new
nonparametric bounds that significantly enrich the nonparametric bound universe.
These bounds essentially describe the discrepancy between what an optimizing agent
could achieve if all admissible assets were tradable and what she actually achieves
in the real-world market, thus providing an economically meaningful way to restrict
candidate pricing kernels. Motivated by these new bounds, I propose to use the
generalized entropy function, a natural extension of the original entropy, to system-
atically study market implied bounds. Through cumulant-expansions on both sides
of the generalized entropy bounds, I show how the new bounds provide unique infor-
mation about the pricing kernel. Their abilities in teasing out tail information are
also highlighted.
Equipped with these analytical tools, I study index option returns, since their
unique moment characteristics can potentially provide the sharpest restrictions on
the pricing kernel. Empirically, I find that strategies with short positions in deep
OTM put options dominate both the market index and other standard derivative
trading strategies in constraining moments of the pricing kernel. This highlights the
pricing of jump risks in the index option, and is expected to be useful for inferring
rare event distributions in the pricing kernel. I then postulate a pricing kernel in
the form of a standard disaster model and use option return bounds to differentiate
among alternative parameterizations. Both point estimates and formal testing re-
sults indicate the deficiency of standard disaster models in reconciling with option
data. Both tail distortion and time-dependency might be needed to attain bounds
implied by option returns.
A study of the joint behavior of time-varying disaster distribution and option
returns is an obvious avenue to pursue. This not only helps achieve unconditional
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option return bounds but also generates insights into the time series properties of
option returns. The newly developed bound system, in particular an extended ver-
sion that can cope with conditioning information, is expected to be instrumental.
On the other hand, it remains interesting to see other applications of the generalized
entropy bounds, possibly on welfare analysis, model diagnosis, and the creation of
new representative agent models.
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3Diagnosing Dynamic Asset Pricing Models with
Generalized Entropy Bounds
3.1 Theory
3.1.1 Entropy in BCZ
To relate properties of asset returns to features of pricing kernels, BCZ relies on an
entropy concept that has wide applications in science and information theory. In
particular, for a positive random variable M (e.g., a stochastic discount factor), the
entropy is defined as
ENpMq  logEM  E logM. (3.1)
The first term logEM is revealed by the yield on a riskless bond and E logM , by
Jensen’s Inequality and under the no-arbitrage condition, is bounded by the maximal
E logR (expected log return) over a portfolio of assets. Taken together, the entropy
must be greater than or equal to the expected excess return. This fundamental link
between the pricing kernel and asset returns prompts BCZ to use the entropy as an
alternative measure of pricing kernel dispersion.
Under log-normality of the pricing kernel, ENpMq reduces to one-half the vari-
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ance of the log pricing kernel. More generally, BCZ show that ENpMq is a weighted
average of high-order cumulants of the pricing kernel. Let κj be the j-th cumulant
of the pricing kernel,1 then ENpMq can be decomposed as
ENpMq 
8¸
j2
κjplogMq{j!. (3.2)
This decomposition shows how high-order cumulants enter into the entropy definition
and is important for the characterization of pricing kernels that feature tail event
risks, e.g., disaster models.
3.1.2 Generalized entropy
While BCZ’s definition of entropy is intuitively appealing, questions remain about
the specific functional form and the economic content of their entropy definition.
In particular, in the case of log-normality, why would one-half the variance be the
most interesting case? Do there exist other scalings of the variance that are both
mathematically tractable and economically informative (i.e., allowing us to study
the pricing kernel through financial market data)? In general, why is BCZ’s way of
weighting the cumulants most interesting?
I attempt to answer the above inquiries using the extended entropy concept de-
veloped in Liu (2012). Liu (2012) extends the basic entropy by allowing a more
general weighting scheme on the cumulants of the pricing kernel. In particular, Liu
(2012) defines the generalized entropy function (GEF) as
GEF pM ; sq  logEpMq  1
s
logEpM sq, s P p8, 1q. (3.3)
It generalizes the basic entropy as Liu (2012) shows that GEF pM ; sq converges to
ENpMq when sÑ 0. In general, Liu (2012) shows that GEF pM ; sq can be decom-
1Cumulants are slightly different from moments. For the exact calculation of cumulants, see
Backus, Chernov and Martin (2011).
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posed as
GEF pM ; sq 
8¸
j2
κjplogMq
j!
p1 sj1q. (3.4)
Setting s at zero, we arrive at BCZ’s entropy definition. In the case of normality, it
can be shown that
GEF pM ; sq  1
2
p1 sqV arplogMq. (3.5)
We therefore obtain scalings that are different from one-half as in the basic entropy
definition. In general, equation (3.4) permits a polynomial weighting of the individual
cumulants. By varying the power s, we gain insights into various combinations of
the moments of the pricing kernel. For example, by setting s at large negative
numbers, GEF roughly calculates the difference between even and odd moments
of the pricing kernel. This difference is important for diagnosing pricing kernels
that feature asymmetric jumps (e.g., consumption-based models that feature rare
disasters often include downside jumps only). BCZ’s definition sets s at zero and
is unable to capture this information. Liu (2012) builds on this insight to make
inference about a disaster model by using option market returns.
More importantly, Liu (2012) shows that similar to the entropy inequality, the
generalized entropy function at power s is bounded from below by moments of asset
returns:
GEF pM ; sq ¥ s 1
s
logEpR ss1 q  logpRf q, s P p8, 1q, (3.6)
where Rf is the riskfree rate and R is an arbitrary return. If we define γ  1{p1 
sq, then EpR ss1 q equals EpR1γq, which is the expected utility (up to a scaling
constant) of an agent with a risk aversion coefficient of γ. Therefore, the generalized
entropy function at power s (GEF pM ; sq) is no less than the “excess” utility (i.e.,
the right hand side of inequality (3.6)) for an agent with risk aversion γ  1{p1 sq.
This interpretation parallels the interpretation of the basic entropy inequality and
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allows us to directly link pricing kernel dispersion (i.e., generalized entropy) to return
moments. For more properties on generalized entropy, see Liu (2012).
3.1.3 Diagnosing Asset Pricing Models Using Generalized Entropies
What does generalized entropy give us in diagnosing asset pricing models? Or more
specifically, what information about the pricing kernel is revealed through generalized
entropy that is not already in entropy? In this section, I discuss the power of gen-
eralized entropy, especially in comparison with the basic entropy, from a theoretical
point of view.
Time-homogeneous Discount Factor
To set up the framework for a time-homogeneous stochastic discount factor, we
consider a general representation of the pricing kernel that includes many existing
consumption-based asset pricing models as special cases. Suppose the pricing kernel
is given by
Mt 1  exppδqpCt 1{Ctqα1pfpXt 1q{fpXtqq, (3.7)
where f is some positive function and the Markov state vector Xt is modeled as a sta-
tionary process. This representation factors the pricing kernel into the usual power
utility part and a multiplicative part fpXt 1q{fpXtq that models the pricing ker-
nel’s departure from the permanent consumption growth. This factorization applies
to models with habit persistence and to limiting versions of models with recursive
utility.2
Under this representation, we have
1
n
E
n¸
j1
logMt j  δ   pα  1q
n
Eplog ct n  log ctq   1
n
Eplog fpXt nq  log fpXtqq.
(3.8)
2See Borovicka, Hansen, Hendricks and Scheinkman (2010).
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If we further assume that increments in log consumption growth are i.i.d. and given
the stationarity of Xt, we have
1
n
E
n¸
j1
logMt j  δ   pα  1qEplog c1  log c0q. (3.9)
Notice that in equation (3.8), the part involving f disappears as stationarity of the
state vector implies 1
n
Eplog fpXt nq  log fpXtqq  0. The formula in equation (3.9)
suggests that the expectation of the per period log pricing kernel is a linear (affine,
if risk aversion α ¡ 1) function of the expected consumption growth rate. This is
exactly the same as in the power utility case. Hence, the second component in the
basic entropy definition cannot reveal information about the transitory component f .
As a result, from the perspective of model comparison, the basic entropy only focuses
on fitting the time series of bond yields with different maturities. This absence of
information about how the transient component f affects alternative assets (i.e.,
assets other than riskless bonds) is the primary disadvantage in using the basic
entropy to disgnose asset pricing models.
This disappearance of temporary variations in entropy is unique to BCZ’s defi-
nition. Under generalized entropy, temporary variations show up in the second part
of the entropy definition. To see this, we make a few assumptions. First, we assume
that log consumption growth and the stationary process fpXtq are independent and
normally distributed. Second, we assume that the increments in log consumption
growth are i.i.d. Neither of these assumptions is necessary for the illustration of the
usefulness of the generalized entropy. We use them to ease exposition. Under these
assumptions, the second part in GEF pM ; sq scaled by horizon n is
1
ns
logEpMt 1 . . .Mt nqs  δ   pα  1qEplog c1  log c0q   1
2
spα  1q2 
V arplog c1  log c0q   1
2
s
V arplog fpXt nq  log fpXtqq
n
.
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For BCZ’s entropy, the power s is set at zero so neither the variance of the
consumption growth nor the variance of the transient component enters the entropy
definition. For alternative values of s, both variances show up. Since fpXtq is station-
ary, the scaled variance of the transient shock V arplog fpXt nqlog fpXtqq{n goes to
zero as horizon n increases. For a finite horizon n, the second part of GEF weights
the unconditional variance of the permanent shock and the temporary shock. In
essence, generalized entropy encodes high-order moment3 information of the pricing
kernel that is absent in the basic entropy.
The generalized entropy is crucial for the diagnosis of asset pricing models that
feature external habits. Popular habit models such as the Campbell-Cochrane model
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and the Santos-Veronesi model (Santos and Veronesi,
2001) have similar but different specifications on transitory shocks through the func-
tion f . However, these similar specifications of external habits compound dramat-
ically over time for the pricing of growth rate risk and become drastically different
over long horizons.4 To quantify these differences among models, we first need to
have a measure in which the specification of f does matter. Clearly, the basic entropy
fails to meet this criteria while the generalized entropy is able to.
Stochastic Volatility
Recent asset pricing models feature stochastic volatility, that is, time-variation in the
conditional variance of the pricing kernel. Prominent examples include the long-run
risk model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) and its variations.5 The defining feature of such
a model is the fluctuating quantity of risks. Locally, normality is assumed to obtain
3This includes the second moment as shown by the example.
4See Borovicka, Hansen, Hendricks and Scheinkman (2010) for an illustration of the nonlinear
compounding in the Campbell-Cochrane habit model.
5See Ai (2010), Drechsler and Yaron (2011) and Zhou and Zhu (2013).
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simple characterization.6 However, if we integrate over time, such models become
a more complicated “mixture of normals”. In particular, a low probability event
under the steady state volatility can happen with a high probability under a high
volatility state. Unconditionally, the thin tails of the normal density are enlarged by
this mixture structure. It is thus important to see if the entropy or the generalized
entropy can capture this mixture distribution.
To see how the generalized entropy captures stochastic volatility, I use a toy
consumption-based model that features stochastic volatility. In particular, suppose
the log pricing kernel mt 1 has the following form:
mt 1  C0   Cσσ2t  γσtηt 1   Awwt 1, (3.10)
where σt is the volatility state variable, ηt 1 is the permanent shock for consumption
growth and wt 1 is the shock for the volatility process. The model can be thought
of as a restricted long-run risks model in which the long-run growth channel is shut
off.7 In this model, only the permanent shock for consumption growth enters the
discount factor with stochastic volatility.
To calculate the second component in the generalized entropy, I first condition
on current information and then take unconditional expectation.
1
s
logErexpps mt 1qs  1
s
logErexpps mt 1q|Fts, (3.11)
 Const.  1
s
logErexpps  Cσσ2tlomon
Stationary
 s2  r1
2
γ2σ2t slooomooon
Permanent
qs.(3.12)
Based on properties of moment generating functions for normally distributed random
variables, the conditional moment generating function for the pricing kernel Eps 
6Discrete time models that assume normally distributed innovations for the volatility process
sometimes imply negative values for volatility and are thus inappropriate. Although alternative
distributions (e.g., Gamma distribution) can be applied to obtain strict positivity, I use models
with normal innovations to ease the exposition.
7See Bansal and Yaron (2004) for the relation between the loadings of the pricing kernel and
the preference parameters, especially the IES (Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution).
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mt 1|Ftq includes two parts. One part is the conditional mean that depends on the
stationary state variable σ2t and the other part captures the permanent shock ηt 1
magnified by the stochastic volatility σt. The key observation is that these two parts
are weighted differently. BCZ’s entropy sets s at zero and thus completely misses
the permanent shock part.8 The intuition is that for an agent with log utility, she
optimally chooses the growth optimal portfolio. Her maximized utility only reflects
the growth rate of the pricing kernel. At the other extreme, when s equals one
(risk aversion γ  1{p1  sq  8), the agent becomes infinitely risk-averse and the
conditional entropy reduces to the reciprocal of the risk-free rate. For s values that
fall between zero and one, the agent weights the variation from the state variable σ2t
and the variation from the permanent shock.
To sum up, generalized entropy is capable of disclosing more information about
the pricing kernel than what the basic entropy can. For a time-homogeneous discount
factor, it captures moments of transitory shocks and should be useful for differentiat-
ing models that have similar specifications on the nonlinear functional that governs
the movement of the state vector (e.g., different versions of the habit model). For a
discount factor that features stochastic volatility, it weights moments of the perma-
nent and stationary shocks. It remains interesting to see whether asset market data
can provide useful information to bear on these generalized entropies.
3.1.4 Horizon Dependence and Conditioning Information
Horizon dependence is not only an empirical fact for financial market data but also a
key feature for most asset pricing models. However, BCZ’s entropy captures horizon
dependence through bond yields only and completely misses other sources of depen-
dency among for time series of discount factors. To see this, notice that the first
8As s approaches zero, 1s logErexppsmt 1qs approaches Epmt 1q, which misses the information
from contemporaneous shocks.
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part in BCZ’s entropy ENpMq is log of the expectation of the pricing kernel, which
is simply minus the continuously compounded return of a riskless bond. The second
part, EplogMq, reduces to the sum of the expectation of single period pricing kernels
and, by assuming stationarity of the log pricing kernel, equals the expectation of the
single period log pricing kernel times the number of periods. On a per period basis,
the second part of their definition always equals the expected single period pricing
kernel and fails to capture the dependence structure among them.
The story is different for the generalized entropy. I write out the GEF for an
n-period pricing kernel as
GEF pM ; sq  logEpMt 1Mt 2 . . .Mt nq  1
s
logErpMt 1Mt 2 . . .Mt nqss. (3.13)
When the discount factors are independent, GEF for the n-period pricing kernel
becomes n times the GEF of the single period pricing kernel. In other words, GEF
scales in the case of independence. In general, a multi-period GEF cannot be sim-
plified and the second part captures the dependence among single period discount
factors other than what has already been captured in bond yields.
Another way to study horizon dependence is to directly consider conditioning
information. Previous research has used conditioning information to sharpen uncon-
ditional mean-variance frontier and asset pricing bounds.9 I also use conditioning
information to augment the asset space10 and obtain sharper restrictions on the pric-
ing kernel through generalized entropy bounds. However, we face some choices in
selecting among the many financial and economic variables that have been docu-
mented to predict market returns. As a first step in bringing in predictive variables
to diagnose asset pricing models, this paper relies on empirical proxies for the state
variables that candidate models assume. This makes sense because they are the
9See Bekaert and Liu (2004), Gallant, Hansen and Tauchen (1990) and Ferson and Siegel (2003).
10See Brandt and Santa-Clara (2006) for a similar argument on how to use conditioning infor-
mation to augment the asset space.
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primitive economic assumptions for these models to work and bounds implied by
them should be the minimal thresholds for any reasonable model to overcome.
3.2 Applications
3.2.1 Data
For the empirical analysis, I use monthly data on the S&P 500 index and the risk-
free rate. The riskfree rate is from Kenneth French’s online data library. When
conditioning information is considered and for consumption, I use the per capita
consumption growth data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For survey
forecasts on GDP growth and growth dispersion, I use both the Livingston Survey
and the Blue Chips Economic Indicators. I combine forecasts from the two surveys
to obtain a large cross-section of forecasters.
3.2.2 Candidate Models
We use three representative agent models that have been proposed by the recent asset
pricing literature. For models that feature external habits, we use the Campbell and
Cochrane (CC, 1999) model and the Chan and Kogan (CK, 2002) model. Both
habit models tie the current price of risk to past consumption but rely on different
functional form of the habit stock. CK uses ratio habit while CC uses difference
habit. The key parameters in both models are the persistence for habits. I use
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)’s choice of 0.9885 for CC and use BCZ’s choice of 0.9
for CK. Had we adopted a lower persistence for CK as in Chan and Kogan (2002),
the rejection of CK will be even stronger, as we will see later.
For models that feature stochastic volatility, I use the long-run risks model as in
Bansal and Yaron (LRR, 2004) but choose to use the calibration in Bansal, Kiku and
Yaron (BKY, 2007). BKY suggest a higher persistence for stochastic volatility than
the original calibration in Bansal and Yaron (2004) to better match consumption
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dynamics. In fact, our overall assessment of LRR is independent of the choice of the
calibrations.
I choose not to consider the third strand of models proposed by the literature,
namely, the rare disaster models. For models that feature skewed and heavy-tailed
jumps, we need to consider returns that also have these properties. Liu (2012) takes
on this project to use index option returns to infer the rare disaster distributions.
3.2.3 Unconditional Bounds
Time-scaled Generalized Entropy
To ease the interpretation of our results, I define the time-scaled generalized entropy
Mpt, sq for a multi-period pricing kernel M1M2 . . .Mt as:
Mpt, sq  12
t
 r1
s
logEpM1M2 . . .Mtqss. (3.14)
Mpt, sq is the second component in GEF multiplied by 12{t. We choose to focus on
Mpt, sq as it is the key ingredient that makes GEF different from the basic entropy.
Additionally, it is properly scaled so that everything is in annual terms when we vary
the horizon t. In particular, when the pricing kernels are i.i.d., Mpt, sq reduces to
12  rE logM1s, which is constant across all horizon t. Given an arbitrary return R,
12  rE logM1s is bounded below by 12  rE logRs, which is the annal continuously
compounded return. Therefore, Mpt, sq has a unit that is commensurate with annual
returns and is a constant when there is no predictability in the pricing kernel.
Table 3.1 shows the values of Mpt, sq across various powers (s) and horizons (t) for
the three candidate models. To see how Mpt, sq reveals information about the pricing
kernel, we start with the baseline case at s  0. This corresponds to a risk aversion
of one. At this level of risk aversion, Mpt, 0q is constant across all horizons. As we
discussed previously, the basic entropy — in the absence of the part that relates to
the riskfree rate — fails to capture horizon dependence. To interpret Mpt, 0q, the
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Table 3.1: Model implied time-scaled generalized entropy Mpt, sq. The expression for
Mpt, sq is given by equation (14). We simulate a long time series (50,000) for each candidate model
to calculate the expectation in Mpt, sq.
Panel A: Chan and Kogan (CK, 2002)
Power 1mth 3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s  3pγ  1{4q 161.39 173.34 168.42 141.85 96.47
s  1pγ  1{2q 155.32 152.12 129.52 103.67 48.63
s  0pγ  1q 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17
s  1{2pγ  2q 4.05 2.74 1.92 -1.35 -2.10
s  2{3pγ  3q 1.90 1.57 -1.71 -2.59 -3.65
Panel B: Campbell and Cochrane (CC, 1999)
Power 1mth 3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s  3pγ  1{4q 86.34 89.89 113.10 125.12 114.14
s  1pγ  1{2q 42.33 42.36 42.51 42.91 44.52
s  0pγ  1q 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36
s  1{2pγ  2q 10.98 11.02 11.19 11.38 11.89
s  2{3pγ  3q 7.52 7.57 7.74 7.94 8.47
Panel C: Basal, Kiku and Yaron (BKY, 2007)
Power 1mth 3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s  3pγ  1{4q 111.39 113.52 127.22 144.05 138.74
s  1pγ  1{2q 54.96 55.03 55.51 56.49 60.50
s  0pγ  1q 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.03 27.30
s  1{2pγ  2q 13.53 13.56 13.64 13.70 13.92
s  2{3pγ  3q 8.94 8.98 9.08 9.14 9.37
basic entropy bound implies that the maximal allowable mean equity return is 27.3%
per annum for LRR, which is more than enough to cover the observed mean equity
return in the magnitude of 8-10% per annum.11 For CK and CC, Mpt, 0q drops to
6.71% and 21.36%, respectively. Similar to what BCZ found, CK is unable to meet
the basic entropy. We will discuss the statistical significance of this result later.
For other s values, we see a large amount of variation in Mpt, sq across horizon
t. For instance, at s  3, Mpt,3q at the five-year horizon is almost 25% higher
11Note that Mpt, sq does not adjust for the riskfree rate, so we have the mean raw equity return
instead of the equity risk premium.
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than Mpt,3q at the three-month horizon. The variation is even higher for the two
habit models. When the pricing kernels are i.i.d., there should be no variation for
Mpt, sq across horizon t. Therefore, the amount of variation measures the degree
of departure from the i.i.d. case and is important to the diagnosis of asset pricing
models that feature predictability and/or stochastic volatility. Fixing horizon t and
by varying power s, Mpt, sq reveals the degree of non-normality in the pricing kernel.
To see this, notice that Mpt, sq is linear in s when the multi-period discount factor
is log-normally distributed, i.e.,
Mpt, sq9p1 sqV arpM1M2 . . .Mtq
t
. (3.15)
Hence, the curvature of Mpt, sq in s measures the degree of departure from normality.
To evaluate the curvature of Mpt, sq based on Table 1, we first approximate the slope
of Mpt, sq at a power s by
Slopepsq  Mpt, s  δq Mpt, sq
δ
. (3.16)
We calculate the slope at s  3 by setting δ  2 and the slope at s  1{2 by setting
δ  1{6. For LRR and at one-month horizon, the slopes at s  3 and s  1{2
are 28.40 and 27.84, respectively. At the five-year horizon, they are 37.15 and 26.76,
respectively. Therefore, the difference in slopes at different powers is much larger at
long horizons than at short horizons. This agrees with our previous discussion on
the normal-mixture structure of LRR. With stochastic volatility, the pricing kernel is
approximately unconditionally log-normal at monthly horizons but is far from being
log-normal at five-year horizons.
To sum up, the time-scaled generalized entropy Mpt, sq discloses important in-
formation about the discount factor. In particular, horizon dependence is revealed
when we vary the horizon t and non-normality is revealed when we vary the power
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s. Both horizon dependence and non-normality are key to the diagnosis of recent
asset pricing models. It remains interesting to see if asset market data can provide
effective restrictions on Mpt, sq to help distinguish candidate models.
Model Diagnosis under Unconditional Bounds
We bring in the market data to test the candidate models unconditionally. In partic-
ular, given a multi-period pricing kernel M Mt 1Mt 2 . . .Mt n and a gross returnrR  Rt 1Rt 2 . . . Rt n, we test if the following bound is satisfied:
 1
s
logEpM sq ¥ s 1
s
logEp rR1 11s q, s   1. (3.17)
As discussed previously, the equivalent risk aversion for power s is γ  1
1s
. We
examine several values of s. The market return rR can represent almost any observable
gross return, with the minor restriction that it remains positive with probability one.
To be consistent with the literature, I focus on the S&P 500 return data.12
To provide statistical significance for a violation of bounds in Equation (3.17),
we rely on bootstrap to generate the “p-value” for an inequality. In particular,
to take return autocorrelations into account, I use block-bootstrap to generate the
empirical distribution for the return moment on the right-hand side of Equation
(3.17).13 The p-value then calculates how often the inequality holds among the
bootstrapped samples. A small p-value indicates a high likelihood of violating the
bound.
Table 3.2 shows the results for testing Equation (3.17). When s  1, we see that
the model implied moments are consistently higher than the data implied moments,
12Alternative assets can provide more information about certain properties of the pricing kernel.
For instance, Liu (2012) uses option return data to infer the higher order moment properties of the
pricing kernel.
13In particular, for an n-period return, we split the historical return series into M{n non-
overlapping blocks, where M is the total length of the return series. We then treat these blocks as
re-sampling units to perform bootstrapping. Newey-West adjustment gives similar results.
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Table 3.2: Testing unconditional bounds. The inequality given by equation (17) is tested.
“Data” shows the right-hand side of equation (17), with rR being the S&P 500 return. The p-values
(in bracket) are generated using block-bootstrap as described in footnote (13).
Horizon
Power 1mth 3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s= -1 Data 10.01 10.11 10.04 9.78 8.92
(γ  1{2) LRR 54.96 55.03 55.51 56.49 60.50
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 42.33 42.36 42.51 42.91 44.52
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CK 155.32 152.12 129.52 103.67 48.63
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
s= 0 Data 9.13 9.12 9.04 8.85 8.27
(γ  1) LRR 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CK 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17
[0.32] [0.32] [0.34] [0.36] [0.38]
s= 1/2 Data 7.35 7.10 6.81 6.53 6.73
(γ  2) LRR 13.53 13.56 13.64 13.70 13.91
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 8.98 9.02 9.19 9.38 9.89
[0.77] [0.78] [0.81] [0.83] [0.88]
CK 4.05 2.74 1.92 -1.35 -2.10
[0.12] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
s= 2/3 Data 5.52 4.97 4.14 3.27 4.86
(γ  3) LRR 8.94 8.98 9.08 9.14 9.37
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 6.52 6.57 6.74 6.94 7.47
[0.86] [0.87] [0.89] [0.78] [0.81]
CK 1.90 1.57 -1.71 -2.59 -3.65
[0.17] [0.11] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]
i.e., the left-hand side of Equation (3.17) consistently dominates the right-hand side.
This dominance is statistically significant, as the p-values are uniformly one, implying
that there is no violation for the bootstrapped return moments at all.
At s  0, which corresponds to the basic entropy bound, CK violates the bound
in mean. That is, the model implied entropy of 6.17% is not enough to explain
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the observed mean equity return of around 9% across various horizons. This agrees
with BCZ, who also find that CK is unable to generate enough dispersion to cover
the equity risk premium. However, this violation does not seem to be statistically
significant, as the p-values are all above 30% across all horizons. Therefore, there is
no statistical evidence for the rejection of CK at s  0. Neither LRR nor CC violates
the basic entropy bound.
Turning to other values of s, we find statistical evidence for the rejection of CK. In
particular, when s  1{2 or 2{3, CK fails the generalized entropy bound in mean and
moreover, bootstrapped p-values are mostly below 10% when the horizon is above
three months and almost zero for two-year and five-year horizon. The rejection seems
to be stronger at longer horizons. Neither LRR nor CC violates the bounds in mean.
Overall, using unconditional bounds, we find strong statistical evidence for the
rejection of CK. The rejection seems to be stronger at longer horizons. Borovicka
et al. (2011) discuss the mechanism of nonlinear compounding in habit models,
especially at long horizons. I provide a tool to characterize horizon dependence
through the generalized entropy and evaluate model implications through generalized
entropy bounds. It seems that bounds with fractional powers (i.e., risk aversion
γ ¡ 1) are powerful in diagnosing asset pricing models.
3.2.4 Conditional Bounds
Conditioning Variables
For unconditional bounds, we are essentially assuming that investors passively hold
the market portfolio. But what about other assets and strategies? Certainly, the
larger the asset space, the sharper bounds become. So exactly what other assets
should we use? One obvious caveat is that no model is the true model. This means
we should not use, say, exotic options to gauge general equilibrium CCAPM’s.
I suggest the use of dynamic strategies that rely on model implied state variables.
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This is reasonable because these state variables are the very basic assumptions for
these models to work. If a model offers a reasonable description of the world and
given that market participants reside in this model economy and observe these state
variables, they will actively trade in the market by following these state variables.
Their maximization behavior in turn provides information about the discount fac-
tor.14
Corresponding to the three candidate models that we focus on, we have two sets of
state variables. For habit models, the habit ratio, which relates to past consumption
growth, is the key ingredient for the models. I use the realized average consumption
growth rate for the past five years as the state variable for the two habit models,
denoted as hˆt. For LRR, both the expected growth rate and growth uncertainty
play important roles in driving asset prices. I use survey based economic forecasts
to construct empirical proxies for these two state variables. In particular, at each
date t, suppose we observe the cross-section of forecasts for annual consumption
growth rate Eitp∆ct 1qni1. We use the sample mean and standard deviation of the
cross-section of forecasts as the proxies for the expected growth rate and growth
uncertainty, denoted as xˆt and σˆt, respectively, i.e.,
xˆt  1
n
n¸
i1
Eitp∆ct 1q, (3.18)
σˆt 
d
1
n
n¸
i1
pEitp∆ct 1q  xˆtq2. (3.19)
Ideally, we would like to have a large cross-section to increase the precision of both
measurements. I therefore follow Colacito, Ghysels and Meng (2013) to combine the
forecasts from Livingston and SPF surveys. This limits the data frequency to be
14See the utility based interpretation of generalized entropy bounds at the beginning of Section
2.
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semi-annual as Livingston forecasts are made every half a year. 15
Predictability Regressions
To take a first look at how these model implied state variables drive returns, I
run predictability regressions for both the realized return and return variance. In
particular, starting from the day on which forecasts are made, I calculate the realized
semi-annual market return Rett,t 6 and realized variance RVt,t 6, which is calculated
by integrating over weekly returns. I then project these realized variables onto the
three state variables. Table 3.3 shows the regression results.
Consistent with habit models, the past consumption growth hˆt seems to be pos-
itively related to both future returns and return variance. However, the loadings do
not seem to be significant and the regression R-squares are less than 5%, which are
not impressive at the semi-annual frequency. For LRR, the expected growth proxy
xˆt is negatively related to future returns, which is contrary to the implications of
standard LRR models (e.g., Bansal and Yaron, 2004).16 On the other hand, the
uncertainty proxy σˆt positively forecasts both future returns and return variance,
consistent with LRR. Moreover, it seems to have modest predictability for future
returns (R2  4%) and strong predictability for realized variance (R2  14%). This
finding is consistent with Colacito, Ghysels and Meng (2013), who show that forecast
dispersion is a significant predictor of return, both in level and in variance.
Model Diagnosis under Conditional Bounds
Predictive regressions show the abilities of some state variables in forecasting the
movements of market returns. We now incorporate them into the agent’s opti-
15For details on how to combine forecasts, see Colacito, Ghysels and Meng (2013). For other
works that use survey forecasts to measure growth uncertainty, see Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010).
16Further extensions of the model, possibly through richer specifications on the correlation be-
tween the expected growth shock and dividend growth shock, can reconcile this finding. See Ja-
gannathan and Marakani (2011).
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Table 3.3: Predictive regressions for
model implied state variables. xˆt and
σˆt and the mean and standard deviation of
the cross-section of survey forecasts as given
by equation (18) and (19), respectively. hˆt
is the average consumption growth rate for
the past five years. We project the realized
return Rett,t 6 and realized variance RVt,t 6
onto current state variables. R2 reports the
adjusted R-square.
xˆt σˆt hˆt R
2
Rett,t 6 -0.171 0.06
(0.07)
0.093 0.04
(0.08)
0.371 0.02
(0.52)
-0.052 0.031 0.07
(0.03) (0.03)
RVt,t 6 -0.143 0.05
(0.12)
0.160 0.14
(0.08)
0.048 0.04
(0.05)
-0.097 0.149 0.17
(0.10) (0.07)
mization problem and use the maximally achievable utility to sharpen asset pricing
bounds, thanks to the utility-based interpretation of generalized entropy bounds dis-
cussed previously. I do this in a simple manner. I assume that an investor allocates
her wealth between the market portfolio and the riskfree rate at the beginning of
each period, after observing an investment signal st. Assuming a function F that
describes the weight that she puts on the market portfolio, the end of period return
over horizon h is given by:
Rt,t h  F pstq Rmktt,t h   p1 F pstqq Rbondt,t h. (3.20)
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Furthermore, I postulate that F follows a logit function.17 That is, given a univariate
investment signal st, F pstq is given by:
F pstq  exppα0   α1stq
exppα0   α1stq   1 , (3.21)
where α0 and α1 are coefficients that need to be estimated. There are at least two
advantages in adopting the response function F . First, although more complicated
functional forms can be used, the simple two-parameter logit specification allows
a more robust estimate.18 Second, the logit function guarantees that the weight
strictly falls between zero and one, making the composite return always positive.
The positivity of returns is a necessary condition for bounds to hold.
An investor with a risk aversion coefficient of γ seeks to maximize her uncon-
ditional expected utility EpR1γt,t hq{p1  γq. Given a response function F pstq, her
utility is determined and depends on α0 and α1. I search for α0 and α1 to maximize
the sample counterpart of her utility. Let the estimated coefficients for the response
function be αˆ0 and αˆ1 and the maximized objective function be Upαˆ0, αˆ1q. Then the
generalized entropy bounds, applying to the dynamic strategy return Rt,t h, implies
the following inequality:
 1
s
logEpM sq ¥ s 1
s
logUpαˆ0, αˆ1qp1 γq, γ  1
1 s. (3.22)
Similar to what I do under unconditional bounds, I test if the above inequality
holds for a given model. To calculate statistical significance, I need to generate the
empirical distribution of Upαˆ0, αˆ1q. I achieve this through bootstrapping.19
17For alternative functional forms, see the later discussion on robustness.
18For the tradeoff between robustness and flexibility for portfolio choice problems, see Brandt
(1999).
19I simultaneously bootstrap the historical return series and investment signals. For each boot-
strapped sample, I solve the optimization problem and obtain the maximized utility. I do this many
times to obtain the empirical distribution for Upαˆ0, αˆ1q.
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Table 3.4: Testing conditional bounds using past consumption growth (hˆt). The in-
equality given by equation (22) is tested. “Data(Uncond.)” and “Data(Cond.)” show the right-
hand side of equation (17) and (22), respectively. The p-values (in bracket) are generated using
block-bootstrap as described in footnote (19).
Horizon
3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s= 0 Data(Uncond.) 9.12 9.04 8.85 8.27
(γ  1) Data(Cond.) 9.58 10.01 9.78 9.91
LRR 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
s= 1/2 Data(Uncond.) 7.10 6.81 6.53 6.73
(γ  2q Data(Cond.) 7.98 7.51 7.16 7.21
LRR 13.56 13.64 13.70 13.91
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 9.02 9.19 9.38 9.89
[0.83] [0.91] [1.00] [1.00]
s= 2/3 Data (Uncond.) 4.97 4.14 3.27 4.86
(γ  3) Data (Cond.) 5.11 5.02 4.12 4.37
LRR 8.98 9.08 9.14 9.37
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 6.57 6.74 6.94 7.47
[0.89] [0.93] [1.00] [1.00]
Table 3.4-3.6 show the results by examining one signal at a time. By conditioning
on the volatility signal σˆt, we see the rejection of CC. In particular, when s  1{2
(γ  2), CC cannot generate enough entropy at the two-year and five-year horizon.
But the results are statistically insignificant. When s  2{3 (γ  3), CC is rejected
statistically (at 10%) at relatively short horizons. There seems to be no violation
for LRR. Therefore, by incorporating conditional information, the data moments
(i.e., right-hand side of Equation (17)) are increased and this helps us better screen
candidate models. As a result, CC survives the exercise using unconditional bounds
but fails when the volatility signal is considered. When either the growth signal xˆt
or the habit signal hˆt is used, however, no rejection for CC is found. This is due
to the limited ability of either signal to generate significant utility gain over the
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Table 3.5: Testing conditional bounds using expected growth (xˆt). The inequality given
by equation (22) is tested. “Data(Uncond.)” and “Data(Cond.)” show the right-hand side of equa-
tion (17) and (22), respectively. The p-values (in bracket) are generated using block-bootstrap as
described in footnote (19).
Horizon
3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s= 0 Data(Uncond.) 9.12 9.04 8.85 8.27
(γ  1) Data(Cond.) 12.13 11.89 11.78 11.21
LRR 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
s= 1/2 Data(Uncond.) 7.10 6.81 6.53 6.73
(γ  2) Data(Cond.) 8.98 8.71 8.35 8.11
LRR 13.56 13.64 13.70 13.91
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 9.02 9.19 9.38 9.89
[0.56] [0.76] [0.75] [0.88]
s= 2/3 Data (Uncond.) 4.97 4.14 3.27 4.86
(γ  3) Data (Cond.) 6.01 5.56 5.32 5.01
LRR 8.98 9.08 9.14 9.37
[0.94] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 6.57 6.74 6.94 7.47
[0.61] [0.63] [0.71] [0.78]
static strategy (i.e., passively holding the market portfolio) and is consistent with
the results from predictive regressions.
Overall, we find statistical evidence for the rejection of CC when growth uncer-
tainty is considered. To the contrary, LRR is not rejected. This points to the impor-
tance of time-varying economic uncertainty in driving asset market movements. The
habit model, while capable of overcoming the static equity risk premium, seems to
have a hard time reconciling the utility gain by an active investor that dynamically
balances her portfolio based on growth uncertainty.
Robustness
Different assumptions on the response function may affect the results. An alternative
functional form that can also restrict F pstq to be within zero and one is the probit
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Table 3.6: Testing conditional bounds using growth uncertainty (σˆt). The inequality
given by equation (22) is tested. “Data(Uncond.)” and “Data(Cond.)” show the right-hand side of
equation (17) and (22), respectively. The p-values (in bracket) are generated using block-bootstrap
as described in footnote (19).
Horizon
3mth 1yr 2yr 5yr
s= 0 Data(Uncond.) 9.12 9.04 8.85 8.27
(γ  1) Data(Cond.) 11.39 11.19 11.01 10.37
LRR 27.30 27.30 27.30 27.30
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
s= 1/2 Data(Uncond.) 7.10 6.81 6.53 6.73
(γ  2) Data(Cond.) 8.51 8.83 9.40 10.02
LRR 13.56 13.64 13.70 13.91
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 9.02 9.19 9.38 9.89
[0.64] [0.55] [0.48] [0.45]
s= 2/3 Data (Uncond.) 4.97 4.14 3.27 4.86
(γ  3) Data (Cond.) 7.23 7.32 7.97 7.81
LRR 8.98 9.08 9.14 9.37
[0.87] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
CC 6.57 6.74 6.94 7.47
[0.08] [0.09] [0.06] [0.34]
function. I redo the above exercise using the probit function and there seems to be
no material change in the results.20
To isolate the effect of each of the state variables, I use them separately as the
conditioning information. However, more significant results (i.e., sharper bounds)
can be obtained by combining these signals. In particular, LRR relies on both
the expected growth and growth uncertainty and it seems natural to consider them
simultaneously as the conditioning information. I combine the two signals in an
additive way. More specifically, I assume that the investment signal st loads linearly
on both state variables and redo the above exercise. As expected, we obtain a sharper
20Details on the results are available upon request.
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rejection of CC, with a p-value that is around 2% lower across different horizons. The
decline in p-value is only marginal, possibly due to the fact that xˆt and σˆt are mildly
correlated so there is not much independent information provided by each additional
signal.21
3.3 Conclusion
Leading asset pricing models are successful in explaining several asset market regu-
larities, e.g., first and second moments of the market return and bond yields. Given
their equal success along these dimensions, how do we further distinguish them?
More importantly, what other return characteristics are also important to bear on
these models? I suggest using the generalized entropy to reveal moment information
of the pricing kernel and using the generalized entropy bounds as a diagnostic tool
to differentiate candidate models.
Under unconditional bound, I find that the optimized utility of an agent with a
certain risk aversion provides a high hurdle for models to overcome. In particular,
the Chan and Kogan (2002) model fails to meet such a hurdle, not only in mean
but also statistically. Adding conditioning information to the analysis, the rejection
of the Chan and Kogan (2002) model is even stronger and moreover, we find mild
evidence against the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model. This is because dynamic
strategies that depend on growth uncertainty produce utility gains that are too high
for the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model to reconcile.
While model implied state variables are found to be informative in distinguishing
candidate models, we can bring in more conditioning variables to further sharpen
the restrictions. For instance, variables such as the pd-ratio, earnings-price ratio and
past return volatility have been shown to predict the first and/or second moment of
the market return. It would be interesting to see if the long-run risks model can meet
21The correlation coefficient between xˆt and σˆt is 0.47.
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the conditional bounds based on these variables. I leave these to future research.
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4. . . and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns
4.1 The Search Process
Our goal is not to catalogue every asset pricing paper ever published. We narrow
the focus to papers that propose and test new factors. For example, Sharpe (1964),
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) all theoretically proposed (at roughly the same
time), a single factor model — the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Beginning
with Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), there are hundreds of papers that test the
CAPM. We include the theoretical papers as well as the first paper to empirically
test the model, in this case, Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972). We do not include
the hundreds of papers that test the CAPM in different contexts, e.g., international
markets, different time periods. We do, however, include papers, such as Fama and
MacBeth (1973) which tests the market factor as well as two additional factors.
Sometimes different papers propose different empirical proxies for the same type
of economic risk. Although they may look similar from a theoretical standpoint, we
still include them. An example is the empirical proxies for idiosyncratic financial
constraints risk. While Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) use the Kaplan and
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Zingales (1997) index to proxy for firm-level financial constraint, Whited and Wu
(2006) estimate their own constraint index based on the first order conditions of
firms’ optimization problem. We include both even though they are likely highly
correlated.
Since our focus is on factors that can broadly explain asset market return patterns,
we omit papers that focus on a small group of stocks or for a short period of time.
This will, for example, exclude a substantial amount of empirical corporate finance
research that studies event-driven return movements.
Certain theoretical models lack immediate empirical content. Although they
could be empirically relevant once suitable proxies are constructed, we choose to
exclude them.
With these rules in mind, we narrow our search to generally the top journals in
finance, economics and accounting. To include the most recent research, we search
for working papers on SSRN. Working papers pose a challenge because there are
thousands of them and they are not refereed. We choose a subset of papers that we
suspect are in review at top journals or have been presented at top conferences or
are due to be presented at top conferences. We end up using 63 working papers. In
total, we focus on 312 published works and selected working papers. We catalogue
315 different factors.1
Our collection of 315 factors likely under-represents the factor population. First,
we generally only consider top journals. Second, we are very selective in choosing
only a handful of working papers. Third, and perhaps most importantly, we should
be measuring the number of factors tested (which is unobservable) — that is, we
do not observe the factors that were tested but failed to pass the usual significance
levels and were never published (see Fama (1991)).
1As already mentioned, some of these factors are highly correlated. For example, we include
two versions of idiosyncratic volatility — where the residual is defined by different time-series
regressions.
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4.2 Factor Taxonomy
To facilitate our analysis, we group the factors into different categories. We start with
two broad categories: “common” and “individual”. “Common” means the factor can
be viewed as a proxy for a common source of risk. Risk exposure to this factor or its
innovations is supposed to help explain cross-sectional return patterns. “Individual”
means the factor is specific to the security or portfolio. A good example is Fama and
MacBeth (1973). While the beta against the market return is systematic (exposure
to a common risk factor), the standard deviation of the market model residual is
security specific and hence an idiosyncratic or individual risk. Many of the individual
factors we identify are referred to in the literature as “characteristics”.
Based on the unique properties of the proposed factors, we further divide the
“common” and “individual” groups into finer categories. In particular, we divide
“common” into: “financial”, “macro”, “microstructure”, “behavioral”, “accounting”
and “other”. We divide “individual” into the same categories — except we omit the
“macro” classification, which is common, by definition. The following table provides
further details on the definitions of these sub-categories and gives examples for each.
Table 4.1: Factor Classification
Risk type Description Examples
Common
p113q
Financial
p46q
Proxy for aggregate financial market
movement, including market portfo-
lio returns, volatility, squared mar-
ket returns, etc.
Sharpe (1964): market returns;
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976):
squared market returns
Macro
p40q
Proxy for movement in macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, including con-
sumption, investment, inflation, etc.
Breeden (1979): consumption
growth; Cochrane (1991): invest-
ment returns
Microstructure
p11q
Proxy for aggregate movements in
market microstructure or financial
market frictions, including liquidity,
transaction costs, etc.
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003): mar-
ket liquidity; Lo and Wang (2006):
market trading volume
Behavioral
p3q
Proxy for aggregate movements
in investor behavior, sentiment or
behavior-driven systematic mispric-
ing
Baker and Wurgler (2006): investor
sentiment; Hirshleifer and Jiang
(2010): market mispricing
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Accounting
p8q
Proxy for aggregate movement in
firm-level accounting variables, in-
cluding payout yield, cash flow, etc.
Fama and French (1992): size and
book-to-market; Da and Warachka
(2009): cash flow
Other
p5q
Proxy for aggregate movements that
do not fall into the above categories,
including momentum, investors’ be-
liefs, etc.
Carhart (1997): return momentum;
Ozoguz (2008): investors’ beliefs
Individual
p202q
Financial
p61q
Proxy for firm-level idiosyncratic fi-
nancial risks, including volatility, ex-
treme returns, etc.
Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang
(2006): idiosyncratic volatility; Bali,
Cakici and Whitelaw (2011): ex-
treme stock returns
Microstructure
p28q
Proxy for firm-level financial market
frictions, including short sale restric-
tions, transaction costs, etc.
Jarrow (1980): short sale restric-
tions; Mayshar (1981): transaction
costs
Behavioral
p3q
Proxy for firm-level behavioral bi-
ases, including analyst dispersion,
media coverage, etc.
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina
(2002): analyst dispersion; Fang
and Peress (2009): media coverage
Accounting
p86q
Proxy for firm-level accounting vari-
ables, including PE ratio, debt to eq-
uity ratio, etc.
Basu (1977): PE ratio; Bhandari
(1988): debt to equity ratio
Other
p24q
Proxy for firm-level variables that do
not fall into the above categories, in-
cluding political campaign contribu-
tions, ranking-related firm intangi-
bles, etc.
Cooper, Gulen and Ovtchinnikov
(2010): political campaign contribu-
tions; Edmans (2011): intangibles
Numbers in parentheses represent the number of factors identified. See Table 5 for details.
4.3 Adjusted T-ratios in Multiple Testing
4.3.1 Why Multiple Testing?
Given so many papers have attempted to explain the same cross-section of expected
returns,2 statistical inference should not be based on a “single” test perspective.3 Our
goal is to provide guidance as to the appropriate significance level using a multiple
testing framework.
We want to emphasize that there are many forces that make our guidance le-
nient, that is, a credible case can be made for even lower p-values. We have already
2Strictly speaking, different papers study different sample periods and hence focus on “different”
cross-sections of expected returns. However, the bulk of the papers we consider have substantial
overlapping sample periods. Also, if one believes that cross-sectional return patterns are stationary,
then these papers are studying roughly the same cross-section of expected returns.
3When just one hypothesis is tested, we use the term “individual test”, “single test” and
“independent test” interchangeably. The last term should not be confused with any sort of stochastic
independence.
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mentioned that we only sample a subset of research papers and the “publication
bias/hidden tests” issue (i.e. it is difficult to publish a non-result).4 However, there
is another publication bias that is more subtle. In many scientific fields, replication
studies routinely appear in top journals. That is, a factor is discovered, and others
try to replicate it. In finance and economics, it is very difficult to publish replica-
tion studies. Hence, there is a bias towards publishing “new” factors rather than
rigorously verifying the existence of discovered factors.
There are two ways to deal with the bias introduced by multiple testing: out-of-
sample validation and using a statistical framework that allows for multiple testing.5
When feasible, out-of-sample testing is the cleanest way to rule out spurious fac-
tors. In their study of anomalies, McLean and Pontiff (2013) take the out-of-sample
approach. Their results show a degradation of performance of identified anomalies
after publication which is consistent with the statistical bias. It is possible that this
degradation is larger than they document. In particular, they drop 10 of their 82
anomalies because they could not replicate the in-sample performance of published
studies. Given these non-replicable anomalies were not even able to survive routine
data revisions, they are likely to be insignificant strategies, either in-sample or out-
of-sample. The degradation from the original published “alpha” is 100% for these
strategies — which would lead to a higher average rate of degradation for the 82
strategies.
While the out-of-sample approach has many strengths, it has one important draw-
back: it cannot be used in real time.6 In contrast to many tests in the physical
4See Rosenthal (1979) for one of the earliest and most influential works on publication bias.
5Another approach to test factor robustness is to look at multiple asset classes. This approach
has been followed in several recent papers, e.g., Frazzini and Pedersen (2012) and Koijen, Moskowitz,
Pedersen and Vrugt (2012).
6To make real time assessment in the out-of-sample approach, it is common to hold out some
data. However, this is not genuine out-of-sample testing as all the data are observable to researchers.
A real out-of-sample test needs data in the future.
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sciences, we often need years of data to do an out-of-sample test. We pursue the
multiple testing framework because it yields immediate guidance on whether a dis-
covered factor is real.
4.3.2 A Multiple Testing Framework
In statistics, multiple testing refers to simultaneous testing more than one hypothesis.
The statistics literature was aware of this multiplicity problem at least 50 years ago.7
Early generations of multiple testing procedures focus on the control of the family-
wise error rate (see Section 4.3.1). More recently, increasing interest in multiple
testing from the medical literature has spurred the development of methods that
control the false-discovery rate (see Section 4.3.2). Nowadays, multiple testing is an
active research area in both the statistics and the medical literature.8
Despite the rapid development of multiple testing methods, they have not at-
tracted much attention in the finance literature.9 Moreover, most of the research
that does involve multiple testing focuses on the Bonferroni adjustment, which is
known to be too stringent. Our paper aims to fill this gap by systematically intro-
ducing the multiple testing framework.
7For early research on multiple testing, see Scheffe´’s method (Scheffe´ (1959)) for adjusting
significance levels in a multiple regression context and Tukey’s range test (Tukey (1977)) on pairwise
mean differences.
8See Shaffer (1995) for a review of multiple testing procedures that control for the family-
wise error rate. See Farcomeni (2008) for a review that focuses on procedures that control the
false-discovery rate.
9For the literature on multiple testing corrections for data snooping biases, see Sullivan, Tim-
mermann and White (1999, 2001) and White (2000). For research on data snooping and variable
selection in predictive regressions, see Foster, Smith and Whaley (1997) and Lynch and Vital-Ahuja
(2012). For applications of multiple testing approach in the finance literature, see for example
Shanken (1990), Ferson and Harvey (1999), Boudoukh et al. (2007) and Patton and Timmermann
(2010). More recently, the false discovery rate and its extensions have been used to study tech-
nical trading and mutual fund performance, see for example Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010),
Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) and Kosowski, Timmermann, White and Wermers (2006). Conrad,
Cooper and Kaul (2003) point out that data snooping accounts for a large proportion of the return
differential between equity portfolios that are sorted by firm characteristics. Bajgrowicz, Scaillet
and Treccani (2013) show that multiple testing methods help eliminate a large proportion of spu-
rious jumps detected using conventional test statistics for high-frequency data. Holland, Basu and
Sun (2010) emphasize the importance of multiple testing in accounting research.
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First, we introduce a hypothetical example to motivate a more general framework.
In Table 4.2, we categorize the possible outcomes of a multiple testing exercise. Panel
A displays an example of what the literature could have discovered and Panel B
notationalizes Panel A to ease our subsequent definition of the general Type I error
rate — the chance of making at least one false discovery or the expected fraction of
false discoveries.
Table 4.2: Contingency Table in Testing M Hypotheses.
Panel A shows a hypothetical example for factor testing. Panel B
presents the corresponding notation in a standard multiple testing
framework.
Panel A: An Example
Unpublished Published Total
Truly insignificant 500 50 550
Truly significant 100 50 150
Total 600 100 700
Panel B: The Testing Framework
H0 not rejected H0 rejected Total
H0 True N0|a N0|r M0
H0 False N1|a N1|r M1
Total M R R M
Our example in Panel A assumes 100 published factors (denoted as R). Among
these factors, suppose 50 are false discoveries and the rest are real ones. In addition,
researchers have tried 600 other factors but none of them were found to be significant.
Among them, 500 are truly insignificant but the other 100 are true factors. The total
number of tests (M) is 700. Two types of mistakes are made in this process: 50 factors
are falsely discovered to be true while 100 true factors are buried in unpublished
work. Usual statistical control in a multiple testing context aims at reducing “50” or
“50/100”, the absolute or proportionate occurrence of false discoveries, respectively.
Of course, we only observe published factors because factors that are tried and found
98
to be insignificant rarely make it to publication.10 This poses a challenge since the
usual statistical techniques only handle the case where all test results are observable.
Panel B defines the corresponding terms in a formal statistical testing framework.
In a factor testing exercise, the typical null hypothesis is that a factor is not signifi-
cant. Therefore, a factor is insignificant means the null hypothesis is “true”. Using
“0” (“1”) to indicate the null is true (false) and “a” (“r”) to indicate acceptance
(rejection), we can easily summarize Panel A. For instance, N0|r measures the num-
ber of rejections when the null is true (i.e. the number of false discoveries) and N1|a
measures the number of acceptances when the null is false (i.e. the number of missed
discoveries). To avoid confusion, we try not to use standard statistical language in
describing our notation but rather words unique to our factor testing context. The
generic notation in Panel B is convenient for us to formally define different types of
errors and describe adjustment procedures in subsequent sections.
4.3.3 Type I and Type II Errors
For a single hypothesis test, a value α is used to control Type I error: the probability
of finding a factor to be significant when it is not. In a multiple testing framework,
restricting each individual test’s Type I error rate at α is not enough to control the
overall probability of false discoveries. The intuition is that, under the null that all
factors are insignificant, it is very likely for an event with α probability to occur when
many factors are tested. In multiple hypothesis testing, we need measures of the Type
I error that help us simultaneously evaluate the outcomes of many individual tests.
To gain some intuition on plausible measures of Type I error, we return to Panel
B of Table 4.2. N0|r and N1|a count the total number of the two types of errors:
10Examples of publication of unsuccessful factors include Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Ferson
and Harvey (1993). Fama and MacBeth (1973) show that squared beta and standard deviation
of the market model residual have an insignificant role in explaining the cross-section of expected
returns. Overall, it is rare to publish “non-results” and all instances of published non-results are
coupled with significant results for other factors.
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N0|r counts false discoveries while N1|a counts missed discoveries. As generalized
from single hypothesis testing, the Type I error in multiple hypothesis testing is also
related to false discoveries — concluding a factor is “significant” when it is not. But,
by definition, we must draw several conclusions in multiple hypothesis testing, and
there is a possible false discovery for each. Therefore, plausible definitions of the
Type I error should take into account the joint occurrence of false discoveries.
The literature has adopted at least two ways of summarizing the “joint occur-
rence”. One approach is to count the total number of occurrences N0|r. N0|r greater
than zero suggests incorrect statistical inference for the overall multiple testing prob-
lem — the occurrence of which we should limit. Therefore, the probability of event
N0|r ¡ 0 should be a meaningful quantity for us to control. Indeed, this is the intu-
ition behind the family-wise error rate introduced later. On the other hand, when
the total number of discoveries R is large, one or even a few false discoveries may be
tolerable. In this case, N0|r is no longer a suitable measure; a certain false discovery
proportion may be more desirable. Unsurprisingly, the expected value of N0|r{R is
the focus of false discovery rate, the second type of control.
The two aforementioned measures are the most widely used in the statistics lit-
erature. Moreover, many other techniques can be viewed as extensions of these
measures.11 We now describe each measure in detail.
Family-wise Error Rate
The family-wise error rate (FWER) is the probability of at least one Type I error:
FWER  PrpN0|r ¥ 1q.
11 Holm (1979) is the first to formally define the family-wise error rate. Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995) define and study the false discovery rate. Alternative definitions of error rate include per
comparison error rate (Saville, 1990), positive false discovery rate (Storey, 2003) and generalized
false discovery rate (Sarkar and Guo, 2009).
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FWER measures the probability of even a single false discovery, irrespective of the
total number of tests. For instance, researchers might test 100 factors; FWER mea-
sures the probability of incorrectly identifying one or more factors to be significant.
Given significance or threshold level α, we explore two existing methods (Bonferroni
and Holm’s adjustment) to ensure FWER does not exceed α. Even as the number
of trials increases, FWER still measures the probability of a single false discovery.
This absolute control is in contrast to the proportionate control afforded by the false
discovery rate (FDR), defined below.
False Discovery Rate
The false discovery proportion (FDP) is the proportion of Type I errors:
FDP 
$'&'%
N0|r
R
if R ¡ 0,
0 if R  0.
The false discovery rate (FDR) is defined as:
FDR  ErFDP s.
FDR measures the expected proportion of false discoveries among all discoveries. It is
less stringent than FWER and usually much less so when many tests are performed.12
Intuitively, this is because FDR allows N0|r to grow in proportion to R whereas
FWER measures the probability of making even a single Type I error.
12There is a natural ordering between FDR and FWER. Theoretically, FDR is always bounded
above by FWER, i.e., FDR ¤ FWER. To see this, by definition,
FDR  Er
N0|r
R
|R ¡ 0sPrpR ¡ 0q
¤ ErIpN0|r¥1q|R ¡ 0sPrpR ¡ 0q
 PrppN0|r ¥ 1q X pR ¡ 0qq
¤ PrpN0|r ¥ 1q  FWER,
where IpN0|r¥1q is an indicator function of event N0|r ¥ 1. This implies that procedures that control
FWER under a certain significance level automatically control FDR under the same significance
level. In our context, a factor discovery criterion that controls FWER at α also controls FDR at α.
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Returning to Example A, Panel A shows that a false discovery event has occurred
under FWER since N0|r  50 ¥ 1 and the realized FDP is high, 50{100  50%. This
suggests that the probability of false discoveries (FWER) and the expected proportion
of false discoveries (FDR) may be high.13 The remedy, as suggested by many FWER
and FDR adjustment procedures, would be to lower p-value thresholds for these
hypotheses. In terms of Panel A, this would turn some of the 50 false discoveries
insignificant and push them into the “Unpublished” category. Hopefully the 50 true
discoveries would survive this p-value “upgrade” and remain significant, which is
only possible if their p-values are relatively large.
On the other hand, Type II errors — the mistake of missing true factors — are
also important in multiple hypothesis testing. Similar to Type I errors, both the
total number of missed discoveries N1|a and the fraction of missed discoveries among
all abandoned tests N1|a{pM  Rq are frequently used to measure the severity of
Type II errors.14 Ideally, one would like to simultaneously minimize the chance of
committing a Type I error and that of committing a Type II error. In our context,
we would like to include as few insignificant factors (i.e., as low a Type I error rate)
as possible and simultaneously as many significant ones (i.e., as low a Type II error
rate) as possible. Unfortunately, this is not feasible: as in single hypothesis testing,
a decrease in the Type I error rate often leads to an increase in the Type II error
rate and vice versa. We therefore seek a balance between the two types of errors. A
standard approach is to specify a significance level α for the Type I error rate and
13Panel A only shows one realization of the testing outcome for a certain testing procedure (e.g.,
independent tests). To evaluate FWER and FDR, both of which are expectations and hence depend
on the underlying joint distribution of the testing statistics, we need to know the population of the
testing outcomes. To give an example that is compatible with Example A, we assume that the
t-statistics for the 700 hypotheses are independent. Moreover, we assume the t-statistic for a true
factor follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance one, i.e., N p0, 1q; for a false factor,
we assume its t-statistic follows N p2, 1q. Under these assumptions about the joint distribution of
the test statistics, we find via simulations that FWER is 100% and FDR is 26%, both exceeding
5%.
14See Simes (1986) for one example of Type II error in simulation studies and Farcomeni (2008)
for another example in medical experiments.
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derive testing procedures that aim to minimize the Type II error rate, i.e., maximize
power, among the class of tests with Type I error rate at most α.
When comparing two testing procedures that can both achieve a significance
level α, it seems reasonable to use their Type II error rates. However, the exact
Type II error rate typically depends on a set of unknown parameters and is therefore
difficult to assess.15 To overcome this difficulty, researchers frequently use distance
of the actual Type I error rate to some pre-specified significance level as the measure
for a procedure’s efficiency. Intuitively, if a procedure’s actual Type I error rate is
strictly below α, we can probably push this error rate closer to α by making the
testing procedure less stringent, i.e., higher p-value threshold so there will be more
discoveries. In doing so, the Type II error rate is presumably lowered given the
inverse relation between the two types of error rates. Therefore, once a procedure’s
actual Type I error rate falls below a pre-specified significance level, we want it to be
as close as possible to that significance level in order to achieve the smallest Type II
error rate. Ideally, we would like a procedure’s actual Type I error rate to be exactly
the same as the given significance level.
Both FWER and FDR are important concepts that have wide applications in
many scientific fields. However, based on specific applications, one may be preferred
over the other. When the number of tests is very large, FWER controlling proce-
dures tend to become very tough and eventually lead to a very limited number of
discoveries, if any. Conversely, FWER control is more desirable when the number of
tests is relatively small, in which case more discoveries can be achieved and at the
same time trusted. In the context of our paper, it is difficult to judge whether the
number of tests in the finance literature is large. First, we are unsure of the true
15In single hypothesis testing, a typical Type II error rate is a function of the realization of the
alternative hypothesis. Since it depends on unknown parameter values in the alternative hypoth-
esis, it is difficult to measure directly. The situation is exacerbated in multiple hypothesis testing
because the Type II error rate now depends on a multi-dimensional unknown parameter vector.
See Zehetmayer and Posch (2010) for power estimation in large-scale multiple testing problems.
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number of factors that have been tried. Although there are around 300 published
ones, hundreds or even thousands of factors might have been constructed and tested.
Second, 300 may seem a large number to researchers in finance but is very small com-
pared to the number of tests conducted in medical research.16 Given this difficulty,
we do not take a stand on the relative appropriateness of these two measures but
instead provide adjusted p-values for both. Researchers can compare their p-values
with these benchmarks to see whether FDR or even FWER is satisfied.
Related to the false discovery rate, recent research by Lehmann and Romano
(2005) tries to control the probability of the realized FDP exceeding a certain thresh-
old value, i.e., P pFDP ¡ γq ¤ α, where γ is the threshold FDP value and α is the
significance level.17 Instead of the expected FDP (i.e., the FDR), Lehmann and Ro-
mano’s method allows one to make a statement concerning the realized FDP, which
might be more desirable in certain applications. For example, targeting the realized
FDP is a loss control method and seems more appropriate for risk management or
insurance. For our asset pricing applications, we choose to focus on the FDR. In
addition, it is difficult to tell whether controlling the realized FDP at γ  0.1 with
a significance level of α  0.05 is more stringent than controlling FDP at γ  0.2
with a significance level of α  0.01. While we use the FDR in our application, we
provide some details on the FDP methods in the Appendix.
4.3.4 P-value Adjustment: Three Approaches
The statistics literature has developed many methods to control both FWER and
FDR.18 We choose to present the three most well-known adjustments: Bonferroni,
16For instance, tens of thousands of tests are performed in the analysis of DNA microarrays. See
Farcomeni (2008) for more applications of multiple testing in medical research.
17Also see Romano and Shaikh (2006) and Romano, Shaikh and Wolf (2008).
18Methods that control FWER include Holm (1979), Hochberg (1988) and Hommel (1988).
Methods that control FDR include Benjamini and Hochberg(1995), Benjamini and Liu (1999) and
Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001).
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Holm, and Benjamini, Hochberg and Yekutieli (BHY). Both Bonferroni and Holm
control FWER, and BHY controls FDR. Depending on how the adjustment is im-
plemented, they can be categorized into two general types of corrections: a “Single
step” correction equally adjusts each p-value and a “sequential” correction is an
adaptive procedure that depends on the entire distribution of p-values. Bonferroni
is a single-step procedure whereas Holm and BHY are sequential procedures. Table
?? summarizes the two properties of the three methods.
Table 4.3: A Summary of p-value Adjustments
Adjustment type Single/Sequential Multiple test
Bonferroni Single FWER
Holm Sequential FWER
Benjamini, Hochberg and
Sequential FDR
Yekutieli (BHY)
In the usual multiple testing framework, we observe the outcomes of all test
statistics, those rejected as well as not rejected. In our context, however, successful
factors are more likely to be published and their p-values observed. This missing ob-
servations problem is the main obstacle in applying existing adjustment procedures.
In the appendix, we propose a new general methodology to overcome this problem.
For now, we assume that all tests and their associated p-values are observed and
detail the steps for the three types of adjustments.
Suppose there are in total M tests and we choose to set FWER at αw and FDR
at αd. In particular, we consider an example with the total number of tests M  10
to illustrate how different adjustment procedures work. For our main results, we set
both αw and αd at 5%. Table 4.4, Panel A lists the t-ratios and the corresponding
p-values for 10 hypothetical tests. The numbers in the table are broadly consistent
with the magnitude of t-ratios that researchers report for factor significance. Note
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that all 10 factors will be “discovered” if we test one hypothesis at a time. Multiple
testing adjustments will usually generate different results.
Table 4.4: An Example of Multiple Testing
Panel A displays 10 t-ratios and their associated p-values for a hypothetical example. Panel B
and C explain Holm’s and BHY’s adjustment procedure, respectively. Bold numbers in each panel
are associated with significant factors under the specific adjustment procedure of that panel. M
represents the total number of tests (10) and cpMq 
°M
j1 1{j. k is the order of p-values from
lowest to highest. αw is the significance level for Bonferroni’s and Holm’s procedure and αd is the
significance level for BHY’s procedure. Both numbers are set at 5%. The threshold t-ratio for
Bonferroni is 0.05%, for Holm 0.60% and for BHY 0.85%.
Panel A: 10 Hypothetical t-ratios and Bonferroni “significant” factors # of
discoveries
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3t-ratio 1.99 2.63 2.21 3.43 2.17 2.64 4.56 5.34 2.75 2.49
p-value (%) 4.66 0.85 2.71 0.05 3.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.28
Panel B: Holm adjusted p-values and “significant” factors
New order (k) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
4
Old order k 8 7 4 9 6 2 10 3 5 1
p-value (%) 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.60 0.84 0.85 1.28 2.71 3.00 4.66
αw{pM   1  kq 0.50 0.56 0.63 0.71 0.83 1.00 1.25 1.67 2.50 5.00
Panel C: BHY adjusted p-values and “significant” factors
New order (k) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
6
Old order k 8 7 4 9 6 2 10 3 5 1
p-value (%) 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.60 0.84 0.85 1.28 2.71 3.00 4.66
pk  αdq{pM  cpMqq 0.15 0.21 0.50 0.70 0.85 1.00 1.20 1.35 1.55 1.70
αd  5%
Bonferroni’s Adjustment
Bonferroni ’s adjustment is as follows:
• Reject any hypothesis with p-value ¤ αwM :
pBonferronii  minrMpi, 1s.
Bonferroni applies the same adjustment to each test. It inflates the original p-value
by the number of tests M ; the adjusted p-value is compared with the threshold value
αw.
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Example 4.4.1 To apply Bonferroni’s adjustment to the example in Table 4.4,
we simply multiply all the p-values by 10 and compare the new p-values with αw 
5%. Equivalently, we can look at the original p-values and consider the cutoff of
0.5%( αw{10). This leaves the t-ratio of tests 4,7 and 8 as significant.
Using the notation in Panel B of Table 4.2 and assuming M0 of the M null
hypotheses are true, Bonferroni operates as a single step procedure that can be shown
to restrict FWER at levels less than or equal to M0αw{M , without any assumption
on the dependence structure of the p-values. Since M0 ¤M , Bonferroni also controls
FWER at level αw.
19
Holm’s Adjustment
Sequential methods have recently been proposed to adjust p-values in multiple hy-
pothesis testing. They are motivated by a seminal paper by Schweder and Spjotvoll
(1982), who suggest a graphical presentation of the multiple testing p-values. In
particular, using Np to denote the number of tests that have a p-value exceeding p,
Schweder and Spjotvoll (1982) suggest plotting Np against p1  pq. When p is not
very small, it is very likely that the associated test is from the null hypothesis. In this
case, the p-value for a null test can be shown to be uniformly distributed between 0
and 1. It then follows that for a large p and under independence among tests, the
expected number of tests with a p-value exceeding p equals T0p1pq, where T0 is the
number of null hypotheses, i.e., EpNpq  T0p1 pq. By plotting Np against p1 pq,
the graph should be approximately linear with slope T0 for large p-values. Points on
the graph that substantially deviate from this linear pattern should correspond to
non-null hypotheses, i.e., discoveries. The gist of this argument — large and small
19The number of true nulls M0 is inherently unknown, so we usually cannot make Bonferroni
more powerful by increasing αw to αˆ Mαw{M0 (note that M0αˆ{M  αw). However some papers,
including Schweder and Spjotvoll (1982) and Hochberg and Benjamini (1990), try to improve the
power of Bonferroni by estimating M0. We try to achieve the same goal by using either Holm’s
procedure which also controls FWER or procedures that control FDR, an alternative definition of
Type I error rate.
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p-values should be treated differently — have been distilled into many variations of
sequential adjustment methods, among which we will introduce Holm’s method that
controls FWER and BHY’s method that controls FDR.
Holm’s adjustment is as follows:
• Order the original p-values such that pp1q ¤ pp2q ¤    ppkq ¤    ¤ ppMq and let
associated null hypotheses be Hp1q, Hp2q,   Hpkq    , HpMq.
• Let k be the minimum index such that ppkq ¡ αwM 1k .
• Reject null hypotheses Hp1q   Hpk1q (i.e., declare these factors significant)
but not Hpkq   HpMq.
The equivalent adjusted p-value is therefore
pHolmpiq  minrmax
j¤i
tpM  j   1qppjqu, 1s.
Holm’s adjustment is a step-down procedure: 20 for the ordered p-values, we start
from the smallest p-value and go down to the largest one. If k is the smallest index
that satisfies ppkq ¡ αwM 1k , we will reject all tests whose ordered index is below k.
To explore how Holm’s adjustment procedure works, suppose k0 is the smallest
index such that ppkq ¡ αwM 1k . This means that for k   k0, ppkq ¤ αwM 1k . In
particular, for k  1, Bonferroni = Holm, i.e., αwM  αwM 1pk1q ; for k  2, αwM  
αw
M 1pk2q , so Holm is less stringent than Bonferroni. Since less stringent hurdles
are applied to the second to the pk0  1qth p-values, more discoveries are generated
under Holm’s than Bonferroni’s adjustment.
Example 4.4.2 To apply Holm’s adjustment to the example in Table 4.4, we
first order the p-values in ascending order and try to locate the smallest index k
20Viewing small p-values as “up” and large p-values as “down”, Holm’s procedure is a “step-
down” procedure in that it goes from small p-values to large ones. This terminology is consistent
with the statistics literature. Of course, small p-values are associated with “large” values of the
test statistics.
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that makes ppkq ¡ αwM 1k . Table 4.4, Panel B shows the ordered p-values and the
associated αwM 1k ’s. Starting from the smallest p-value and going up, we see that
ppkq is below
αw
M 1k until k  5, at which pp5q is above αw10 17 . Therefore, the
smallest k that satisfies ppkq ¡ αwM 1k is 5 and we reject the null hypothesis for the
first four ordered tests (we discover four factors) and fail to reject the null for the
remaining six tests. The original labels for the rejected tests are in the second row
in Panel B. Compared to Bonferroni, one more factor (9) is discovered, that is, four
factors rather than three are significant. In general, Holm’s approach leads to more
discoveries and all discoveries under Bonferroni are also discoveries under Holm’s.
Like Bonferroni, Holm also restricts FWER at αw without any requirement on the
dependence structure of p-values. It can also be shown that Holm is uniformly more
powerful than Bonferroni in that tests rejected (factors discovered) under Bonferroni
are always rejected under Holm but not vice versa. In other words, Holm leads
to at least as many discoveries as Bonferroni. Given the dominance of Holm over
Bonferroni, one might opt to only use Holm. We include Bonferroni because it is the
most widely used adjustment and a simple single-step procedure.
Benjamini, Hochberg and Yekutieli’s Adjustment
Benjamini, Hochberg and Yekutieli (BHY)’s adjustment is as follows:
• As with Holm’s procedure, order the original p-values such that pp1q ¤ pp2q ¤
   ppkq ¤    ¤ ppMq and let associated null hypotheses beHp1q, Hp2q,   Hpkq    ,
HpMq.
• Let k be the maximum index such that ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd.
• Reject null hypotheses Hp1q   Hpkq but not Hpk 1q   HpMq.
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The equivalent adjusted p-value is defined sequentially as:
pBHYpiq 
$&%
ppMq if i M,
minrpBHYpi 1q , McpMqi ppiqs if i ¤M  1.
where, cpMq is a function of the total number of tests M and controls for the gen-
erality of the test. We adopt the choice in Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) and set
cpMq at
cpMq 
M¸
j1
1
j
,
a value at which the procedure works under arbitrary dependence structure among
the p-values. We discuss alternative specifications of cpMq shortly.
In contrast to Holm’s, BHY’s method starts with the largest p-value and goes up
to the smallest one. If k is the largest index that satisfies ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd, we will
reject all tests (discover factors) whose ordered index is below or equal to k. Also,
note that αd (significance level for FDR) is chosen to be a smaller number than αw
(significance level for FWER). The reason for such a choice is discussed in Section
4.6.
To explore how BHY works, let k0 be the largest index such that ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd.
This means that for k ¡ k0, ppkq ¡ kMcpMqαd. In particular, we have ppk0 1q ¡
pk0 1q
McpMqαd, ppk0 2q ¡ pk0 2qMcpMqαd, . . . , ppMq ¡ MMcpMqαd. We see that the pk0   1qth
to the last null hypotheses, not rejected, are compared to numbers smaller than αd,
the usual significance level in single hypothesis testing. By being stricter than single
hypothesis tests, BHY guarantees that the false discovery rate is below the pre-
specified significance level under arbitrary dependence structure among the p-values.
See Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) for details on the proof.
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Example 4.4.3 To apply BHY’s adjustment to the example in Table 4.4, we
first order the p-values in ascending order and try to locate the largest index k that
satisfies ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd. Table 4.4, Panel C shows the ordered p-values and the
associated kMcpMqαd’s. Starting from the largest p-value and going down, we see
that ppkq is above
k
McpMqαd until k  6, at which pp6q is below k102.93αd. Therefore,
the smallest k that satisfies ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd is 6 and we reject the null hypothesis
for the first six ordered tests and fail to reject for the remaining four tests. In the end,
BHY leads to six significant factors (8,7,4,9,6 and 2), three more than Bonferroni
and two more than Holm.21
Under independence among p-values, we can gain insight into the choice of pBHYpiq
by interpreting pBHYpiq as the solution to a post-experiment maximization problem.
22
In particular, assume all individual hypotheses are performed and their p-values
collected. It can be shown that pBHYpiq is the solution to the following problem:
Objective : Choose pˆ that maximizes the number of discoveries nppˆq,
Constraint : pˆM{nppˆq ¤ αd.
We first interpret the constraint. Under independence and when each hypothesis
is tested individually at level pˆ, the expected number of false discoveries satisfies
EpN0|rq ¤ pˆM . Hence, after observing the outcome of the experiment and thus
conditional on having nppˆq discoveries, the FDR is no greater than pˆM{nppˆq. The
constraint therefore requires the post-experiment FDR to satisfy the pre-specified
significance level. Under this constraint, the objective is to choose pˆ to maximize
the number of discoveries. Since the constraint is satisfied for each realized p-value
sequence of the experiment, it is satisfied in expectation as well. In sum, pBHYpiq is the
21For independent tests, 10/10 are discovered. For BHY, the effective cutoff is 0.85%, for Bon-
ferroni 0.50% and for Holm 0.60%. The cutoffs are all far smaller than the usual 5%.
22This interpretation is shown in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Under independence, cpMq 
1 is sufficient for BHY to work. See our subsequent discussions on the choice of cpMq.
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optimal cutoff p-value (i.e., maximal number of discoveries) that satisfies the FDR
constraint for each outcome of the experiment.
The choice of cpMq determines the generality of BHY’s procedure. Intuitively,
the larger cpMq is, the more difficult it is to satisfy the inequality ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd
and hence there will be fewer discoveries. This makes it easier to restrict the false
discovery rate below a given significance level since fewer discoveries are made. In
the original work that develops the concept of false discovery rate and related testing
procedures, cpMq is set equal to one. It turns out that under this choice, BHY is only
valid when the test statistics are independent or positively dependent.23 With our
choice of cpMq, BHY is valid under any form of dependence among the p-values.24
Note with cpMq ¡ 1, this reduces the size of kMcpMqαd and it is tougher to satisfy
the inequality ppkq ¤ kMcpMqαd. That is, there will be fewer factors found to be
significant.
Figure 4.1 summarizes Example A. It plots the original p-value sample as well as
threshold p-value lines for various adjustment procedures. We see the stark difference
in outcomes between multiple and single hypothesis testing. While all 10 factors
would be discovered under single hypothesis testing, only three to six factors would
be discovered under a multiple hypothesis test. Although single hypothesis testing
guarantees the Type I error of each test meets a given significance level, meeting the
more stringent FWER or FDR bound will lead us to discard a number of factors.
To summarize the properties of the three adjustment procedures, Bonferroni’s
adjustment is the simplest and inflates the original p-value by the total number of
23Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) is the original paper that proposes FDR and sets cpMq 
1. They show their procedures restricts the FDR below the pre-specified significance level under
independence. Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) and Sarkar (2002) later show that the choice of
cpMq  1 also works under positive dependence. For recent studies that assume specific dependence
structure to improve on BHY, see Yekutieli and Benjamini (1999), Troendle (2000), Dudoit and Van
der Laan (2008) and Romano, Shaikh and Wolf (2008). For a modified Type I error rate definition
that is analogous to FDR and its connection to Bayesian hypothesis testing, see Storey (2003).
24See Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) for the proof.
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Figure 4.1: Multiple Test Thresholds for Example A
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The 10 p-values for Example A and the threshold p-value lines for various adjustment procedures.
All 10 factors are discovered under independent tests, three under Bonferroni, four under Holm and
six under BHY. The significance level is set at 5% for each adjustment method.
tests. Holm’s adjustment is a refinement of Bonferroni but involves ordering of p-
values and thus depends on the entire distribution of p-values. BHY’s adjustment,
unlike that of Bonferroni or Holm, aims to control the false discovery rate and also
depends on the distribution of p-values. Importantly, all three methods allow for
general dependence among the test statistics.
4.3.5 Summary Statistics
Figure 4.2 shows the history of discovered factors and publications.25 We observe a
dramatic increase in factor discoveries during the last decade. In the early period
25To be specific, we only count those that have t-ratios or equivalent statistics reported. Roughly
20 new factors fail to satisfy this requirement. For details on these, see factors in Table 6 marked
with ;.
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from 1980 to 1991, only about one factor is discovered per year. This number has
grown to around five in the 1991-2003 period, during which a number of papers,
such as Fama and French (1992), Carhart (1997) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003),
spurred interest in studying cross-sectional return patterns. In the last nine years, the
annual factor discovery rate has increased sharply to around 18. In total, 162 factors
were discovered in the past nine years, roughly doubling the 90 factors discovered in
all previous years. We do not include working papers in Figure 4.2. In our sample,
there are 63 working papers covering 68 factors.
We obtain t-ratios for each of the 315 factors discovered, including the ones in
working papers.26 The overwhelming majority of t-ratios exceed the 1.96 bench-
mark for 5% significance.27 The non-significant ones typically belong to papers that
propose a number of factors. These likely represent only a small sub-sample of non-
significant t-ratios for all tried factors. Importantly, we take published t-ratios as
given. That is, we assume they are econometrically sound with respect to the usual
suspects (data errors, coding errors, misalignment, heteroskedasticity, autocorrela-
tion, outliers, etc.).
4.3.6 P-value Adjustment When All Tests Are Published (M  R)
We now apply the three adjustment methods previously introduced to the observed
factor tests, under the assumption that test results of all tried factors are avail-
able. We know that this assumption is false since our sample under-represents all
26The sign of a t-ratio depends on the source of risk or the direction of the long/short strategy.
We usually calculate p-values based on two-sided t-tests, so the sign does not matter. Therefore we
use absolute values of these t-ratios.
27The multiple testing framework is robust to outliers. The procedures are based on either the
total number of tests (Bonferroni) or the order statistics of t-ratios (Holm and BHY). However,
outliers may affect our results on the truncated exponential distribution estimation when M ¡ R
(see Appendix A). For the results in the paper, we use the full sample. Appendix A shows the
implications of trimming the top one percent of t-ratios.
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Figure 4.2: Factors and Publications
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insignificant factors by conventional significance standards: we only observe those
insignificant factors that are published alongside significant ones. We design methods
to handle this missing data issue later.
Despite some limitations, our results in this section are useful for at least two
purposes. First, the benchmark t-ratio based on our incomplete sample provides a
lower bound of the true t-ratio benchmark. In other words, if M(total number of
tests) ¡R (total number of discoveries), then we would accept fewer factors than
when M  R,28, so future t-ratios need to at least surpass our benchmark to claim
28This is always true for Bonferroni’s adjustment but not always true for the other two types of
adjustments. The Bonferroni adjusted t-ratio is monotonically increasing in the number of trials so
the t-ratio benchmark will only rise if there are more factors. Holm and BHY depend on the exact
t-ratio distribution so more factors do not necessarily imply a higher t-ratio benchmark.
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significance. Second, results in this section can be rationalized within a Bayesian or
hierarchical testing framework.29 Factors in our list constitute an “elite” group: they
have survived academia’s scrutiny for publication. Placing a high prior on this group
in a Bayesian testing framework or viewing this group as a cluster in a hierarchical
testing framework, one can interpret results in this section as the first step factor
selection within an a priori group.
Based on our sample of observed t-ratios of published factors,30 we obtain three
benchmark t-ratios. In particular, at each point in time, we transform the set of
available t-ratios into p-values. We then apply the three adjustment methods to
obtain benchmark p-values. Finally, these p-value benchmarks are transformed back
into t-ratios, assuming that standard normal distribution well approximates the t-
distribution. To guide future research, we extrapolate our benchmark t-ratios 20
years into the future.
We choose to set αw at 5% (Holm, FWER) and αd at 1% (BHY, FDR) for
our main results. Significance level is subjective, as in individual hypothesis testing
where conventional significance levels are usually adopted. Since FWER is a special
case of the Type I error in individual testing and 5% seems the default significance
level in cross-sectional studies, we set αw at 5%. On the other hand, FDR is a weaker
control relative to FWER; moreover, it has no power in further screening individual
29See Wagenmakers and Gru¨nwald (2006) and Storey (2003) on Bayesian interpretations of
traditional hypothesis testing. See Meinshausen (2008) for a hierarchical approach on variable
selection.
30There are at least two ways to generate t-ratios for a risk factor. One way is to show that
factor related sorting results in cross-sectional return patterns that are not explained by standard
risk factors. The t-ratio for the intercept of the long/short strategy returns regressed on common
risk factors is usually reported. The other way is to use factor loadings as explanatory variables and
show that they are related to the cross-section of expected returns after controlling for standard
risk factors. Individual stocks or stylized portfolios (e.g., Fama-French 25 portfolios) are used as
dependent variables. The t-ratio for the factor risk premium is taken as the t-ratio for the factor.
In sum, depending on where the new risk factor or factor returns enter the regressions, the first way
can be thought of as the left hand side (LHS) approach and the second the right hand side (RHS)
approach. For our data collection, we choose to use the RHS t-ratios. When they are not available,
we use the LHS t-ratios or simply the t-ratios for the average returns of long/short strategies if the
authors do not control for other risk factors.
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tests if FDR is set greater than or equal to the significance level of individual tests.31
We therefore set FDR at 1% but will explain what happens when αd is increased to
5%.
Figure 4.3 presents the three benchmark t-ratios. Both Bonferroni and Holm ad-
justed benchmark t-ratios are monotonically increasing in the number of discoveries.
For Bonferroni, the benchmark t-ratio starts at 1.96 and increases to 3.78 by 2012.
It reaches 4.00 in 2032. The corresponding p-values for 3.78 and 4.00 are 0.02% and
0.01% respectively, much lower than the starting level of 5%. Holm implied t-ratios
always fall below Bonferroni t-ratios, consistent with the fact that Bonferroni always
results in fewer discoveries than Holm. However, Holm tracks Bonferroni closely
and their differences are small. BHY implied benchmarks, on the other hand, are
not monotonic. They fluctuate before year 2000 and stabilize at 3.39 (p-value =
0.07%) after 2010. This stationarity feature of BHY implied t-ratios, inherent in the
definition of FDR, is in contrast to Bonferroni and Holm. Intuitively, at any fixed
significance level α, the Law of Large Numbers forces the false discovery rate (FDR)
to converge to a constant.32 If we change αd to 5%, the corresponding BHY implied
benchmark t-ratio is 2.78 (p-value = 0.54%) in 2012 and 2.81 (p-value = 0.50%) in
2032, still much higher than the 1.96 staring value. In sum, taking into account of
testing multiplicity, we believe the minimum threshold t-ratio for 5% significance is
about 2.8, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.5%.
To see how the new t-ratio benchmarks better differentiate the statistical sig-
nificance of factors, in Figure 4.3 we mark the t-ratios of a few prominent factors.
31When tests are all significant based on single testing and for Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)’s
original adjustment algorithm (i.e., cpMq  1), BHY yields the same results as single testing. To
see this, notice that the threshold for the largest p-value becomes αd in BHY’s method. As a result,
if all tests are individually significant at level αd, the largest p-value would satisfy ppMq ¤ αd.
Based on BHY’s procedure, this means we reject all null hypotheses. In our context, the p-values
for published factors are all below 5% due to hidden tests. Therefore, under cpMq  1, if we set αd
equal to 5%, all of these factors will be still be declared as significant under multiple testing.
32This intuition is precise for the case when tests are independent. When there is dependence,
we need the dependence to be weak to apply the Law of Large Numbers.
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Among these factors, HML, MOM, DCG, SRV and MRT are significant across all
types of t-ratio adjustments, EP, LIQ and CVOL are sometimes significant and the
rest are never significant.
4.3.7 Robustness
Our three adjustment methods are able to control their Type I error rates (FWER
for Bonferroni and Holm; FDR for BHY) under arbitrary distributional assumptions
about the test statistics. However, if the test statistics are positively correlated, then
all three methods might be conservative in that too few factors are discovered. Then
again, counteracting this conservatism is our incomplete coverage of tried factors.
By adding factors to our current sample, certain adjusted threshold t-ratios (e.g.,
Bonferroni) will increase, making our current estimates less conservative. We discuss
the dependence issue in this section and address the incomplete coverage issue in the
Appendix.
Test statistics dependence
In theory, under independence, Bonferroni and Holm approximately achieve the pre-
specified significance level α when the number of tests is large.33 On the other
hand, both procedures tend to generate fewer discoveries than desired when there
is a certain degree of dependence among the tests. Intuitively, in the extreme case
where all tests are the same (i.e., correlation = 1.0), we do not need to adjust at all:
FWER is the same as the Type I error rate for single tests. Hence, the usual single
33To see this for Bonferroni, suppose tests are independent and all null hypotheses are true. We
have
FWER  PrpN0|r ¥ 1q
 1  PrpN0|r  0q
 1  p1  α{nqn
nÑ8
ÝÝÝÑ 1  exppαq  α
where n denotes the number of tests. The last step approximation is true when α is small.
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hypothesis test is sufficient. Under either independence or positive dependence, the
actual Type I error rate of BHY is strictly less than the pre-specified significance
level, i.e., BHY is too stringent in that too few factors are discovered.34
Having discussed assumptions for the testing methods to work efficiently, we
now try to think of scenarios that can potentially violate these assumptions. First,
factors that proxy for the same type of risk may be dependent. Moreover, returns
of long-short portfolios designed to achieve exposure to a particular type of factor
may be correlated. For example, hedge portfolios based on dividend yield, earnings
yield and book-to-market are correlated. Other examples include risk factors that
reflect financial constraints risk, market-wide liquidity and uncertainty risk. If this
type of positive dependence exists among test statistics, all three methods would
likely to generate fewer significant factors than desired. There is definitely some
dependence in our sample. As mentioned previously, there are a number of factors
with price in the denominator which are naturally correlated. Another example is
that we count four different idiosyncratic volatility factors. On the other hand, most
often factors need to “stand their ground” to be publishable. In the end, if you think
we are overcounting at 315, consider taking a haircut to 113 factors (the number
of “common” factors). Figure 3 shows that our main conclusions do not materially
change. For example, the Holm at 113 factors is 3.29 (p-value = 0.10%) while Holm
at 315 factors is 3.64 (p-value = 0.03%).
Second, research studying the same factor but based on different samples will
generate highly dependent test statistics. Examples include the sequence of papers
studying the size effect. We try to minimize this concern by including, with a few
exceptions, only the original paper that proposes the factor. To the extent that our
list includes few such duplicate factors, our method greatly reduces the dependence
that would be introduced by including all papers studying the same factor but for
34See footnote 4.3.4 and the references therein.
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different sample periods.
Finally, when dependence among test statistics can be captured by Pearson corre-
lations among contemporaneous strategy returns, we present a new model in Section
5 to systematically incorporate the information in test correlations.
The Case When M ¡ R
To deal with the hidden tests issue when M ¡ R, we propose in Appendix A a
simulation framework to estimate benchmark t-ratios. The idea is to first back out
the underlying distribution for the t-statistics of all tried factors; then, to generate
benchmark t-ratio estimates, apply the three adjustment procedures to simulated
t-statistics samples.35
Based on our estimates, 70% of all tried factors are missing. The new benchmark
t-ratios for Bonferroni and Holm are estimated to be 3.84 and 3.75, respectively;
both slightly higher than when M  R. This is as expected because more factors
are tried under this framework. The BHY implied t-ratio increases from 3.37 to 3.48
at 1% significance and from 2.79 to 2.96 at 5% significance.36 In sum, across various
scenarios, we think the minimum threshold t-ratio is 2.96, corresponding to BHY’s
adjustment for M ¡ R at 5% significance. Alternative cases all result in even higher
benchmark t-ratios. Please refer to Appendix B for the details.
A Bayesian Hypothesis Testing Framework
We can also study multiple hypothesis testing within a Bayesian framework. One
major obstacle of applying Bayesian methods in our context is the unobservability of
35The underlying assumption for the model in Appendix B is the independence among t-
statistics, which may not be plausible given our previous discussions on test dependence. In that
case, our structural model proposed in Section 5 provides a more realistic data generating process
for the cross-section of test statistics.
36Two sets of results are shown in Appendix B: one based on the original sample and the other
on the trimmed sample. We use results based on the trimmed sample as they provide the lower
bounds on the benchmark t-ratios.
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all tried factors. While we propose new frequentist methods to handle this missing
data problem, it is not clear how to structure the Bayesian framework in this context.
In addition, the high dimensionality of the problem raises concerns on both the
accuracy and the computational burden of Bayesian methods.
Nevertheless, ignoring the missing data issue, we outline a standard Bayesian
multiple hypothesis testing framework in Appendix B and explain how it relates
to our multiple testing framework. We discuss in detail the pros and cons of the
Bayesian approach. In contrast to the frequentist approach, which uses generalized
Type I error rates to guide multiple testing, the Bayesian approach relies on the pos-
terior likelihood function and thus contains a natural penalty term for multiplicity.
However, this simplicity comes at the expense of having a restrictive hierarchical
model structure and independence assumptions that may not be realistic for our fac-
tor testing problem. Although extensions incorporating certain forms of dependence
are possible, it is unclear what precisely we should do for the 315 factors in our list.
In addition, even for the Bayesian approach, final reject/accept decision still involves
threshold choice. Finally, as the number of tests becomes large, the Bayesian ap-
proach gets computationally challenging.37 Due to these concerns, we choose not to
implement the Bayesian approach and instead discuss it briefly. We leave extensions
of the basic Bayesian framework that could possibly alleviate the above concerns to
future research.
Methods Controlling the FDP
Instead of FDR, recent research by Lehmann and Romano (2005) develops methods
to directly control the realized FDP. In particular, they propose a stepdown method
to control the probability of FDP exceeding a threshold value. Since their definition
37The calculation of the posterior likelihood function involves multiple integrals. As the number
of tests becomes large, simulation approaches such as importance sampling may become unstable
in calculating these high-dimensional integrals.
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of Type I error (i.e., P pFDP ¡ γq where γ is the threshold FDP value) is different
from either FWER or FDR, results based on their methods are not comparable to
ours. However, the main conclusion is the same. For instance, when γ  0.10 and
α  0.05, the benchmark t-ratio is 2.70 (p-value = 0.69%), much lower than the
conventional cutoff of 1.96. The details are presented in the appendix.
4.4 Correlation Among Test Statistics
Although the BHY method is robust to arbitrary dependence among test statistics,
it does not use any information about the dependence structure. Such information,
when appropriately incorporated, can be helpful in making the method more accurate
(i.e., less conservative). We focus on the type of dependence that can be captured
by Pearson correlation. As one way to generate correlation among test statistics,
we focus on the correlation among contemporaneous variables (i.e., factor returns)
that constitute the test statistics. This is perhaps the most important source of
correlation as contemporaneous returns are certainly affected by the movements of
the same set of macroeconomic and market variables. Therefore, in our context,
the dependence among test statistics is equivalent to the correlation among strategy
returns.
Multiple testing corrections in the presence of correlation has only been consid-
ered in the recent statistics literature. Existing methods include bootstrap based
permutation tests and direct statistical modeling. Permutation tests resample the
entire dataset and construct an empirical distribution for the pool of test statistics.38
Through resampling, the correlation structure in the data is taken into account and
no model is needed. In contrast, direct statistical modeling makes additional distri-
38Westfall and Young (1993) and Ge et al. (2003) are the early papers that suggest the permuta-
tion resampling approach in multiple testing. Later development of the permutation approach tries
to reduce computational burden by proposing efficient alternative approaches. Examples include
Lin (2005), Conneely and Boehnke (2007) and Han, Kang and Eskin (2009).
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butional assumptions on the data generating process. These assumptions are usually
case dependent as different kinds of correlations are more plausible under different
circumstances.39
In addition, recent research in finance explores bootstrap procedures to assess the
statistical significance of individual tests.40 Most of these studies focus on mutual
fund evaluation. They bootstrap the time-series of mutual fund returns and obtain
an empirical distribution for the t-ratio for each fund. In contrast, our approach
focuses on the joint distribution of the t-ratios, as both FWER and FDR depend
on the cross-section of t-ratios. As such, we are able to apply a multiple testing
framework to the cross-section of factor tests.
Our data pose a challenge to existing methods both in finance and statistics be-
cause we do not always observe the time-series of strategy returns (when a t-ratio is
based on long-short strategy returns) or the time-series of slopes in cross-sectional
regressions (when a t-ratio is based on the slope coefficients in cross-sectional regres-
sions). Often all we have is the single t-statistic that summarizes the significance of a
factor. We propose a novel approach to overcome this missing data problem. It is in
essence a direct modeling approach but does not require the full information of the
return series based on which the t-statistic is constructed. In addition, our approach
is flexible enough to incorporate various kinds of distributional assumptions. We
expect it to be a valuable addition to the multiple testing literature, especially when
only test statistics are observable.
Our method first proposes a structural model to describe the data generating
process for the cross-section of returns. It highlights the key statistical properties
for returns in our context and is flexible enough to incorporate various kinds of
39See Sun and Cai (2008) and Wei et al. (2009).
40See Efron (1979) for the original work in the statistics literature. For recent finance applica-
tions, see Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and Wermers (2006), Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007),
Fama and French (2010) and Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013).
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dependence. Through the structural model, we link Type I error rates in multiple
testing to the few structural parameters in the model. Finally, we estimate the model
using the t-statistics for published factors and provide multiple testing adjusted t-
ratios based on the estimated structural model.41
4.4.1 A Model with Correlations
For each factor, suppose researchers construct a corresponding long-short trading
strategy and normalize the return standard deviation to be σ  15% per year,
which is close to the annual volatility of the market index.42 In particular, let the
normalized strategy return in period t for the i-th discovered strategy be Xi,t. Then
the t-stat for testing the significance of this strategy is:
Ti  p
N¸
t1
Xi,t{Nq{pσ{
?
Nq.
Assuming joint normality and zero serial correlation for strategy returns, this t-stat
has a normal distribution
Ti  Npµi{pσ{
?
Nq, 1q,
where µi denotes the population mean of the strategy. The µi’s are unobservable
and hypothesis testing under this framework amounts to testing µi ¡ 0. We assume
that each µi is an independent draw from the following mixture distribution:
µi  p0Itµ0u   p1 p0qExppλq,
where Itµ0u is the distribution that has a point mass at zero, Exppλq is the ex-
ponential distribution that has a mean parameter λ and p0 is the probability of
41See Harvey and Liu (2014b) for further details of our approach.
42Notice that this assumption is not necessary for our approach. Fixing the standard deviations
of different strategies eliminates the need to separately model them, which can be done through a
joint modeling of the mean and variance of the cross-section of returns. See Harvey and Liu (2014b)
for further discussions on this.
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drawing from the point mass distribution. This mixture distribution assumption is
the core component for Bayesian multiple testing43 and succinctly captures the idea
of hypothesis testing in the traditional frequentist’s view: while there are a range of
possible values for the means of truly profitable strategies, a proportion of strategies
should have a mean that is indistinguishable from zero. The exponential assumption
is not essential for our model as more sophisticated distributions (e.g., a Gamma
distribution featuring two free parameters) can be used. We use the exponential dis-
tribution for its simplicity44 and perhaps more importantly, for it being consistent
with the intuition that more profitable strategies are less likely to exist. An ex-
ponential distribution captures this intuition by having a monotonically decreasing
probability density function.
Next, we incorporate correlations into the above framework. Among the various
sources of correlations, the cross-sectional correlations among contemporaneous re-
turns are the most important for us to take into account. This is because, unlike
time-series correlations for individual return series, cross-sectional return correlations
are caused by macroeconomic or market movements and can have a significant impact
on multiple testing correction. Other kinds of correlations can be easily embedded
into our framework as well.45
As a starting point, we assume that the contemporaneous correlation between
43See Appendix B for a brief discussion on the Bayesian approach for multiple testing.
44As shown later, we need to estimate the parameters in the mixture model based on our t-
statistics sample. An over-parameterized distribution for the continuous distribution in the mixture
model, albeit flexible, may result in imprecise estimates. We therefore use the simple one-parameter
exponential distribution family.
45To incorporate the serial correlation for individual strategies, we can model them as simple
autoregressive processes. To incorporate the spatial structure in the way that factors are discovered
(i.e., a group of factors discovered during a certain period can be related to each other due to the
increased research intensity on that group for that period), we can impose a Markov structure
on the time-series of µi’s. See Sun and Cai (2008) for an example of spatial dependence for the
null hypotheses. Lastly, to accommodate the intuition that factors within a class should be more
correlated than factors across classes, we can use a block diagonal structure for the correlation
matrix for strategy returns. See Harvey and Liu (2014b) for further discussion of the kinds of
correlation structures that our model is able to incorporate.
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two strategies’ returns is ρ. The non-contemporaneous correlations are assumed to
be zero. That is,
CorrpXi,t, Xj,tq  ρ, i  j,
CorrpXi,t, Xj,sq  0, t  s.
Finally, to incorporate the impact of hidden tests, we assume that M factors are
tried but only factors that exceed a certain t-ratio threshold are published. We set
the threshold t-statistic at 1.96 and focus on the sub-sample of factors that have a
t-statistic larger than 1.96. However, as shown in Appendix B, factors with marginal
t-ratios (i.e., t-ratios just above 1.96) are less likely to be published than those with
larger t-ratios. Therefore, our sub-sample of published t-ratios only covers a fraction
of t-ratios above 1.96 for tried factors. To overcome this missing data problem, we
assume that our sample covers a fraction r of t-ratios in between 1.96 and 2.57 and
that all t-ratios above 2.57 are covered. We bootstrap from the existing t-ratio sample
to construct the full sample. For instance, when r  1{2, we simply duplicate the
sample of t-ratios in between 1.96 and 2.57 and maintain the sample of t-ratios above
2.57 to construct the full sample. For the baseline case, we set r  1{2, consistent
with the analysis in Appendix B. We try alternative values of r to see how the results
change.46
Given the correlation structure and the sampling distribution for the means of
returns, we can fully characterize the distributional properties of the cross-section of
returns. We can also determine the distribution for the cross-section of t-statistics as
they are functions of returns. Based our sample of t-statistics for published research,
46Our choice of the threshold t-ratio is smaller than the 2.57 threshold in Appendix A. This is
for model identification purposes. With a large t-ratio threshold (e.g., t= 2.57), factors that are
generated under the null hypothesis (i.e., false discoveries) are observed with a low probability as
their t-ratios rarely exceed the threshold. With little presence of these factors in the sample, certain
parameters (e.g., p0) are poorly identified. In short, we cannot estimate the probability of drawing
from the null hypothesis accurately if we rarely observe a factor that is generated from the null
hypothesis. We therefore lower the threshold to allow a better estimation of the model. For more
details on the selection of the threshold t-ratio, see Harvey and Liu (2014b).
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we match key sample statistics with their population counterparts in the model.
The sample statistics we choose to match are the quantiles of the sample of t-
statistics and the sample size (i.e., the total number of discoveries). Two concerns
motivate us to use quantiles. First, sample quantiles are less susceptible to outliers
compared to means and other moment-related sample statistics. Our t-ratio sample
does have a few very large observations and we expect quantiles to be more useful
descriptive statistics than the mean and the standard deviation. Second, simulation
studies show that quantiles in our model are more sensitive to changes in parameters
than other statistics. To offer a more efficient estimation of the model, we choose to
focus on quantiles.
In particular, the quantities we choose to match and their values for the baseline
sample (i.e., r  1{2) are given by:$'''&'''%
pT  Total number of discoveries  352,pQ1  The 20th percentile of the sample of t-statistics  2.39,pQ2  The 50th percentile of the sample of t-statistics  3.16,pQ3  The 90th percentile of the sample of t-statistics  6.35.
These three quantiles are representative of the spectrum of quantiles and can be
shown to be most sensitive to parameter changes in our model. Fixing the model
parameters, we can also obtain the model implied sample statistics T,Q1, Q2, and Q3
through simulations.47 The estimation works by seeking to find the set of parameters
that minimizes the following objective function:
Dpλ, p0,M, ρq  w0pT  pT q2   3¸
i1
wipQi  pQiq2
where w0 and twiu3i1 are the weights associated with the squared distances. Mo-
47Model implied quantiles are difficult (and most likely infeasible) to calculate analytically. We
obtain them through simulations. In particular, for a fixed set of parameters, we simulate 5,000
independent samples of t-statistics. For each sample, we calculate the four summary statistics. The
median of these summary statistics across the 5,000 simulations are taken as the model implied
statistics.
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tivated by the optimal weighting for the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimators, we set these weights at w0  1 and w1  w2  w3  10, 000. They can
be shown to have the same magnitude as the inverses of the variances of the cor-
responding model implied sample statistics across a wide range of parameter values
and should help improve estimation efficiency.
We estimate the three parameters (λ, p0, and M) in the model and choose to
calibrate the correlation coefficient ρ. In particular, for a given level of correlation
ρ, we numerically search for the model parameters pλ, p0,Mq that minimize the
objective function Dpλ, p0,M, ρq.
We choose to calibrate the amount of correlation because the correlation coef-
ficient is likely to be weakly identified in this framework. Ideally, to have a better
identification of ρ, we would like to have t-statistics that are generated from samples
that have varying degrees of overlap.48 We do not allow this in either our estima-
tion framework (i.e., all t-statistics are generated from samples that cover the same
period) or our data (we do not record the specific period for which the t-statistic
is generated). As a result, our results are best interpreted as the estimated t-ratio
thresholds for a hypothetical level of correlation. Nonetheless, we provide a brief dis-
cussion on the plausible levels of correlation in later sections. For additional details
about the estimation method and its performance, we refer the readers to Harvey
and Liu (2014b).
To investigate how correlation affects multiple testing, we follow an intuitive
simulation procedure. In particular, fixing λ, p0 and M at their estimates, we know
the data generating process for the cross-section of returns. Through simulations,
we are able to calculate the previously defined Type I error rates (i.e., FWER and
48Intuitively, t-statistics that are based on similar sample periods are more correlated than t-
statistics that are based on distinct sample periods. Therefore, the degree of overlap in sample
period helps identify the correlation coefficient. See Ferson and Chen (2013) for a similar argument
on measuring the correlations among fund returns.
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FDR) for any given threshold t-ratio. We search for the optimal threshold t-ratio
that exactly achieves a pre-specified error rate.
4.4.2 Results
Our estimation framework assumes a balanced panel with M factors and N periods
of returns. We need to assign a value to N . Returns for published works usually
cover a period ranging from twenty to fifty years. In our framework, the choice of
N does not affect the distribution of Ti under the null hypothesis (i.e., µi  0) but
will affect Ti under the alternative hypothesis (i.e., µi ¡ 0). When µi is different
from zero, Ti has a mean of µi{pσ{
?
Nq. A larger N reduces the noise in returns and
makes it more likely for Ti to be significant. To be conservative (i.e., less likely to
generate significant t-ratios under the alternative hypotheses), we set N at 240 (i.e.,
twenty years). Other specifications of N change the estimate of λ but leave the other
parameters almost intact. In particular, the threshold t-ratios are little changed for
alternative values of N .
The results are presented in Table 4.5. Across different correlation levels, λ (the
mean parameter for the exponential distribution that represents the mean returns
for true factors) is consistently estimated at 0.55% per month. This corresponds to
an annual factor return of 6.6%. Therefore, we estimate the average mean returns
for truly significant factors to be 6.6% per annum. Given that we standardize factor
returns by an annual volatility of 15%, the average annual Sharpe ratio for these
factors is 0.44 (or monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.13).
For the other parameter estimates, both p0 and M are increasing in ρ. Focusing
on the baseline case in Panel A and at ρ  0, we estimate that researchers have
tried M  1, 295 factors and 60.3% ( 1  0.397) are true discoveries. When ρ is
increased to 0.60, we estimate that a total of M  1, 773 factors have been tried
and around 40.1% ( 1  0.599) are true factors. Notice that we can estimate the
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average total number of discoveries by M p1 p0q if we were able to observe which
distribution the factor mean is drawn from. This estimate is around 750 when the
level of correlation is not too high (i.e., ρ   0.8). Of course, in reality we cannot
observe the underlying distribution for the factor mean and have to rely on the t-
statistics. As a result, a significant fraction of these 750 factors are discarded because
their associated t-statistics cannot overcome the threshold t-ratio.
Turning to the estimates of threshold t-ratios and focusing on FWER, we see that
they are not monotonic in the level of correlation. Intuitively, two forces are at work
in driving these threshold t-ratios. On the one hand, both p0 and M are increasing
in the level of correlation. Therefore, more factors — both in absolute value and
in proportion — are drawn from the null hypothesis. To control the occurrences of
false discoveries based on these factors, we need a higher threshold t-ratio. On the
other hand, a higher correlation among test-statistics reduces the required threshold
t-ratio. In the extreme case when all test statistics are perfectly correlated, we do not
need multiple testing adjustment at all. These two forces work against each other
and result in the non-monotonic pattern for the threshold t-ratios under FWER. For
FDR, it appears that the impact of larger p0 and M dominates so that the threshold
t-ratios are increasing in the level of correlation.
Across various correlation specifications, our estimates show that in general a t-
ratio of 3.9 and 3.0 is needed to control FWER at 5% and FDR at 1%, respectively.49
Notice that these numbers are not far away from our previous estimates of 3.78 (Holm
adjustment that controls FWER at 5%) and 3.38 (BHY adjustment that controls
FDR at 1%). However, these seemingly similar numbers are generated through
different mechanisms. Our current estimate assumes a certain level of correlation
among returns and relies on an estimate of more than 1,300 for the total number of
49To save space, we choose not to discuss the performance of our estimation method. Harvey
and Liu (2014b) provide a detailed simulation study of our model.
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trials. On the other hand, our previous calculation assumes that the 315 published
factors are all the factors that have been tried but does not specify a correlation
structure.
Table 4.5: Estimation Results: A Model with Correlations
We estimate the model with correlations. r is the assumed proportion of missing observations
for factors with a t-ratio in between 1.96 and 2.57. Panel A shows the results for the baseline
case when r  1{2 and Panel B shows the results for the case when r  2{3. ρ is the correlation
coefficient between two strategy returns in the same period. p0 is the probability of having a
strategy that has a mean of zero. λ is the mean parameter of the exponential distribution for
the means of the true factors. M is the total number of trials.
t-ratio
ρ p0 λ(%) M FWER(5%) FWER(1%) FDR(5%) FDR(1%)
(monthly)
Panel A: r = 1/2 (Baseline)
0 0.397 0.550 1,295 3.89 4.28 2.16 2.88
0.2 0.446 0.555 1,377 3.91 4.30 2.27 2.95
0.4 0.486 0.554 1,476 3.81 4.23 2.34 3.05
0.6 0.599 0.555 1,773 3.67 4.15 2.43 3.09
0.8 0.839 0.560 3,109 3.35 3.89 2.59 3.25
Panel B: r = 2/3
0 0.684 0.550 2,455 4.17 4.55 2.69 3.30
0.2 0.724 0.551 2,696 4.15 4.54 2.76 3.38
0.4 0.774 0.552 3,032 4.06 4.45 2.80 3.40
0.6 0.885 0.562 4,338 3.86 4.29 2.91 3.55
0.8 0.924 0.532 5,391 3.44 4.00 2.75 3.39
4.4.3 How Large Is ρ?
Our sample has limitations in making a direct inference on the level of correlation.
To give some guidance, we provide indirect evidence on the plausible levels of ρ.
First, the value of the optimized objective function sheds light on the level of
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ρ. Intuitively, a value of ρ that is more consistent with the data generating process
should result in a lower optimized objective function. Across the various specifi-
cations of ρ in Table 4.5, we find that the optimized objective function reaches its
lowest point when ρ  0.2. Therefore, our t-ratio sample suggests a low level of
correlation. However, this evidence is only suggestive given the weak identification
of ρ in our model.
Second, we draw on external data source to provide inference. In particular, we
gain access to the S&P CAPITAL IQ database, which includes detailed information
on the time-series of returns of over 400 factors for the US equity market. Calculating
the average correlation among these equity risk factors for the 1985-2014 period, we
estimate ρ to be around 0.22.
Finally, existing studies in the literature provide guidance on the level of corre-
lation. McLean and Pontiff (2013) estimate the correlation among anomaly returns
to be around 0.05. Green, Hand and Zhang (2012) focus on accounting-based fac-
tors and find the average correlation to be between 0.06 and 0.20. Focusing on
mutual fund returns, Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010) argue for a correlation of
zero among fund returns while Ferson and Chen (2013) calibrate this number to be
between 0.04 and 0.09.
Overall, we believe that the average correlation among factor returns should be
low, possibly in the neighborhood of 0.20.
4.5 Conclusion
At least 315 factors have been tested to explain the cross-section of expected returns.
Most of these factors have been proposed over the last ten years. Indeed, Cochrane
(2011) refers to this as “a zoo of new factors”. Our paper argues that it is a serious
mistake to use the usual statistical significance cutoffs (e.g., a t-ratio exceeding 2.0)
in asset pricing tests. Given the plethora of factors and the inevitable data mining,
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many of the historically discovered factors would be deemed “significant” by chance.
Our paper presents three conventional multiple testing frameworks and proposes
a new one that particularly suits research in financial economics. While these frame-
works differ in their assumptions, they are consistent in their conclusions. We argue
that a newly discovered factor today should have a t-ratio that exceeds 3.0. We
provide a time-series of recommended “cutoffs” from the first empirical test in 1967
through to present day. Many published factors fail to exceed our recommended
cutoffs.
While a ratio of 3.0 (which corresponds to a p-value of 0.27%) seems like a very
high hurdle, we also argue that there are good reasons to expect that 3.0 is too
low. First, we only count factors that are published in prominent journals and we
sample only a small fraction of the working papers. Second, there are surely many
factors that were tried by empiricists, failed, and never made it to publication or
even a working paper. Indeed, the culture in financial economics is to focus on the
discovery of new factors. In contrast to other fields such as medical science, it is rare
to publish replication studies of existing factors. Given that our count of 315 tested
factors is surely too low, this means the t-ratio cutoff is likely even higher.50
Should a t-ratio of 3.0 be used for every factor proposed in the future? Probably
not. A case can be made that a factor developed from first principles should have a
lower threshold t-ratio than a factor that is discovered as a purely empirical exercise.
Nevertheless, a t-ratio of 2.0 is no longer appropriate — even for factors that are
derived from theory.
In medical research, the recognition of the multiple testing problem has led to
the disturbing conclusion that “most claimed research findings are false” (Ioannidis
(2005)). Our analysis of factor discoveries leads to the same conclusion – many of the
50In astronomy and physics, even higher threshold t-ratios are often used to control for testing
multiplicity. For instance, the high profile discovery of Higgs Boson has a t-ratio of more than 5
(p-value less than 0.0001%). See ATLAS Collaboration (2012) and CMS Collaboration (2012).
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factors discovered in the field of finance are likely false discoveries: of the 295 pub-
lished significant factors, 158 would be considered false discoveries under Bonferonni,
142 under Holm, 132 under BHY (1%) and 80 under BHY (5%). In addition, the
idea that there are so many factors is inconsistent with the principal component anal-
ysis, where, perhaps there are five “statistical” common factors driving time-series
variation in equity returns (Ahn, Horenstein and Wang (2012)).
The assumption that researchers follow the rules of classical statistics (e.g., ran-
domization, unbiased reporting, etc.) is at odds with the notion of individual incen-
tives which, ironically, is one of the fundamental premises in economics. Importantly,
the optimal amount of data mining is not zero since some data mining produces
knowledge. The key, as argued by Glaeser (2008), is to design appropriate statisti-
cal methods to adjust for biases, not to eliminate research initiatives. The multiple
testing framework detailed in our paper is true to this advice.
Our research quantifies the warnings of both Fama (1991) and Schwert (2003).
We attempt to navigate the zoo and establish new benchmarks to guide empirical
asset pricing tests.
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5Multiple Testing in Financial Economics
5.1 A Multiple Testing Framework
5.1.1 The Null Hypothesis
Assume that researchers have carried out M tests. The corresponding test statistics
are given by y  py1, y2, . . . , yM q, with each yi representing the test statistic or vector
of test statistics for the i-th experiment. We want to perform M tests of hypotheses:
H0i : yi  f0i,
H1i : yi  f1i.
Here f0i and f1i denote the null and alternative distribution, respectively. They
often involve unknown parameters. Notice that at this level of generality, multiple
testing amounts to considering this set of M hypotheses as a whole. We do not
require information on the interrelationships among the f0i’s or f1i’s to design a
specific testing method. For example, well-known procedures such as Bonferroni and
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)’s method can be applied to the collection of p-values
of individual tests to control for family-wise error rate (FWER) and false-discovery
rate (FDR), respectively.
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In typical applications of multiple testing in economics, however, we do know
the connections among the collection of null and alternative hypotheses and incor-
porating such information into the test procedure can improve the performance of
the test. For instance, most studies that propose investment strategies based on
the cross-section of stocks test the hypothesis that the mean strategy return is zero.
These studies therefore have a common null hypothesis. Moreover, based on the
primitive assumption of economic scarcity, it is reasonable to assume that more prof-
itable strategies are less likely to exist. More specifically, among the truly profitable
strategies (i.e., the alternative hypothesis is true), the number of strategies that
achieve a certain level of mean return is declining in the level of the mean. Effec-
tively, this imposes a monotonicity restriction on the density function of the average
returns for profitable strategies. Both the common null observation and the mono-
tonicity restriction under alternative hypotheses can be important to the design of a
testing procedure as they help us better understand the composition of test statistics
under both the null and the alternative hypotheses.
For the above reasons, we propose a model to facilitate the economic applications
of multiple testing methods. We first parameterize f0i and f1i as a constant hypoth-
esized value or vector µi. We assume that each µi is an independent draw from the
following mixture distribution:
µi  p0Itµ0u   p1 p0qF pλq,
where Itµ0u is the distribution that has a point mass at zero and F pλq is a fam-
ily of distributions that are parameterized by vector λ.1 This mixture distribution
assumption is the key component for Bayesian hypothesis testing2 and captures the
dichotomy between the null and alternative hypothesis in a simple manner. From
1Without loss of generality, we assume that µi  0 is the common null of all hypotheses.
2See Meng and Dempster (1987), Scott and Berger (2006) and Whittemore (2007) for the
Bayesian approach on multiple hypothesis testing.
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the perspective of hierarchical modeling, the mixture distribution dictates that µi is
generated in two steps. First, with probability p0, µi assumes a value of zero and
thus belongs to the null distribution. If µi does not equal zero in the first step, it is
subsequently drawn from the parametric distribution F pλq.
The parametric distribution F pλq is common across all tests and describes the
distribution of µi when µi  0. Economic intuition often suggests distributional
properties that F pλq should assume. For instance, when smaller values of µi are
more plausible than larger ones due to economic scarcity, a single-parameter expo-
nential family may be adequate to describe F pλq. To allow for a more flexible shape
and to separate the mean from the variance, a two-parameter Gamma distribution is
an obvious extension of the exponential family. Similar to most econometric specifi-
cations, the bias and variance tradeoff applies and it is not always better to assume
a more complicated model.
5.1.2 Decomposing Test Statistics
Given a population mean µi for the i-th hypothesis, we need a specification on the
shock process to generate the associated test statistic. As shown in Lin (2005), all
the commonly used statistics can be written or can be approximately by the statistics
of the following form:
Gi  UTi V 1i Ui, i  1, . . . ,M,
where
Ui 
n¸
k1
Uik,
and
Vi 
n¸
k1
UikU
T
ik.
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Under the null hypothesis that µi  0, Ui approximately follows a normal distribution
with mean zero and covariance matrix Vi in large samples, so that Gi approximately
follows a χ2 distribution with mi degrees of freedom, where mi is the dimension of
Ui. In general, the Ui’s are correlated and so are the Gi’s. Although our most general
framework is able to handle multi-dimensional Ui, we restrict our attention to the
univariate case to ease exposition.
Guided by the general expression for test statistics above, we focus on the t statis-
tic, which is the square root of the above χ2 statistic and often used by economists.
The t-test for testing the hypothesis µi  0 is given by
Ti  p
n¸
k1
Uik{nq{pσˆi{
?
nq,
where σˆi is an estimate of the standard deviation of Uik, k  1, . . . , n. To model the
cross-section of t-statistics and their correlations, we first model the cross-section of
standard deviations. For each experiment i, suppose σi is independently drawn from
the following distribution for standard deviations
σi  Gpξq,
where Gpξq is a family of distributions that are parameterized by vector ξ. Given
the σi’s, the scaled observation Uik{σi has a mean of µi{σi and a standard deviation
of one. We can now impose a correlation structure on both the cross-section and the
time-series of Uik{σi’s to study its impact on multiple testing. The simplest structure
is the equal correlation structure given by:
CorrpUi,k{σi, Uj,k{σjq  ρ, i  j,
CorrpUi,k{σi, Uj,l{σjq  0, k  l.
This correlation structure assumes zero correlation between variables that occur in
different periods (both within and across experiments) and a correlation coefficient
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of ρ between any pair of contemporaneous variables. These modeling assumptions
highlight the importance of correlation in the cross-section and make the model
useful when the primary concern is about the impact of cross-sectional correlation
on multiple testing. For a general correlation structure that extends beyond the
equal correlation case, we use Φ to parameterize the correlation matrix. Φ contains
the parameters in the correlation matrix that need to be estimated or calibrated.
More detailed forms of correlations can be imposed on the panel of tUik{σi, i 
1, . . . ,M, k  1, . . . , nu to study their impacts on the formation of test statistics.3
For instance, to accommodate time-series correlations within each experiment, we
can use simple time-series models, e.g., an AR(1) process for tUik{σi, k  1, . . . , nu.
After fixing the time-series model, we can either assume a constant autoregressive
parameter across all experiments or a distribution from which the cross-section of
autoregressive parameters are drawn. The latter assumption is more appropriate
when there is a large degree of heterogeneity of shock persistence across experiments.
Notationally, we collect the single autoregressive parameter or the parameters for the
distribution of autoregressive parameters in Ψ.
An important issue is the separate identification of F pλq and Gpτq. Suppose the
standard deviation σi for tUik, k  1, . . . , nu is known. Then the t-statistic is the
sum of the scaled Uik’s, that is,
rTi  p n¸
k1
Uik{σiq{
?
n.
Notice that each summand Uik{σi has a mean of µi{σi and a variance of one. As-
suming tUikunk1 are i.i.d., then rTi has a mean of pµi{σiq?n and a variance of one.
Given that we only observe the individual t-statistics, the distribution F and G can
only be identified through the distribution of tµi{σiuMi1. This observation prompts
3Viewing “i” as the individual index and “k” as the time index, we have a panel of variables.
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us to model the distribution of the ratio µi{σi, as opposed to model the distribution
of µi and σi separately. With a slight abuse of notation, we also use F to denote the
distribution of µi{σi. In reality, σi is unknown so rTi differs from Ti by a factor of
σˆi{σi. However, this factor should be very close to one for large n as variance can be
estimated with a high precision for time-series data with a relatively large number of
observations.4 Therefore, we use rTi to approximate Ti in our applications and focus
on the estimation of the distribution of the signal-to-noise ratio µi{σi.
Finally, we assume that all shocks follow a multivariate normal distribution.
When dependence is the concern, the multiple testing literature allows for a gen-
eral dependence structure among test statistics and p-values.5 This does not fit in
our context as we need the exact distribution of shocks to generate simulated mo-
ments for test statistics. We choose to rely on the normal distribution for convenience
and focus on dependence represented by Pearson correlations.6
In particular, suppose that tWik, k  1, . . . , nu are the innovations for the time-
series tUik{σi, k  1, . . . , nu and are independent normal shocks with a variance of
1{p1 ρ2i q, where ρi is the persistence for the process tUik{σiunk1. Cross-sectionally,
tWikuMi1 follows a multivariate normal distribution with a pre-imposed correlation
structure (parameterized by Φ). Lastly, the vector of shocks tWikuMi1 move inde-
pendently in time (i.e., in k). These specifications, together with the specifications
for the cross-section of means µi{σi, are sufficient for us to simulate the cross-section
of t-statistics for any number of experiments M and time periods n. The simulated
moments for the cross-section of t-statistics are then matched to the corresponding
4With n larger than one hundred, the Student’s t distribution is indistinguishable from the
normal distribution.
5See Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) and Sarkar (2002) for their definitions of dependence
and the reason why Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)’s procedure is robust against these forms of
dependence.
6Note that any elliptical distribution, which includes the multivariate normal distribution, would
work for our purpose.
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moments of the observed t-statistics to estimate parameters of the model.
Essentially, our framework allows us to substitute normally distributed shocks
for the unobservable Uik’s. This substitution can be important for both the model
estimation and the multiple testing adjustment based on the estimated model. While
normality is an important and convenient case to consider, alternative distributional
assumptions are also possible for other applications. For instance, certain investment
strategy returns display higher order moment characteristics that can have a large
impact on test statistics. When Uik’s are observable, the literature on permutation
tests suggest re-sampling techniques that are robust to shock specifications.7 In
this paper, we primarily focus on normal shocks to define both cross-sectional and
time-series correlations and investigate how thus defined correlations affect multiple
testing. Further investigation on alternative shock specifications is left for future
research.
5.1.3 Publication Bias
Lastly, publication bias — not all research findings are published — is important
for us to embed into our framework. Publication bias is a phenomenon that is likely
endemic to all empirical inquires. In medical research, significant findings are more
likely to be published and cited.8 In economics, statistically significant results are
more likely to be published.9 That is, the editorial process makes it less likely that a
paper testing an interesting hypothesis gets published if the results are insignificant.
Given this bias, published studies are unlikely to be representative of all studies
that have been conducted. This undercoverage issue causes problems for multiple
testing adjustments as all trials, including unpublished ones, need to be taken into
7See Ge et al. (2003) and Romano and Wolf (2005). A recent paper by Hsu, Hsu and Kuan
(2010) applies the idea of permutation tests to evaluate mutual fund performances.
8The research on publication bias in medical research are voluminous. See Song et al. (2009)
for a summary.
9See Fanelli (2012).
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account. For instance, the commonly used Bonferroni adjustment works by multi-
plying a p-value by the number of tests. If publication bias is present, we are likely
to underestimate the total number of tests. This leads to an inadequate adjustment
and often causes the Type I error rates for multiple testing (e.g., FWER or FDR) to
be above the pre-specified value.
To model publication bias, we assume that a study will be published if and only
if its associated t-statistic exceeds a certain threshold value T0. Our assumption
is consistent with meta-analysis in the medical science literature.10 Among the M
studies that have been carried out, only M0 of them are publicly available. Let the
collection of t-statistics corresponding to these M0 studies be tT¯iuM0i1. We have
tT¯iuM0i1  tTiuMi1 and T¯i ¥ T0, i  1, . . . ,M0.
Notice that tT¯iuM0i1 are made of two groups of t-statistics. One group includes t-
statistics for false discoveries, i.e., discoveries that are insignificant (µi  0) but
have a large t-statistic by chance, and the other group includes t-statistics for truly
significant discoveries (µi  0). Multiple testing aims to develop new threshold
values to limit the size of the first group.
In practice, we need to make a choice for T0. For most applications, it seems
that T0  1.96 (single test p-value = 5%) is the obvious choice. However, studies
with “borderline” t-statistics are difficult to get published. Hence, we will likely
have missing observations with statistics around T0  1.96. To alleviate this missing
data problem, we can choose a higher threshold (e.g., T0  2.57, single test p-
value = 1%). Correspondingly, we only keep studies in the data that have a t-
statistic above this new threshold to construct sample moments for t-statistics. In
principle, we can use an even higher threshold value to further reduce the likelihood
10See Gerber et al.(2010).
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of missing observations. However, this will result in even fewer observations and
make the moment estimates less reliable. To strike a balance between bias (i.e.,
missing observations bias our sample moment estimates) and variability (i.e., fewer
observations lead to variable sample moment estimates), we adhere to the somewhat
subjective choice of T0  2.57.11
5.2 Model Estimation
5.2.1 Simulating the Cross-section of Test Statistics
Our estimation first simulates the cross-section of test statistics and then matches
key moments of these simulated test statistics to the corresponding moments of the
observed test statistics. For a given set of parameters for the structural model, we
detail the simulation process as follows.
Step I: Simulate the cross-section of means (µi, i  1, . . . ,M) and persis-
tence parameters (νi, i  1, . . . ,M)
• GenerateM values independently from the mixture distribution p0Itµ0u 
p1  p0qF pλq; they correspond to the cross-section of means (µi, i 
1, . . . ,M)
• Generate M values independently from the distribution Ψpνq; they corre-
spond to the cross-section of persistence parameters (νi, i  1, . . . ,M)
Step II: Simulate a panel of normal shocks tWik, i  1, . . . ,M, k  1, . . . , nu
• At each time k, generate a M -dimensional vector from a multivariate nor-
mal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Φ. The diagonal
entries of Φ are tp1 ρ2i q, i  1, . . . ,Mu and the non-diagonal entries are
11In principle, we can estimate the threshold T0. However, as emphasized by the literature
on truncated observations, the estimation for the threshold is unstable. We therefore adopt a
pre-selected threshold.
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determined by a pre-imposed correlation structure, as parameterized by
Φ
• Array these vectors into a M  n matrix
Step III: Generate the cross-section of t-statistics tTiuMi1
• For each i and with a starting value µ0i ,12 construct the time-series tUik, k 
1, . . . , nu by calculating Uik  µip1  ρiq   ρiUi,k1  Wik, k  1, . . . , n
sequentially
• For each i, construct the t-statistic Ti by calculating Ti  p
°n
k1 Uikq{
?
n
Step IV: Truncate test statistics at T0 to obtain the truncated sample
tT¯ uM0i1
• For each i, keep Ti if it is larger than T0; the collection of Ti’s that are
kept is the truncated sample tT¯ uM0i1
We repeat the above procedure 10,000 times, each time generating a new sample
of t-statistics. We then calculate population moments of test statistics by averaging
across these simulated samples.
5.2.2 Estimation
For estimation, we follow the principle of the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM, Hansen, 1982) to match the simulated moments with the sample moments
for t-statistics. For the most general model, we collect all model parameters into
vector Θ  rM, p0, λ1,Ψ1,Φ1s1. In Θ, M is the total number of trials, p0 is the prob-
ability of drawing from the null hypothesis, λ parameterizes the distribution F for
the non-null hypotheses, Ψ parameterizes the cross-section of persistence parameters
12Either a fixed or random seed can be assigned to µ0i . We use the unconditional mean µi for
convenience.
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and Φ parameterizes the correlation matrix for the cross-section of contemporaneous
shocks.
To understand Θ, we further decompose Θ into two parts:
Θ  rrM, p0, λ1sloooomoooon
Θ11
, rΨ1,Φ1sloomoon
Θ12
s1.
By this decomposition, Θ1 includes parameters that traditional methods (e.g., Holm
(1979) and Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)) on multiple testing focus on and Θ2
includes information on correlation or persistence parameters that provide a more
detailed description of the panel of shocks.13 While most studies on multiple test-
ing focus on one or a few components of Θ1, we are particularly interested in how
Θ2 affects multiple testing adjustments. The inclusion of Θ2 can change a certain
multiple testing adjustment through two channels. First, fixing the estimate of Θ1,
the correlation specification in Θ2 itself will change the adjustment. In the extreme
case when all shocks are perfectly correlated in the cross-section, we do not need any
adjustment at all. Second, Θ2 can affect the adjustment indirectly through Θ1 as
the estimate of Θ1 depends on the value of Θ2. Our model thus provides a coherent
framework for assessing the impact of Θ2.
While in principle both Θ1 and Θ2 can be estimated within our framework, we
choose to estimate Θ1 only and calibrate Θ2.
14 Unlike Θ1, Θ2 is best thought of as
descriptional of the shock structure that generates the cross-section of test statistics.
While it could have large impact on multiple testing, we use it primarily as a con-
venient modeling device to measure the departure from the i.i.d. case for the panel
13For instance, to incorporate the information of p0 into multiple testing, adaptive versions
of the Bonferroni and Benjamini-Hochberg methods have been proposed in the literature. See
Storey, Taylor and Siegmund (2004), Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006), Sarkar (2006, 2008),
Gavrilov, Benjamini and Sarkar (2009), Blanchard and Roquain (2008), Finner and Gontscharuk
(2009). They try to improve the performances of traditional methods by estimating the number of
true null hypotheses.
14We discuss several ways to “estimate” Θ2 at the end of Section 4.
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of shocks. More sophisticated modeling of the correlation structure and its impact
on multiple testing can be pursued along the lines of the current work but is beyond
the scope of the current paper. Additionally, correlations among shocks and hence
test statistics are best identified through test statistics that are based on partially
overlapped observations.15 Our framework assumes a balanced panel and should not
be used to identify such correlations in estimation.
In sum, we estimate our model and propose multiple testing thresholds for a
number of Θ2 values that can be calibrated. There are several ways to calibrate Θ2.
First, when there is no missing data, ρ can be easily estimated from the average
correlation among individual series. As we discussed previously, when there is no
missing information, permutation tests bootstrap from individual series to adjust for
multiple tests and are robust to non-normality and dependence among test statistics.
However, such tests are computationally challenging when the number of tests is
large.16 Our method requires much less computation time and can be valuable in
providing a benchmark estimate on what the right adjustment should be.17 Second,
we can estimate the average correlation for a few series and extrapolate for the entire
population, providing that we do have information on a few individual series, either
through sources that are publicly available or by direct replication of published works.
Extrapolation can be dangerous so a range of values for the correlation coefficient
should be tried instead of a single point estimate. Lastly, when even a few individual
series are difficulty to come by, we can create a table that provides the mapping
between the level of correlation and the threshold value for test statistics. Future
15See Ferson and Chen (2013) for the same argument on measuring the correlations among
mutual fund returns.
16For recent works on the permutation approach that try to reduce computational burden, see
Lin (2005), Conneely and Boehnke (2007) and Han, Kang and Eskin (2009).
17Lin (2005) tries to reduce computation time for permutation tests by simulating innovations
from a multivariate normal distribution when the score statistics are known. Our work extends Lin
(2005) by also simulating the score statistics.
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research can then claim its level of significance under a certain level of correlation.
We estimate Θ1 by matching moments of the observed and the simulated test
statistics. One important moment that we need to include is the total number of
published works that have a t-ratio exceeding the pre-specified t-ratio threshold T0.
It helps identify the total number of trials M . Intuitively, fixing all the parameters in
Θ1 except for M , the probability for a test statistic to exceed T0 is determined. The
excepted number of publications is thus proportional to M . Besides this moment, we
include the first few sample moments of the observed cross-section of test statistics
(e.g., mean, variance, etc.) to estimate other structural parameters. For the simplest
model in which Θ1 is parameterized by three parameters (i.e., λ is a scalar), at least
the mean and variance of test statistics are needed to estimate the model. For
simplicity, we follow exactly identified GMM to include exactly the same number of
moments as the dimension of Θ1.
5.2.3 Multiple testing adjustment
Finally, we propose multiple testing adjusted thresholds by simulating our structural
model at the estimated parameter values. In particular, at a fixed parameter estimate
Θˆ and given a threshold value R for test statistics, we calculate a certain Type I error
rate (e.g., FWER or FDR) by simulations. We then search for the optimal threshold
value R that achieves a pre-specified significance level.
One important advantage of our structural modeling approach is the precise cal-
culation of Type I/II error rates under various definitions. Unlike a single test, the
definition for Type I/II error rates is not straightforward for multiple tests. The
statistics literature has proposed several interesting candidates, including FWER
and FDR. But there is no consensus as to the preferred choice.18 Moreover, usual
18Alternative definitions akin to FDR include per comparison error rate (Saville, 1990), positive
false discovery rate (Storey, 2003) and generalized false discovery rate (Sarkar and Guo, 2009).
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adjustments for multiple testing can only achieve a given significance level under
certain conditions (e.g., independence among test statistics) and can be very con-
servative if these conditions are violated. Our simulation framework allows a precise
calculation of different forms of error rates. This helps generate multiple testing
adjustments that are not overly conservative. In addition, the precise calculation of
Type II error rates, however they are defined, allows us to look more into the classic
tradeoff between Type I and Type II error rates in a multiple testing context.19 Our
methods offer additional insights on this tradeoff.
5.3 A Simulation Study
5.3.1 Model Simulation
We simulate many t-statistic samples and examine how sample moments change as
the parameters for the structural model change. We generate a sample of t-statistics
in the following way. We assume that M  5, 000 tests have been tried. The test
statistics are generated by the structural model at parameter pp0, λ, ρq, where p0 is
the probability of drawing from the null hypothesis, λ is the single mean parameter
that models the exponential distribution for alternative hypotheses and ρ is the
correlation coefficient for any pair of normal shocks that constitute the t-statistics.
Among these 5,000 trials, only a fraction of them have a t-statistic that is larger
than T0  2.57. We keep these test statistics and calculate sample statistics based
on them. To obtain the distribution of the sample statistics, we repeat the above
procedure many times, each time generating a new sample of test statistics. To
focus on important parameters, we fix λ at 0.30 and the number of time periods at
N  240, i.e., 20 years of monthly data, and vary p0 and λ to examine their impacts
on sample statistics.
19Most studies on multiple testing adjustment eschew the issue of Type II errors, mainly because
they depend on the high dimensional parameter vector under the alternative hypotheses and are
thus difficult to measure.
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Table 1 summarizes sample moments for the model simulated at different levels of
p0 and ρ. Fixing ρ, we see that all summary statistics displayed (i.e., mean, median,
standard deviation and maximum) of the sample of test statistics are monotonically
decreasing in the level of p0. For example, when ρ  0.25, the 50th percentile of
the median of t-statistics changes from 5.76 to 5.38 when p0 changes from 0.30 to
0.90. Intuitively, this happens because with a higher chance of drawing from the null
hypothesis, a higher fraction of the truncated t-statistic sample is made up of false
discoveries. This lowers the overall mean and variance of the truncated t-statistic
sample as t-statistics under the alternative hypotheses are generally higher and more
dispersed than t-statistics under the null hypothesis. The monotone relation between
moments of test statistics and p0 helps identify p0 when the model is estimated.
Lastly, as expected, the number of discoveries M0 also decreases as p0 becomes
larger. This again can help identify p0 since the number of discoveries is one of the
moments that we need to match in the model estimation.
Fixing p0, we do not see any noticeable change in sample moments as the level of
correlation ρ changes. For instance, fixing p0 at 0.30, the 50th percentile of the mean
of test statistics drops from 7.21 to 7.19 when ρ changes from zero to 0.50. It then
increases slightly and reaches 7.20 when ρ further increases to 0.75. None of these
changes are important compared to the standard deviation for t-stat means across
samples.20 In contrast, we observe that the variation in M0 increases dramatically
as ρ increases. Fixing p0 at 0.30, we see that the range between the 10th and 90th
percentiles for M0 changes from 89 (=2123-2034) at ρ  0 to 1023 (=2575-1552) at
ρ  0.75. Taken together, correlations among test statistics drive the across-sample
variation of the number of discoveries while keeping sample characteristics (i.e., mean,
20Based on the range between the 10th and 90th percentiles, the standard deviation for t-stat
means across simulated samples is about 0.15 across the four ρ levels when p0  0.30.
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Table 5.1: Model Simulation
Summary statistics for the structural model simulated 5,000 times. The model is parameterized by
Θ  pM,p0, λ, ρq
1, where M is the total number of trials and is fixed at 5,000, p0 is the probability
of drawing from the null hypothesis, λ is the mean parameter for the exponential distribution for
alternative hypotheses and ρ is the pairwise correlation coefficient between the normal shocks for two
different tests. In the table, M0 reports the number of discoveries (i.e., tests with a t-ratio over 2.57)
and “Mean(t-stat)”, “Median(t-stat)”, “Std(t-stat)” and “Max(t-stat)” report the mean, median,
standard deviation and maximum of the sample of test statistics that are above 2.57, respectively.
p0  0.30
ρ  0 ρ  0.25 ρ  0.50 ρ  0.75
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
M0 2034 2074 2123 1816 2060 2400 1647 1984 2410 1552 1953 2575
Mean(t-stat) 7.06 7.21 7.32 7.09 7.20 7.32 7.04 7.19 7.30 7.07 7.20 7.37
Median(t-stat) 5.65 5.80 5.90 5.64 5.76 5.89 5.61 5.76 5.88 5.63 5.77 5.93
Std(t-stat) 4.47 4.63 4.84 4.53 4.66 4.83 4.42 4.66 4.86 4.46 4.68 4.83
Max(t-stat) 34.71 39.32 47.17 33.28 39.68 48.91 34.27 39.28 46.40 33.97 39.90 48.09
p0  0.60
ρ  0 ρ  0.25 ρ  0.50 ρ  0.75
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
M0 1164 1199 1239 1068 1196 1402 995 1176 1518 942 1179 1468
Mean(t-stat) 6.89 7.10 7.27 6.97 7.18 7.35 6.81 7.14 7.35 6.95 7.17 7.36
Median(t-stat) 5.51 5.68 5.85 5.54 5.74 5.91 5.32 5.75 5.94 5.51 5.78 5.97
Std(t-stat) 4.37 4.59 4.91 4.43 4.66 4.91 4.38 4.61 4.83 4.34 4.62 4.89
Max(t-stat) 31.71 37.02 45.66 32.24 37.58 46.12 31.05 35.34 43.01 32.00 37.16 46.73
p0  0.90
ρ  0 ρ  0.25 ρ  0.50 ρ  0.75
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
M0 315 337 360 284 323 415 263 299 446 231 299 403
Mean(t-stat) 6.36 6.65 7.04 6.03 6.73 7.23 5.69 6.99 7.50 5.86 7.08 7.51
Median(t-stat) 4.86 5.17 5.62 3.99 5.38 5.81 3.76 5.55 6.07 4.21 5.64 6.03
Std(t-stat) 4.08 4.58 5.02 3.97 4.49 4.96 4.05 4.54 5.11 4.05 4.53 5.12
Max(t-stat) 24.56 31.23 40.48 24.64 30.20 38.73 25.28 30.51 39.10 24.47 31.15 39.51
median, etc.) largely unchanged. In other words, with high correlations among test
statistics, the total number of discoveries made by some literature could be very
different — either far above or below its current value — if history repeats. This
fact has important implication for the identification of M in the model estimation.
Given a high value of ρ, the observed number of discoveries is a noisy indicator of
M . Noisy estimates of M in turn imply noisy multiple testing adjustments, as we
will see in the next section.
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5.3.2 Model Estimation
We now examine the accuracy of the model estimation as well as multiple testing
adjustment. Fixing M at 5,000 and λ at 0.30, we simulate one sample of test statistics
for a certain combination of p0 and ρ. We estimate the model based on the simulated
sample by pre-specifying a correlation level ρˆ, which can be different from the true
ρ based on which the data is generated. We denote the estimated parameter vector
as Θˆ1  pMˆ, pˆ0, λˆq1. Together with ρˆ, we can search for the threshold value Rˆ that
achieves a pre-specified Type I error rate for multiple testing based on the estimated
structural model. We use FWER and FDR as the two error rate measures and
set the significance level at 10% and 5%, respectively. Lastly, we simulate the true
underlying model to calculate the real error rate for the proposed threshold value Rˆ.
The resulting real error rates, denoted as {FWER and zFDR, should be to close to 10%
and 5% respectively if the estimation works well. Therefore, their departure from
their target significance levels offers an analytical way to evaluate the performance
of our estimation.
Table 2 presents the estimation results. We have several remarks. First, the 50th
percentiles of the three parameter estimates are centered around their true values.
Notice that this is true even when ρˆ  ρ, i.e., the specified pairwise correlation differs
from the true correlation. This happens because ρ only changes the variation in the
number of discoveries across simulated samples, as shown in the previous simulation
study. Given a parameter vector Θ1  pM, p0, λq1 and a correlation coefficient ρ, the
required sample moments for our estimation (i.e., number of discoveries, mean and
variance for test statistics) are almost independent of the level of ρ. This indepen-
dence results in the unbiasedness in the estimation of Θ1 even if ρ is misspecified.
Second, the two error rates {FWER and {FDR seem to be estimated unbiasedly only
when ρˆ  ρ. When ρˆ ¡ ρ (ρˆ   ρ), both error rates are overestimated (underesti-
190
Table 5.2: Model Estimation for Simulated Samples
We estimate the structural model parameterized by Θ  pM,p0, λ, ρq
1 100 times. Each time, we
simulate a sample of test statistics based on Θ. Based on this simulated sample and hypothesizing
the level of correlation at ρˆ, we estimate Θ1  pM,p0, λq
1 via GMM. The estimated structural
model at Θˆ  pΘˆ1, ρˆq
1 is then used to generate threshold values that set FWER and FDR at 10%
and 5%, respectively. These threshold values are then entered into the true model to generate the
estimated FWER ( ˆFWER) and FDR ( ˆFDR).
p0  0.30
Mˆ pˆ0 λˆ {FWER(%) {FDR(%)
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
ρ  0 ρˆ  0 3970 4824 5619 0.20 0.27 0.36 0.21 0.31 0.38 7.34 9.12 13.26 3.78 5.21 7.42
ρˆ  0.25 3654 4982 5813 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.19 0.28 0.37 8.61 12.82 14.51 4.93 6.69 8.28
ρˆ  0.75 3691 5012 5942 0.16 0.31 0.41 0.18 0.29 0.42 10.29 14.37 17.83 5.03 7.43 9.91
ρ  0.25 ρˆ  0 2947 4860 6593 0.17 0.22 0.34 0.20 0.33 0.41 5.47 8.19 12.52 2.41 4.29 6.27
ρˆ  0.25 3089 4851 6531 0.21 0.33 0.39 0.18 0.26 0.35 4.71 10.82 13.96 2.68 4.71 7.03
ρˆ  0.75 2547 4981 7219 0.22 0.35 0.43 0.16 0.29 0.39 6.47 13.21 17.21 2.51 6.21 8.19
ρ  0.75 ρˆ  0 2868 4789 6342 0.15 0.29 0.45 0.19 0.28 0.37 3.32 7.89 13.21 1.46 3.78 7.02
ρˆ  0.25 2419 4521 6813 0.24 0.34 0.46 0.18 0.25 0.36 3.98 8.93 14.54 2.31 4.07 7.45
ρˆ  0.75 2480 4802 6931 0.23 0.35 0.40 0.18 0.29 0.41 4.13 9.89 18.47 2.28 5.43 8.72
p0  0.60
Mˆ pˆ0 λˆ {FWER(%) {FDR(%)
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
ρ  0 ρˆ  0 3963 4857 5593 0.49 0.56 0.37 0.22 0.33 0.39 7.74 9.62 13.56 3.38 4.81 7.11
ρˆ  0.25 3531 5068 5805 0.45 0.56 0.34 0.17 0.25 0.36 8.41 12.72 14.21 4.61 6.44 7.96
ρˆ  0.75 3678 5117 5873 0.47 0.64 0.43 0.21 0.31 0.41 11.19 15.27 18.73 4.79 7.23 9.37
ρ  0.25 ρˆ  0 3343 4765 5993 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.19 0.32 0.38 5.25 7.99 13.61 2.39 4.17 5.55
ρˆ  0.25 3172 5050 6497 0.57 0.67 0.73 0.17 0.27 0.37 5.69 10.57 13.03 3.29 4.89 6.71
ρˆ  0.75 2998 4858 6608 0.59 0.69 0.76 0.13 0.25 0.37 7.36 12.88 16.19 3.99 6.20 7.58
ρ  0.75 ρˆ  0 2853 4794 6401 0.42 0.56 0.73 0.17 0.26 0.37 3.29 7.77 13.04 2.03 3.69 5.87
ρˆ  0.25 2672 4663 6790 0.51 0.53 0.73 0.20 0.29 0.39 3.85 8.71 14.20 2.29 4.17 6.42
ρˆ  0.75 3001 4824 6678 0.53 0.63 0.69 0.18 0.26 0.39 5.53 9.87 15.41 3.19 5.44 7.87
p0  0.90
Mˆ pˆ0 λˆ {FWER(%) {FDR(%)
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
ρ  0 ρˆ  0 3979 5146 5602 0.76 0.84 0.92 0.25 0.35 0.42 7.96 9.73 13.28 3.56 4.93 6.98
ρˆ  0.25 3423 4798 5731 0.74 0.86 0.94 0.19 0.24 0.35 8.40 12.58 14.09 4.87 6.05 7.69
ρˆ  0.75 3578 5231 5871 0.78 0.84 0.93 0.24 0.35 0.43 11.09 14.85 17.67 5.38 7.43 10.03
ρ  0.25 ρˆ  0 2821 4582 6783 0.79 0.87 0.91 0.16 0.30 0.39 6.37 8.14 11.96 2.17 4.29 5.41
ρˆ  0.25 2628 4967 6892 0.77 0.91 0.95 0.23 0.29 0.36 5.94 10.80 13.43 3.17 4.85 6.69
ρˆ  0.75 2546 5097 7283 0.75 0.88 0.93 0.16 0.31 0.39 7.74 12.59 15.79 4.03 6.01 7.73
ρ  0.75 ρˆ  0 2268 4795 7097 0.70 0.84 0.93 0.21 0.29 0.36 5.63 7.87 11.79 1.66 3.57 6.05
ρˆ  0.25 2087 4543 7209 0.78 0.90 0.96 0.25 0.32 0.41 5.61 8.98 13.46 2.48 4.27 6.58
ρˆ  0.75 2397 5067 7270 0.83 0.92 0.95 0.20 0.25 0.37 6.91 9.37 13.80 2.39 5.30 7.63
mated). Given the unbiased estimate of Θ1 for the structural model, a conjecture
of ρ that is higher than the true ρ (i.e., ρˆ ¡ ρ) suggests a threshold value Rˆ that
is lower than what is needed to meet a certain significance level. This explains why
both {FWER and {FDR are above their target levels when ρˆ ¡ ρ. In summary, mean
estimates imply that while structural parameters are estimated unbiasedly whether
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the knowledge of ρ is known or not, the accuracy of the error rate estimates crucially
depends on a correct specification of ρ.
A closer examination of Table 2 reveals other interesting patterns for our estima-
tion. Irrespective of the level of p0 and given that ρ is known (i.e., ρˆ  ρ), it seems
that the standard errors for both parameter and error rate estimates are higher for
larger values of ρ. This pattern appears to be more pronounced for M and the two
error rates and less so for p0 and λ. For instance, when p0  0.60, the 10%-90%
confidence band for the estimate of M is around 2,000 at ρ  0 and increases to
3,000 at ρ  0.75. Similarly, for the estimate of FWER, the confidence band is
about 6% at ρ  0 and 10% at ρ  0.75. Again, this happens because the variation
in the number of discoveries is large across simulations when ρ is large. Given that
M is identified mainly through the number of discoveries, it will vary considerably
across simulations. At the same time, error rates crucially depend on the number
of trials M . Uncertainty in the estimate of M translates into uncertainty in the
estimates of the two error rates. This explains why the standard errors for the error
rate estimates are also high when ρ is large.
Lastly, to compare the performance of our model to standard approaches, Table
3 shows the error rate estimates under well-known procedures. In particular, we
calculate FWER using Holm (1979)’s procedure and calculate FDR using Benjamini
and Hochberg (1995)’s procedure. Also, we separate each error rate calculation into
two cases, depending on whether all the tests are observed or not. In the case when
not all tests are observed, we assume that only tests with a t-stat over 2.57 are
observed. We see from Table 3 that many error rate estimates are very different
from their target rates. When all tests are observable, both error rates are close to
their targets when ρ  0. This is because both procedures achieve their target rates
when tests are independent (ρ  0) and p0  1 (i.e., all null hypotheses are true).21
21See Holm (1979) and Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) for the proofs.
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When ρ gets larger, the two error rates become smaller and further below their target
rates. When only significant tests are observed and taken into account in multiple
testing adjustment, both methods become too lenient (i.e., the threshold t-statistic
is too low), generating error rates that are high above the target rates.
Table 5.3: Error Rates under Conventional Adjustments
Type I error rates for the structural model parameterzied by Θ  pM,p0, λ, ρq, where M and λ
are fixed at 5,000 and 0.30, respectively. We simulate a large number of samples of test statistics.
For each sample, we apply Holm’s adjustment (Holm, 1979) to either the complete sample (“M is
known”) or the sample truncated at 2.57 (“M is unknown”) to generate threshold values. These
values are then entered into the underlying true model to determine the true FWER ( ˆFWER).
Analogously, we apply Benjamini and Hochberg’s adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) to
obtain the true FDR ( ˆFDR).
p0  0.30
M is known M is unknown
{FWER(%) {FDR(%) {FWER(%) {FDR(%)
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
ρ  0 2.67 3.09 3.87 0.74 1.74 2.24 13.21 15.43 16.21 5.78 9.58 12.29
ρ  0.25 1.49 2.21 2.97 0.77 1.53 1.99 11.54 13.23 15.51 4.65 8.76 12.09
ρ  0.75 0.64 1.73 2.09 0.43 0.96 1.76 8.49 10.29 11.97 2.76 6.53 8.58
p0  0.60
M is known M is unknown
{FWER(%) {FDR(%) {FWER(%) {FDR(%)
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
ρ  0 5.33 5.96 7.34 1.23 3.05 3.97 14.39 16.78 17.59 6.87 10.58 13.39
ρ  0.25 2.20 4.19 5.68 1.59 2.69 3.19 12.69 14.42 16.77 5.93 10.04 13.21
ρ  0.75 1.03 2.48 3.65 0.57 1.05 2.02 9.71 11.79 13.37 3.83 7.46 12.76
p0  0.90
M is known M is unknown
{FWER(%) {FDR(%) {FWER(%) {FDR(%)
Percentiles(%) 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90
ρ  0 7.83 8.93 10.47 3.78 4.87 5.31 16.73 19.40 22.77 8.94 13.19 18.41
ρ  0.25 5.67 6.78 8.09 2.87 3.99 4.45 13.47 16.03 19.45 6.95 11.47 16.74
ρ  0.75 2.32 4.39 5.78 1.95 2.58 3.71 10.37 12.96 15.57 4.59 9.94 14.38
Comparing the error rate estimates in Table 2 and 3, our method performs fa-
vorably. In particular, when ρ is correctly specified, the error rate estimates based
on our structural model are centered around their target rates whereas conventional
methods imply estimates that are either too high or too low, depending on whether
there is missing data or not. Even when ρ is misspecified, it seems beneficial to
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have an estimate for the parameters of the structural model. The implied error rates
based on the misspecified ρ, albeit biased to some degree, seem to be closer to their
target rates than what most conventional methods imply, regardless of whether there
is missing data or not.
5.4 Conclusion
In many applications in economics, many candidate variables are used to test a
similar hypothesis. For example, there are many papers that study why countries
grow at different rates and a large number of “explanatory” variables are proposed.
We introduce a new framework that allows for comparisons across many research
studies and explicitly controls for the correlation among the proposed variables.
Our approach explicitly models the distributions under the null and alternative
hypotheses and decomposes a test statistic into the mean effect and innovations. We
simulate the cross-section of innovations and estimate our model using GMM. We
show that our estimation works well. We also control publication bias and allow for
correlation among tests.
Our research can be enriched in several dimensions. While we assume a correctly
specified distributional family for the alternative hypotheses, it would be interesting
to see how a misspecified distributional family changes our conclusions. Also, shocks
that have fatter tails can be simulated to examine the model’s performance. Lastly,
from a theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to see how the parameters
in our model are exactly identified by the sample moments in the GMM estimation.
We leave these issues to future research.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.
The optimization problem we want to solve is
sup
R
Er
R1γ
1 γ
s
s.t. p1q EpMRq  1,
p2q R ¡ 0.
For simplicity, I succinctly denote γpδq by γ. Moreover, to save space, I only solve the case
when γ P p0, 1q. For γ P p1,8q the maximization problem is essentially a minimization
problem and a similar proof follows. For γ P p0, 1q, the maximization problem will be
well-defined if all moments of M are assumed to exist. This is because
EpR1γq  EpR1γM1γMγ1q
¤ rEprpMRq1γs
1
1γ qs1γ  rEpMγ1q
1
γ sγ
 EpM
γ1
γ qγ .
Note that I am using the same trick as in the proof of the new bounds. Also, for γ P p1,8q
a lower bound for EpR1γq exists so the corresponding minimization problem is also well-
195
defined.
Let the state density function be fpsq and let the Lagrange multipliers associated with
EpMRq  1 and Rpsq ¡ 0 be λ and µpsq, respectively, then the Lagrange function is
LpRpsq, λ, µpsqq  1
1 γ
»
Rpsq1γfpsqds λp
»
MpsqRpsqfpsqds 1q  µpsqRpsq.
It is easy to see that the objective function 11γ
³
Rpsq1γfpsqds is concave in Rpsq. Addi-
tionally, the constraint
³
MpsqRpsqfpsqds  1 is linear in Rpsq. Under these two conditions,
the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a maximum of
this problem. The first-order condition for the argument Rpsq is
Rpsqγfpsq  λMpsqfpsq  µpsq  0.
Since returns need to have a positive support, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
positivity constraint µpsq will be zero in every state. Assuming an everywhere positive
fpsq, we arrive at the following solution for Rpsq
Rpsq  rλp1 γqs
 1
γMpsq
 1
γ . (A.1)
To express λ as a moment of the pricing kernel, we can multiply both sides of equation
(A.1) by Mpsqfpsq and sum across states. This leave us with the following equation for λ
rλp1 γqs
 1
γEpM
1 1
γ q  1. (A.2)
Combining equation (A.1) and (A.2), we get the optimal portfolio choice as a function of
M only
R˜ M
 1
γ {EpM
γ1
γ q. (A.3)
Note that, by assumption, M P Q  , so R˜ P ℵ  . This validates the earlier step in setting
µpsq to zero. Finally, by plugging the optimal choice R˜ into the objective function, we have
UpMq 
EpR˜1γq
1 γ

rEpM
γ1
γ qsγ
1 γ
. (A.4)
Equation (A.3) and (A.4) give the optimal solution to this problem.
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A.2 Duality definition and proof
For an optimizing investor with a risk-aversion coefficient of γ, her optimization problem
is
sup
R
Er
R1γ
1 γ
s
s.t. p1q EpMRq  1,
p2q R ¡ 0.
Denote the maximized objective function by UY LpMq and the optimal choice variable by
RY LpMq, respectively. Note that they are both functionals on M and can be thought of
as operators: they operate on any pricing kernel defined on ℵ   and yield a value function
and a choice return variable. Symmetrically, a Hansen-Jaganathan type of optimization
on the δ-th moment of the pricing kernel can be presented by
inf
M
rEpMδqs
1
1δ
1 γpδq
s.t. p1q EpMRq  1,
p2q M ¡ 0.
where γpδq  11δ is what I will term the dual parameter transformation. Similarly, let
UHJ pRq and MHJ pRq be the associated functionals (operators). Then a duality between
these two optimization problems is satisfied iff the following conditions hold:
RY LpMHJ pRqq  R
MHJ pRY LpMqq  M.
In words, these relationships say the following: 1. The pricing kernel that satisfies the HJ
problem with a given return R is the only kernel that can yield an optimal choice of R in
my optimization problem; 2. The return that is the optimal choice under my optimization
scheme for a given pricking kernel M is the only return that can yield M as the optimal
choice in the HJ problem. If two operators satisfy these above duality conditions, then
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inverse operators can be defined straightforwardly as
R1Y LpRq MHJ pRq
M1HJ pMq  RY LpMq.
Given the duality definition, it is easy to see that HJ and my optimization are indeed dual
problems. To see this, we only need to work out MHJ pRq. Similar to Proposition 1, it can
be shown that
MHJ pRq  CpRq R
1
δ1 , (A.5)
where the normalizing constant CpRq is equal to 1{EpR
δ
δ1 q. By plugging the formulae in
equation (A.3) and (A.5) into the duality conditions, it is readily seen that these conditions
are satisfied.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
I prove by giving an example. I construct a sequence of pricing kernels that can all price
a riskless bond but have either explosive or degenerate δ-th moment in the limit.
Let the state space be p0, 1q and letX be a random variable that is uniformly distributed
on p0, 1q: X  Up0, 1q. Let tMnu
8
n1 be a sequence of pricing kernels that are defined by
Mn 
$'''&
'''%
n αn if X P p0,
1
n
q,
αn
n 1
if X P r
1
n
, 1q
(A.6)
where tαnu
8
n1 is a sequence that satisfies αn   n and
αn
n Ñ 0 (For simplicity, αn can
be set at the constant one). Pricing kernels defined in such a way can be understood as
describing economies with rare disasters. Rare events happen with a probability 1n and
the state price is high in disaster states. Note that a one-period riskless bond has a gross
return of one, since EpMnq  1 for any n. Notice that EpM
δ
nq goes to 8 since
EpMδnq ¥ pn αnq
δ 1
n
Ñ8
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for any δ ¡ 1. However, if a riskless bond is the only security, then return moments are
all equal to one. Therefore, no upper bound can be imposed on EpMδq. Similarly, for
δ P p0, 1q, we have
EpMδnq  pn αnq
δ 1
n
  p
αn
n 1
qδp1
1
n
q Ñ 0,
so no lower bound (except the trivial zero bound) exists for δ P p0, 1q. Lastly, if δ P p8, 0q
then no upper bound exists.
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Appendix B
Truncated Model Estimation and Bayesian
Multiple Testing for Chapter 4
B.1 Multiple Testing When the Number of Tests (M) is Unknown
The empirical difficulty in applying standard p-value adjustments is that we do not observe
factors that have been tried, found to be insignificant and then discarded. We attempt
to overcome this difficulty using a simulation framework. The idea is first simulate the
empirical distribution of p-values for all experiments (published and unpublished) and
then adjust p-values based on these simulated samples.
First, we assume the test statistic (t-statistic, for instance) for any experiment follows
a certain distribution D (e.g., exponential distribution) and the set of published works is a
truncated D distribution. Based on the estimation framework for truncated distributions,1
we estimate parameters of distribution D and total number of trials M . Next we simulate
many sequences of p-values, each corresponding to a plausible set of p-value realizations of
all trials. To account for the uncertainty in parameter estimates of D and M , we simulate
p-value sequences based on the distribution of estimated D and M . Finally, for each p-
value, we calculate the adjusted p-value based on a sequence of simulated p-values. The
1See Heckman (1979) and Greene (2008), Chapter 24.
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median is taken as the final adjusted p-value.
B.1.1 Using Truncated Exponential Distribution to Model the t-ratio Sample
Truncated distributions have been used to study hidden tests (i.e., publication bias) in
medical research.2 The idea is that studies reporting significant results are more likely
to get published. Assuming a threshold significance level or t-statistic, researchers can to
some extent infer the results of unpublished works and gain understanding of the overall
effect of a drug or treatment. However, in medical research, insignificant results are still
viewed as an indispensable part of the overall statistical evidence and are given much more
prominence than in the financial economics research. As a result, medical publications
tend to report more insignificant results. This makes applying the truncated distribution
framework to medical studies difficult as there is no clear-cut threshold value.3 In this
sense, the truncated distributional framework suits our study better — 1.96 is the obvious
hurdle that research needs to overcome to get published.
On the other hand, not all tried factors with p-value above 1.96 are reported. In the
quantitative asset management industry significant results are not published — they are
considered “trade secrets”. For the academic literature, factors with “borderline” t-ratios
are difficult to get published. Thus, our sample is likely missing a number of factors that
have t-ratios just over the bar of 1.96. To make our inference robust, for our baseline
result, we assume all tried factors with t-ratios above 2.57 are observed and ignore those
with t-ratios in the range of (1.96, 2.57). We experiment with alternative ways to handle
t-ratios in this range.
Many distributions can be used to model the t-ratio sample. One restriction that we
think any of these distributions should satisfy is the monotonicity of the density curve.
Intuitively, it should be easier to find factors with small t-ratios than large ones.4 We
2See Begg and Berlin (1988) and Thornton and Lee (2000).
3When the threshold value is unknown, it must be estimated from the likelihood function.
However, such estimation usually incurs large estimation errors.
4This basic scarcity assumption is also the key ingredient in our model in Section 5.
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choose to use the simplest distribution that incorporates this monotonicity condition: the
exponential distribution.
Panel A of Figure B.1 presents the histogram of the baseline t-ratio sample and the
fitted truncated exponential curve.5 The fitted density closely tracks the histogram and
has a population mean of 2.07.6 Panel B is a histogram of the original t-ratio sample
which, as we discussed before, is likely to under-represent the sample with a t-ratio in the
range of (1.96, 2.57). Panel C is the augmented t-ratio sample with the ad hoc assumption
that our sample covers only half of all factors with t-ratios between 1.96 and 2.57. The
population mean estimate is 2.22 in Panel B and 1.93 in Panel C. As expected, the under-
representation of relatively small t-ratios results in a higher mean estimate for the t-ratio
population. We think the baseline model is the best among all three models as it not only
overcomes the missing data problem for the original sample, but also avoids guessing the
fraction of missing observations in the 1.96-2.57 range. We use this model estimates for
the follow-up analysis.
Using the baseline model, we calculate other interesting population characteristics that
are key to multiple hypothesis testing. Assuming independence, we model observed t-ratios
as draws from an exponential distribution with mean parameter λˆ and a known cutoff point
of 2.57. The proportion of unobserved factors is then estimated as:
P punobservedq  Φp2.5; λˆq  1 expp2.5{λˆq  71.1% (B.1)
where Φpc;λq is the cumulative distribution function evaluated at c for a exponential
distribution with mean λ. Our estimates indicate that the mean absolute value of the
t-ratio for the underlying factor population is 2.07 and about 71.1% of tried factors are
5There are a few very large t-ratios in our sample. We fit the truncated exponential model
without dropping any large t-ratios. In contrast to the usual normal density, exponential distribu-
tion is better at modeling extreme observations. In addition, extreme values are pivotal statistics
for heavy-tailed distributions and are key for model estimation. While extreme observations are
included for model estimation, we exclude them in Figure B.1 to better focus on the main part of
the t-ratio range.
6Our truncated exponential distribution framework allows a simple analytical estimate for the
population mean of the exponential distribution. In particular, let c be the truncation point and
the t-ratio sample be ttiu
N
i1. The mean estimate is given by λˆ  1{pt¯ cq, where t¯  p
°N
i1 tiq{N
is the sample mean.
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Figure B.1: Density Plots for t-ratio
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Empirical density and fitted exponential density curves based on three different samples. Panel
A is based on the baseline sample that includes all t-ratios above 2.57. Panel B is based on the
original sample with all t-ratios above 1.96. Panel C is based on the augmented sample that adds
the sub-sample of observations that fall in between 1.96 and 2.57 to the original t-ratio sample. It
doubles the number of observations within the range of 1.96 and 2.57 in the original sample. λ is
the single parameter for the exponential curve. It gives the population mean for the unrestricted
(i.e., non-truncated) distribution.
discarded. Given that 237 out of the original 315 factors have a t-ratio exceeding 2.57, the
total number of factor tests is estimated to be 820 ( 237{p1  71.1%q) and the number
of factors with a t-ratio between 1.96 and 2.57 is estimated to be 81.7 Since our t-ratio
sample covers only 57 such factors, roughly 30% (=(81-57)/81) of t-ratios between 1.96
and 2.57 are hidden.
7Directly applying our estimate framework to the original sample that includes all t-ratios above
1.96, the estimated total number of factor tests would be 719. Alternatively, assuming our sample
only covers half of the factors with t-ratios between 1.96 and 2.57, the estimated number of factors
is 969.
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B.1.2 Simulated Benchmark t-ratios Under Independence
The truncated exponential distribution framework helps us approximate the distribution of
t-ratios for all factors, published and unpublished. We can then apply the aforementioned
adjustment techniques to this distribution to generate new t-ratio benchmarks. However,
there are two sources of sampling and estimation uncertainty that affect our results. First,
our t-ratio sample may under-represent all factors with t-statistics exceeding 2.57.8 Hence,
our estimates of total trials are biased (too low), which affects our calculation of the
benchmarks. Second, estimation error for the truncated exponential distribution can affect
our benchmark t-ratios. Although we can approximate the estimation error through the
usual asymptotic distribution theory for MLE, it is unclear how this error affects our
benchmark t-ratios. This is because t-ratio adjustment procedures usually depend on
the entire t-ratio distribution and so standard transformational techniques (e.g., the delta
method) do not apply. Moreover, we are not sure whether our sample is large enough to
trust the accuracy of asymptotic approximations.
Given these concerns, we propose a simulation framework that incorporates these un-
certainties. We divide it into four steps:
Step I Estimate λ and M based on a new t-ratio sample with size r R.
Suppose our current t-ratio sample size is R and it only covers a fraction of 1{r of
all factors. We sample r  R t-ratios (with replacement) from the original t-ratio
sample. Based on this new t-ratio sample, we apply the above truncated exponential
distribution framework to the t-ratios and obtain the parameter estimates λ for the
exponential distribution. The truncation probability is calculated as Pˆ  Φp2.5; λˆq.
We can then estimate the total number of trials by
Mˆ 
rR
1 Pˆ
8This will happen if we miss factors published by the academic literature or we do not have
access to the “trade secrets” by industry practitioners.
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Step II Calculate the benchmark t-ratio based on a random sample generated
from λˆ and Mˆ .
Based on the previous step estimate of λˆ and Mˆ , we generate a random sample of
t-ratios for all tried factors. We then calculate the appropriate benchmark t-ratio
based on this generated sample.
Step III Repeat Step II 10,000 times to get the median benchmark t-ratio.
Repeat Step II (based on the same λˆ and Mˆ) 10,000 times to generate a collection of
benchmark t-ratios. We take the median as the final benchmark t-ratio corresponding
to the parameter estimate pλˆ, Mˆq.
Step IV Repeat Step I-III 10,000 times to generate a distribution of benchmark
t-ratios.
Repeat Step I-III 10,000 times, each time with a newly generated t-ratio sample as
in Step I. For each repetition, we obtain a benchmark t-ratio ti corresponding to the
parameter estimates pλˆi, Mˆiq. In the end, we have a collection of benchmark t-ratios
ttiu
10000
i1 .
To see how our procedure works, notice that Steps II-III calculate the theoretical bench-
mark t-ratio for a t-ratio distribution characterized by pλˆ, Mˆq. As a result, the outcome is
simply one number and there is no uncertainty around it. Uncertainties are incorporated in
Steps I and IV. In particular, by sampling repeatedly from the original t-ratio sample and
re-estimating λ and M each time, we take into account estimation error of the truncated
exponential distribution. Also, under the assumption that neglected significant t-ratios
follow the empirical distribution of our t-ratio sample, by varying r, we can assess how this
under-representation of our t-ratio sample affects results.
Table B.1 shows estimates of M and benchmark t-ratios. When r  1, the median
estimate for the total number of trials is 822,9 almost the same as our previous estimate
9Our previous estimate of 820 is a one-shot estimate based on the truncated sample. The results
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of 820 based on the original sample. Unsurprisingly, Bonferroni implied benchmark t-ratio
(4.01) is larger than 3.78, which is what we get ignoring unpublished works. Holm implied
t-ratio (3.96), while not necessarily increasing in the number of trials, is also higher than
before (3.64). BHY implied t-ratio increases from 3.39 to 3.68 at 1% significance and from
2.78 to 3.18 at 5% significance. As r increases, sample size M and benchmark t-ratios for all
four types of adjustments increase. When r doubles, the estimate of M also approximately
doubles and Bonferroni and Holm implied t-ratios increase by about 0.2, whereas BHY
implied t-ratios increase by around 0.03 (under both significance levels).
Table B.1: Benchmark t-ratios When M is Estimated
Estimated total number of factors tried (M) and benchmark t-ratio percentiles based on a trun-
cated exponential distribution framework. Our estimation is based on the original t-ratio sample
truncated at 2.57. The sampling ratio is the assumed ratio of the true population size of t-ratios
exceeding 2.57 over our current sample size. Both Bonferroni and Holm have a significance level of
5%.
Sampling ratio M Bonferroni Holm BHY(1%) BHY(5%)
(r) [10% 90%] [10% 90%] [10% 90% ] [10% 90%] [10% 90%]
1 822 4.01 3.96 3.68 3.18
[727 937 ] [3.98 4.04 ] [3.92 4.00] [3.63 3.74 ] [3.12 3.24]
1.5 1229 4.10 4.06 3.70 3.20
[1125 1370 ] [4.08 4.13 ] [4.03 4.09] [3.66 3.75 ] [3.16 3.25]
2 1652 4.17 4.13 3.71 3.21
[1520 1798 ] [4.15 4.19 ] [4.11 4.16] [3.67 3.75 ] [3.17 3.25]
in Table B.1 are based on repeated estimates based on re-sampled data: we re-sample many times
and 822 is the median of all these estimates. It is close to the one-shot estimate.
206
B.2 A Simple Bayesian Framework
The following framework is adopted from Scott and Berger (2006). It highlights the key
issues in Bayesian multiple hypothesis testing.10 More sophisticated generalizations modify
the basic model but are unlikely to change the fundamental hierarchical testing structure.11
We use this framework to explain the pros and cons of performing multiple testing in a
Bayesian framework.
The hierarchical model is as follows:
H1. pXi|µi, σ
2, γiq
iid
 Npγiµi, σ
2q,
H2. µi|τ
2 iid Np0, τ2q, γi|p0
iid
 Berp1 p0q,
H3. pτ2, σ2q  pi1pτ
2, σ2q, p0  pi2pp0q.
We explain each step in detail as well as the notation:
H1. Xi denotes the average return generated from a long-short trading strategy based
on a certain factor; µi is the unknown mean return; σ
2 is the common variance for
returns and γi is an indicator function, with γi  0 indicating a zero factor mean. γi
is the counterpart of the reject/accept decision in the usual (frequentists’) hypothesis
testing framework.
H1 therefore says that factor returns are independent conditional on mean γiµi and
common variance σ2, with γi  0 indicating that the factor is spurious. The common
variance assumption may look restrictive but we can always scale factor returns by
changing the dollar investment in the long-short strategy. The crucial assumption
10We choose to present the full Bayes approach. An alternative approach — the empirical-Bayes
approach — is closely related to the BHY method that controls the false-discovery rate (FDR).
See Storey (2003) and Efron and Tibshirani (2002) for the empirical-Bayes interpretation of FDR.
For details on the empirical-Bayes method, see Efron, Tibshirani, Storey and Tusher (2001), Efron
(2004) and Efron (2006). For an in-depth investigation of the differences between the full Bayes
and the empirical-Bayes approach, see Scott and Berger (2010).
11See Meng and Dempster (1987) and Whittemore (2007) for more works on the Bayesian ap-
proach in hypothesis testing.
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is conditional independence of average strategy returns. Certain form of conditional
independence is unavoidable for Bayesian hierarchical modeling12 — probably unre-
alistic for our application. We can easily think of scenarios where average returns
of different strategies are correlated, even when population means are known. For
example, it is well known that two of the most popular factors, the Fama and French
(1992) HML and SMB are correlated.
H2. The first step population parameters µi’s and γi’s are assumed to be generated from
two other parametric distributions: µi’s are independently generated from a normal
distribution and γi’s are simply generated from a Bernoulli distribution, i.e., γi  0
with probability p0.
The normality assumption for the µi’s requires the reported Xi’s to randomly repre-
sent either long/short or short/long strategy returns. If researchers have a tendency
to report positive abnormal returns, we need to randomly assign to these returns
plus/minus signs. The normality assumptions in both H1 and H2 are important as
they are necessary to guarantee the properness of the posterior distributions.
H3. Finally, the two variance variables τ2 and σ2 follow a joint prior distribution pi1 and
the probability p0 follows a prior distribution pi2.
Objective or “neutral” priors for pi1 and pi2 can be specified as:
pi1pτ
2, σ2q 9 pτ2   σ2q2
pi2pp0q  Uniformp0, 1q
Under this framework, the joint conditional likelihood function for Xi’s is simply a product
of individual normal likelihood functions and the posterior probability that γi  1 (dis-
covery) can be calculated by applying Bayes’ law. When the number of trials is large, to
12Conditional independence is crucial for the Bayesian framework and the construction of poste-
rior likelihoods. Although it can be extended to incorporate special dependence structures, there is
no consensus on how to systematically handle dependence. See Brown et al. (2012) for a discussion
of independence in Bayesian multiple testing. They also propose a spatial dependence structure
into a Bayesian testing framework.
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calculate the posterior probability we need efficient methods such as importance sampling,
which involves high dimensional integrals.
One benefit of a Bayesian framework for multiple testing is that the multiplicity penalty
term is already embedded. In the frequentists’ framework, this is done by introducing
FWER or FDR. In a Bayesian framework, the so-called “Ockham’s razor effect”13 auto-
matically adjusts the posterior probabilities when more factors are simultaneously tested.14
Simulation studies in Scott and Berger (2006) show how the discovery probabilities for a
few initial signals increase when more noise are added to the original sample.
However, there are several shortcomings for the Bayesian approach. Some of them
are specific to the context of our application and the others are generic to the Bayesian
multiple testing framework.
At least two issues arise when applying the Bayesian approach to our factor selection
problem. First, we do not observe all tried factors. While we back out the distribution
of hidden factors parametrically under the frequentist framework, it is not clear how the
missing data and the multiple testing problems can be simultaneously solved under the
Bayesian framework. Second, the hierarchical testing framework may be overly restric-
tive. Both independence as well as normality assumptions can have a large impact on the
posterior distributions. Although normality can be somewhat relaxed by using alternative
distributions, the scope of alternative distributions is limited as there are only a few dis-
tributions that can guarantee the properness of the posterior distributions. Independence,
as we previously discussed, is likely to be violated in our context. In contrast, the three
adjustment procedures under the frequentists’ framework are able to handle complex data
structures since they rely on only fundamental probability inequalities to restrict their
objective function — the Type I error rate.
There are a few general concerns about the Bayesian multiple testing framework. First,
13See Jefferys and Berger (1992).
14Intuitively, more complex models are penalized because extra parameters involve additional
sources of uncertainty. Simplicity is rewarded in a Bayesian framework as simple models produce
sharp predictions. See the discussions in Scott (2009).
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it is not clear what to do after obtaining the posterior probabilities for individual hypothe-
ses. Presumably, we should find a cutoff probability P and reject all hypotheses that have
a posterior discovery probability larger than P . But then we come back to the initial
problem of finding an appropriate cutoff p-value, which is not at all a clear task. Scott
and Berger (2006) suggest a decision-theoretic approach that chooses the cutoff P by mini-
mizing a loss-function. The parameters of the loss-function, however, are again subjective.
Second, the Bayesian posterior distributions are computationally challenging. We docu-
ment three hundred factors but there are potentially many more if missing factors are
taken into account. When M gets large, importance sampling is a necessity. However,
results of importance sampling rely on simulations and subjective choices of the centers
of the probability distributions for random variables. Consequently, two researchers try-
ing to calculate the same quantity might get very different results. Moreover, in multiple
testing, the curse of dimensionality generates additional risks for Bayesian statistical infer-
ence.15 These technical issues create additional hurdles for the application of the Bayesian
approach.
15See Liang and Kelemen (2008) for a discussion on the computational issues in Bayesian multiple
testing.
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B.3 Method Controlling the FDP
We apply the methods developed in Lehmann and Romano (2005) to control the realized
FDP. The objective is P pFDP ¡ γq ¤ α, where γ is the threshold FDP value and α is
the significance level. Fixing γ and α, we order the individual p-values from the smallest
to the largest (i.e., pp1q ¤ pp2q ¤    ¤ ppMq) and let the corresponding hypotheses be
Hp1q, Hp2q,    , HpMq. We then reject the i-th hypothesis if ppiq ¤ αi{CtγMu 1, where
αi 
ptγiu  1qα
M   tγiu  1 i
,
Ck 
k¸
j1
1
j
.
Here, for a real number x, txu denotes the greatest integer that is no greater than x. Similar
to cpMq in BHY’s adjustment, CtγMu 1 allow one to control the FDP under arbitrary
dependence structure of the p-values.
Table B.2 shows the benchmark t-ratios based on our sample of 315 factors for different
levels of FDP thresholds and significance . The benchmark t-ratios are higher when the
FDP thresholds are tougher (i.e., γ is lower) or when the significance levels are lower (i.e., α
is lower). For typical values of γ and α, the benchmark t-ratios are significantly lower than
conventional values, consistent with previous results based on the FWER or FDR methods.
For instance, when γ  0.10 and α  0.05, the benchmark t-ratio is 2.70 (p-value = 0.69%),
much higher than the conventional cutoff of 1.96.
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Table B.2: Benchmark t-ratios for Lehmann and Romano (2005)
Estimated benchmark t-ratios based on
Lehmann and Romano (2005). The objective
is P pFDP ¡ γq ¤ α.
γ  0.05 γ  0.10 γ  0.20
α  0.01 3.70 3.48 3.25
α  0.05 3.04 2.70 2.38
α  0.10 2.38 2.17 2.16
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